Argo v. Hemphill
| Decision Date | 08 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 21CA0897 |
| Citation | 521 P.3d 1080,2022 COA 104 |
| Parties | Angela Lea ARGO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Christina T. HEMPHILL, a/k/a Christina Tara O'Berto and Dianna K. Hemphill, a/k/a Dianna K. Hemphill-O'Byrne, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Brunette Law Office, LLC, Stephen A. Brunette, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Jessica Hoyt, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
¶ 1 Plaintiff, Angela Lea Argo, appeals the district court's judgment in favor of defendants, Christina T. Hemphill (also known as Christina Tara O'Berto), Dianna K. Hemphill (also known as Dianna K. Hemphill-O'Byrne), and Steven K. Rein, and its order awarding attorney fees and costs to the Hemphills. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 2 This case involves a property rights dispute over an agricultural property in Otero County. The property belonged to Don William Argo, who died on March 19, 2018, after a lengthy illness. Angela is Don's surviving spouse.1 The Hemphills are Don's nieces.
¶ 3 In September 2017, Don executed a last will and testament bequeathing the property to the Hemphills upon his death. That same month, Don also executed and recorded a beneficiary deed conveying the property to the Hemphills upon Don's death.
¶ 4 When Don died, title to the property passed to the Hemphills. The Hemphills attempted to sell the property to Rein. The sale was to be completed on March 20, 2019. The Hemphills contend the sale fell apart because Angela recorded a lifetime lease agreement regarding the property. When the sale did not go through, they leased the property to Rein in October 2019.
¶ 5 Angela contends that she has a leasehold interest in the property. On March 16, 2018—three days before Don's death—Angela and Don executed an agreement granting Angela a lifetime lease for the property. The agreement stated that it It further specified that "[u]pon [Angela's] death all uses of the land will be then transferred to [the Hemphills]." Neither Don nor Angela recorded the lifetime lease agreement at or shortly after the time it was created.
¶ 6 On August 25, 2018—more than five months after Don's death—Angela personally delivered the lifetime lease agreement to the Hemphills at a family gathering. It is undisputed that the Hemphills did not have notice of the lifetime lease before that date.
¶ 7 During the next few months, Angela unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the Hemphills to honor the lifetime lease. Then, on February 1, 2019, the Hemphills’ attorney sent Angela a letter stating that (1) per the beneficiary deed, title to the property vested in the Hemphills upon Don's death; (2) the lifetime lease agreement was unenforceable and Angela was forever barred from asserting an interest in the property because she didn't record her interest in the property within four months of Don's death; and (3) she had one month to remove her personal belongings from the property.
¶ 8 On March 15, 2019, Angela recorded the lifetime lease agreement in Otero County.
¶ 9 The next month, Angela filed suit against the defendants, seeking a "complete adjudication of the rights of all parties to this action with respect to the [property]" under C.R.C.P. 105. In the complaint, which contained several individual claims against the Hemphills and Rein, Angela sought a ruling that her lifetime lease agreement is enforceable against all the defendants. In response, the Hemphills filed several counterclaims against Angela, petitioned the court to declare that the lifetime lease agreement is a spurious document under C.R.C.P. 105.1 and sections 38-35-201 to - 204, C.R.S. 2021, and requested that the court quiet title to the property in them. The district court held a two-day bench trial on Angela's claims and the Hemphills’ counterclaims in April 2021. After Angela rested her case, the Hemphills and Rein separately moved for directed verdicts under C.R.C.P. 50 on the grounds that the lifetime lease agreement is unenforceable.
¶ 10 In oral findings and a subsequent written order, the district court found that the lifetime lease agreement is unenforceable, "void, invalid, and otherwise of no legal [e]ffect" under section 15-15-407, C.R.S. 2021, because the defendants did not have notice of the lifetime lease agreement until more than four months after Don's death. The court ruled that, because the agreement is unenforceable, Angela has no right, title, or interest in the property. The court dismissed Angela's remaining claims.
