Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. State

• Decision Date: 01 February 2017
• Docket Number: No. CR–16–421,CR–16–421
• Citation: 512 S.W.3d 655
• Parties: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee
• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals

512 S.W.3d 655

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Appellant

v.STATE of Arkansas, Appellee

No. CR–16–421

Court of Appeals of Arkansas, DIVISION III.

Opinion Delivered: February 1, 2017

Nader G. Afsordeh, Office of Chief Counsel, Little Rock, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Adam Jackson, Ass't Att'y Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge

The Arkansas Department of Human Services (ADHS) appeals the March 3, 2016 order denying its motion for reconsideration and the March 7, 2016 orders of commitment filed by the Jefferson County Circuit Court in three juvenile-delinquency cases, J.O., P.L., and J.W. ADHS does not appeal the actual determination of delinquency in these matters but appeals the limitations and requirements placed on ADHS by the orders issued by the trial court. Specifically, ADHS argues that this court should (1) reverse the denial of the motions to intervene filed by ADHS, Division of Youth Services (DYS); (2) find that the limitations placed on ADHS as it relates to its ability to place juveniles in a juvenile detention center infringes on its statutory authority; and (3) find that the trial court incorrectly interpreted Arkansas Code Annotated section 9–28–209(a)(1) (Repl. 2015) to mean that ADHS must deliver juveniles to the observation-and-assessment center immediately upon commitment. We affirm the denial of ADHS's motions to intervene in the cases of J.O. and P.L., and we dismiss the remainder of ADHS's appeal.

Facts

On February 9, 2016, J.O. was adjudicated a delinquent juvenile and committed to DYS. On February 11, 2016, P.L. was adjudicated delinquent and also committed to DYS. The trial court recommended that these juveniles be placed in a youth-services center. Both orders of commitment contained language that limited ADHS's ability to move the juveniles within its system of juvenile-service facilities, specifically stating that "DYS shall not permit the juvenile to remain at the Juvenile Detention Center for more than (30) days after the date of the original commitment order without specific written approval from this court."

ADHS was not a party to either of these delinquency proceedings, but on February 17, 2016, ADHS filed motions to intervene and vacate the orders in both J.O.'s and P.L.'s cases. A hearing was held on these motions on February 18, 2016. At that hearing, the trial court denied ADHS's motion to intervene, finding that after a juvenile has been committed to DYS, ADHS assumes the role of the prosecution. No statutory basis for this finding was given during the hearing, but in the orders in both cases filed on February 19, 2016, the trial court found as follows:

1. That the Motion to Intervene is DENIED as:

a. Rule 24(a)(2) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable in the current case, and b. That DYS assumes the jurisdiction formerly held by the prosecuting authority upon commitment to DYS and, therefore, intervention is not necessary in this matter.

2. That the Motion to Vacate paragraph # 13 of the February [9th and 11th Orders] which state "DYS shall not permit the juvenile to remain at the Juvenile Detention Center [sic] for more than (30) days after the date of the original commitment order without specific written approval from this court " is DENIED as:

a. That this stipulation is in the best interest of the juvenile, pursuant to A.C.A. § 9–27–102 and A.C.A. 27–302, as it hastens the services they are to receive during their DYS commitment,

b. That the stipulation is a reasonable request and a reasonable time frame,

c. That the stipulation of a time frame for removal from a Juvenile Detention Center is a common practice of courts throughout the State, and

d. That the Court DENIES the oral request by DYS to stipulate that "Juvenile Detention Center" refers only to the Jefferson County Juvenile Detention Center as it is the Court's intent that the juvenile obtain services as quickly as possible upon commitment.

e. That the Division of Youth Services cited A.C.A. § 9–28–207(a) and states that the provision requiring removal of the juvenile within 30 days from a juvenile detention center infringed upon DYS statutory authority. The court finds this statute inapplicable in that, pursuant to A.C.A. § 9–27–303(63), a juvenile detention center is not a youth services facility operated by the state or its designee. The Court encourages the Division of Youth Services to develop a fair procedure for the transfer of juveniles committed to the Division by using the date of commitment.

(Emphasis added.)

