Arismendez v. Nightingale Home Health Care, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 July 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-40593.,06-40593.
• Citation: 493 F.3d 602
• Parties: Mariluz G. ARISMENDEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NIGHTINGALE HOME HEALTH CARE, INC., doing business as AAA Medical Oxygen Supply, also known as and formerly known as Rotech Healthcare, Inc., also known as and formerly known as Professional Respiratory Home Healthcare, Inc., also known as and formerly known as ABBA Medical Equipment, Inc., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

493 F.3d 602

Mariluz G. ARISMENDEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NIGHTINGALE HOME HEALTH CARE, INC., doing business as AAA Medical Oxygen Supply, also known as and formerly known as Rotech Healthcare, Inc., also known as and formerly known as Professional Respiratory

Home Healthcare, Inc., also known as and formerly known as ABBA Medical Equipment, Inc., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 06-40593.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

July 23, 2007.

Savannah Lina Robinson (argued), Danbury, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Nancy Louise Waters (argued), James Nick Zoys, Geary, Porter & Donovan, Addison, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and BENAVIDES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:

The Plaintiff-Appellant, Mariluz Arismendez, brought suit against her employer, Nightingale Home Health Care, alleging gender discrimination pursuant to the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.001 et seq. The jury found that Arismendez's pregnancy was a motivating factor in Nightingale's decision to discharge her and rendered a verdict in favor of Arismendez. The jury also found that Nightingale (1) did not make a good faith effort to prevent gender discrimination in the workplace and (2) engaged in the above found discriminatory practice with malice or reckless indifference. The jury awarded damages for back pay and compensatory damages. It also awarded $1,000,000 in punitive damages. Arismendez moved for entry of judgment and Nightingale objected, arguing that the proposed judgment failed to apply a statutory cap on punitive damages. The district court sustained Nightingale's objection and remitted the punitive damages to $200,000. Subsequently, finding insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict, the district court granted Nightingale's motion for judgment as a matter of law. We conclude that the district court erred in finding insufficient evidence and reverse the district court's judgment. Additionally, we conclude that the district court correctly ruled that Texas statutory law does not allow punitive damages in excess of $200,000 in this case and direct the court to reinstate the jury's award of damages and remit the punitive damages to $200,000.

I. BACKGROUND

Nightingale is in the business of providing oxygen tanks and other medical equipment to homebound patients. In February of 2002, Arismendez began working as a customer service representative for Nightingale at its McAllen branch. McCune was the regional manager in charge of operations in Texas. From the time Arismendez began working in 2002 until February 2003, the McAllen branch operated without a branch manager. During that period, Arismendez often reported to Chris Cruz, the Corpus Christi branch manager.

In November 2002, Arismendez discovered she was pregnant with her third child. She then discussed maternity leave with James Goldstein, Nightingale's area manager for south Texas. Veronica Vela was hired as the McAllen branch manager in February of 2003.

Arismendez began experiencing lower abdominal pain and, on March 24, 2003, saw her physician, who prescribed bedrest and signed a release that excused her from work until her next appointment on April 7. Arismendez's husband delivered the note to Vela at the office. McCune granted Arismendez a leave of absence until April 8. During this time, Arismendez stayed at her home in McAllen. Arismendez called Vela on a daily basis for the first week of leave to assist with any questions about her work. Arismendez also asked Vela about the short-term disability policy. Pursuant to this conversation, Jesus Sanchez, Arismendez's co-worker, brought a disability form to Arismendez. Arismendez's physician completed the disability form on April 2. The doctor restricted Arismendez's physical activity until April 8, 2003. Vela instructed Arismendez's husband to send the completed form directly to the corporate headquarters, and he complied with her instructions.

On April 7, Arismendez had another doctor's appointment. Her physician ordered two additional weeks of bedrest and signed another release that excused her from work until April 21. Once again, her husband delivered the doctor's note to Vela at the office. Vela, however, claims that she did not receive this note. During this period of leave, Arismendez's husband was away from home working on a job site, and Arismendez stayed at her mother's home in Mexico to obtain help caring for her two young children. Her mother's home did not have a telephone but Arismendez called the office at least two times when Vela was out. During one of the calls, Arismendez heard Sanchez radio Vela and ask if she needed anything from Arismendez. Arismendez told Sanchez that she could not be reached by phone because she was staying with her mother in Reynosa, and Sanchez relayed that information to Vela.

On April 21, Arismendez had a doctor's appointment, during which he ordered fifteen more days of bedrest and signed another work release. Arismendez attempted to deliver the doctor's note to Vela at the office. Vela refused to accept the note and told her she had been terminated several weeks ago. The Employee Separation Report was signed by Vela as the supervisor and dated April 8. The report listed the reasons for the involuntary separation were "excessive sick leave/ job abandonment." Vela also told Arismendez that although Vela knew it was illegal to fire her because she was pregnant, Vela had a "business to run" and "could not take having a pregnant woman in the office."

On May 6, 2004, Arismendez brought a pregnancy discrimination and wrongful termination suit against Nightingale in Texas state court. Nightingale removed it to federal district court. The jury found in favor of Arismendez, awarding $26,150 in back pay damages, $10,000 in compensatory damages, and $1,000,000 in punitive damages. Nightingale objected to the entry of judgment on the plaintiff's motion, asserting a Texas statutory cap on punitive damages. The district court reduced the punitive damage award to $200,000 pursuant to the statutory cap. Nightingale subsequently renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law, and the district court granted the motion, entering judgment in favor of Nightingale. Arismendez now appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Sobley v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 210 F.3d 561, 563 (5th Cir.2000). Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). This Court "must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Additionally, this Court should disregard evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 577 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir.2000)). We must give "credence to evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached if that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses." Id. (citing Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir.2001)). There must be more than a mere scintilla of evidence in the record to prevent judgment as a matter of law in favor of the movant. Id.

B. Discrimination

Arismendez brought suit pursuant to the TCHRA, which prohibits an employer from, among other things, discharging an employee because of her gender. Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.051. Section 21.051(1) provides that "[a]n employer commits an unlawful employment practice if because of . . . sex . . . the employer . . . discharges an individual, or discriminates in any other manner against an individual in connection with . . . privileges of employment." The TCHRA further explains that sex discrimination includes discrimination "because of or on the basis of pregnancy." § 21.106(a).

A stated purpose of the TCHRA is to "provide for the execution of the policies of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Tex. Lab.Code § 21.001(1); see also Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tex.2001). Accordingly, "`analogous federal statutes and the cases interpreting them guide' the reading of the statute." Pineda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 360 F.3d 483, 487 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting Quantum, 47 S.W.3d at 476). However, the TCHRA and Title VII differ in their required proof of the employer's motivation for the unlawful employment practice. Under the Texas statute, to establish an unlawful employment practice, Arismendez need only prove that discrimination was "a motivating factor" in the employer's decision, Quantum, 47 S.W.3d at 480, rather than a "but for" cause as Title VII requires.¹ Pineda, 360 F.3d at 487. However, if an employer demonstrates that it "would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor," then a court may grant declaratory or injunctive relief but may not award damages. § 21.125(b).

Here, the jury specifically found that Arismendez's pregnancy was a motivating factor in the employer's decision to discharge her. Arismendez argues that the district court erred in finding insufficient evidence to support the verdict. She had the burden of persuading the jury either by direct evidence of discrimination or by an indirect method of proof, which is the pretext method set forth in McDonnell Douglas.² Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 309 (5th Cir.2004).

Nightingale responds that Arismendez failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she did not present evidence...