¶ 11 Additionally, the court implicitly found that the lifetime lease agreement is a spurious document, ruled in favor of the Hemphills on their spurious document counterclaim, quieted title to the property in the Hemphills, and ordered the defendants to file any attorney fees requests within twenty-one days of the issuance of the written order.
¶ 12 Angela subsequently filed two timely C.R.C.P. 59 motions for post-trial relief. In the first motion, Angela contended that the court made inadequate findings on the Hemphills’ spurious document counterclaim and asserted that the court incorrectly ruled that the lifetime lease agreement is a spurious document. In the second motion, Angela contended that the court improperly found that the lifetime lease agreement is unenforceable and invalid and that it improperly quieted title in the Hemphills.
¶ 13 The court denied Angela's post-trial motions in identical written orders that stated, in their entirety, as follows:
¶ 14 After the court denied Angela's C.R.C.P. 59 motions, the Hemphills filed a motion for attorney fees and costs. The Hemphills sought attorney fees under two theories. First, the Hemphills argued they were entitled to a mandatory award under the spurious document statutes, which require the court to enter a monetary judgment in favor of the prevailing party on such a claim. § 38-35-204(2), (3). Alternatively, the Hemphills argued that they were entitled to attorney fees and costs under section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2021, on the ground that Angela's claims lacked substantial justification.
¶ 15 The court, without identifying the theory underlying its ruling, granted the Hemphills’ motion and awarded $36,318.20 in fees and costs, plus interest at the statutory rate.
¶ 16 Broadly, Angela asserts that the court erred by (1) finding that the lifetime lease agreement is unenforceable and invalid; (2) finding that the lifetime lease agreement is a spurious document; and (3) awarding attorney fees and costs to the Hemphills. We first address Angela's arguments in turn. Then we address the Hemphills’ request for appellate attorney fees and costs.
¶ 17 Angela raises several interrelated challenges to the court's directed verdict, interpretation of section 15-15-407, and finding that the lifetime lease agreement is unenforceable and invalid. We address, and reject, each of her arguments.
¶ 18 " C.R.C.P. 50 authorizes a party to move for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by the opposing party." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Goddard , 2021 COA 15, ¶ 25, 484 P.3d 765. The district court should only grant a motion for a directed verdict where "the evidence compels the conclusion that reasonable [people] could not disagree and that no evidence or inference therefrom has been received at trial upon which a verdict against the moving party could be sustained." Schuessler v. Wolter , 2012 COA 86, ¶ 33, 310 P.3d 151.
¶ 19 We review the district court's ruling on a motion for directed verdict de novo. Id. "Like the district court, we must consider all the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether a reasonable [person] could have found in favor of the nonmoving party." Goddard , ¶ 26.
¶ 20 Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo. Fischbach v. Holzberlein , 215 P.3d 407, 409 (Colo. App. 2009). When interpreting a statute, our main goal is to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly's purpose and intent. Town of Vail v. Vill. Inn Plaza-Phase V Condo. Ass'n , 2021 COA 108, ¶ 11, 498 P.3d 1123. "In doing so, we consider the entire statutory scheme to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts, and we construe words and phrases in accordance with their plain and ordinary meanings." Ryser v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. , 2021 CO 11, ¶ 14, 480 P.3d 1286. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as written and do not resort to other rules of statutory construction. Id. ; Cisneros v. Elder , 2022 CO 13M, ¶ 21, 506 P.3d 828.
¶ 21 Angela contends that the district court's interpretation of section 15-15-407 is erroneous because it (1) conflicts with the plain language and legislative intent of that statute; (2) conflicts with the commonly understood and accepted meanings of the terms "actual notice" and "constructive notice"; and (3) renders the limitation of action provisions of the statutory scheme meaningless. We disagree with her first two arguments, do not resolve the third, and conclude that the lifetime lease agreement is unenforceable based on the plain language of section 15-15-407.
¶ 22 Under section 15-15-407(1), "[t]itle to the interest in real property transferred by a beneficiary deed shall vest in the designated grantee-beneficiary only on the death of the owner."
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