Despite denying ADHS's motions to intervene, the trial court then heard ADHS's argument on its motions to vacate under the incorrect presumption that ADHS took the place of the prosecution at the time the juveniles were committed to DYS. ADHS argued that the above-referenced provision found in the two commitment orders violated ADHS's statutory authority pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9–28–207, but the trial court rejected that argument and denied the motions to vacate.

Appellant filed motions for reconsideration in both cases. A hearing was held on those two motions on March 3, 2016. No testimony was taken during this hearing, but ADHS argued that (1) ADHS did not assume the role of the prosecution upon a juvenile's commitment to ADHS; and (2) the thirty-day provision in the orders violates ADHS's statutory authority pursuant to section 9–28–209(d), which states that ADHS has "the authority to move a youth at any time within its system of youth services centers or facilities and community-based programs or within the department's programs or facilities."

The trial court rejected ADHS's arguments and further found that section 9–28–209(a) requires a youth to be immediately delivered to the observation-and-assessment center. ADHS objected to this interpretation because the term "immediately" is not found in the statute. ADHS also argued that the trial court's interpretation of section 9–28–209(a) violated due process because ADHS would not have notice of the commitments and that the trial court's interpretation conflicted with section 9–28–209(d), which allows for ADHS to move a juvenile "at any time" to one of ADHS's "programs or facilities." ADHS argued that, according to the statute, when a juvenile is committed he or she must be delivered to the assessment center for assessment and that the legislature recognized the constraints of ADHS and therefore gave ADHS the authority to move those juveniles to the assessment center when it is appropriate to move them, not at the command of the trial court. The trial court rejected all of these arguments and ordered that ADHS was to immediately deliver juveniles to the observation-and-assessment center, without notice, and without regard to space availability and be subject to contempt for a failure to comply pursuant to the order filed on March 3, 2016.

In addition, the trial court found J.W. to be delinquent on February 22, 2016, and the March 7, 2016 order of commitment required ADHS to immediately deliver J.W. to the observation-and-assessment center. ADHS filed a notice of appeal from the March 7, 2016 order of commitment in J.W.'s case on March 8, 2016.¹ Also on March 8, 2016, ADHS filed notices of appeal from the February 19, 2016 orders denying ADHS's motion to intervene and to vacate and the March 3, 2016 orders denying ADHS's motions for reconsideration in both J.O.'s and P.L.'s cases.

On June 14, 2016, ADHS filed a motion to consolidate the appeals and for permission to file a single brief with this court. That motion was granted on July 20, 2016, and the trial court consolidated the three appeal records into CR–16–421.

I. Denial of ADHS's Motions to Intervene in J.O.'s and P.L.'s Cases

When the denial of a motion to intervene as a matter of right is based on a failure by an appellant to meet the requirements of the rule, our review is de novo. McCord v. Foster , 2016 Ark. App. 500, 505 S.W.3d 742, 2016 WL 6247090. De novo review means that the entire case is open for review. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Bass , 2015 Ark. 178, 461 S.W.3d 317.

Rule 24 (2016) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure allows for two types of intervention, (1) permissive and (2) as of right. An intervenor is entitled to intervention as a right when the applicant: "claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties." Ark. R. Civ. P. 24(a). Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2), three requirements must be met for intervention as of right: (1) the party must claim a recognized interest in the property or transaction that is the subject of the litigation; (2) the party's interest must be such that it might be impaired by disposition of the action; and (3) the party's interest is not adequately represented by existing parties.

ADHS first argues that this court should reverse the trial court's ruling that it does not have a right to intervene in juvenile-delinquency matters. In its order denying ADHS's motion to intervene and to vacate, the trial court ruled that intervention was not necessary because ADHS assumes the role of the prosecution once a juvenile has been committed to ADHS. ADHS claims that this ruling is not supported by statutory or caselaw and therefore represents an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

In this case, ADHS was not a party to the original delinquency matters related to J.O. and P.L., but as the result of those delinquency matters, orders of commitment were entered whereby the juveniles were committed to ADHS. Accordingly, ADHS maintains that the hearing involved a "transaction which is the subject of the action," and that ADHS is "situated [so] that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or...