Aridas v. Caserta
| Decision Date | 03 May 1977 |
| Citation | 364 N.E.2d 835,41 N.Y.2d 1059,396 N.Y.S.2d 170 |
| Parties | , 364 N.E.2d 835 Nancy H. ARIDAS, Appellant, v. Charlene B. CASERTA, an infant, by her parent and guardian, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Robert F. Malerba, Huntington, for appellant.
Patrick J. Purcell and Stephen A. Fritz, Mineola, for Charlene E. Caserta, respondent.
Walter G. Evans and Alexander Orr, Jr., New York City, for Elwood Union Free School District No. 1, respondent.
John J. Stewart, Sr., John J. Stewart, Jr., Huntington Station, and Edward L. Milde, New York City, for Long Island Bus Co., Inc., respondent.
Plaintiff's appeal from so much of the order at the Appellate Division as severed the actions against defendants Charlene B. Caserta, the driver of the automobile that struck plaintiff, and Elwood Union Free School District No. 1 and granted a new trial of plaintiff's claims against them should be dismissed on the court's own motion, without costs, on the ground that that portion of the order does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution (N.Y.Const., art. VI, § 3, subd. (a); CPLR 5601, subd. (a), par. (ii)).
To the extent that the order of the Appellate Division reversed the judgment in favor of plaintiff against Long Island Bus Co., Inc., it should be affirmed, with costs to the bus company against plaintiff. The only theory advanced for the claim of negligence on the part of the bus company is predicated on the provisions of subdivision 20 of section 375 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law which require school bus drivers to keep warning lights flashing when passengers are being received or discharged. Even if it were to be assumed that this subdivision were applicable to the school bus standing in the driveway in front of the school buildings (cf. Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 300), a violation if any of this statute could not have been a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiff's injuries. Manifestly the statutory purpose in requiring flashing lights was to alert operators of approaching motor vehicles to the fact that pupils were boarding or alighting from the bus. In the circumstances of this case that fact was independently evident and any motor vehicle operator would have been chargeable with notice thereof irrespective of the absence of flashing signal lights on the bus. Additionally in this instance the driver of the automobile conceded that she had actual knowledge that the buses were loading.
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