Arkansas Motor Coaches, Ltd. v. Williams

• Decision Date: 25 April 1938
• Docket Number: 4-5048
• Citation: 116 S.W.2d 585,196 Ark. 48
• Parties: ARKANSAS MOTOR COACHES, LTD. v. WILLIAMS
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

116 S.W.2d 585

196 Ark. 48

ARKANSAS MOTOR COACHES, LTD. v. WILLIAMS

4-5048

Supreme Court of Arkansas

April 25, 1938

Appeal from Clark Circuit Court; Dexter Bush, Judge; affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

J. W Wrape, Miles & Amsler and Huie & Huie, for appellants.

Boyd Tackett and J. H. Lookadoo, for appellee.

OPINION

MEHAFFY, J.

This action was begun in the Clark circuit court by appellee against the appellants, Arkansas Motor Coaches, Ltd., and P R. Todd to recover damages for injuries caused by a collision between appellee's automobile and a bus belonging to Arkansas Motor Coaches, Ltd., near Hot Springs, Arkansas, on July 17, 1937. Appellee alleged in his complaint that he was 22 years of age and was driving a Plymouth sedan towards Hot Springs in a careful and prudent manner, lights burning, and he was on the right side of the highway and his car was under control; that he met one of appellant's buses coming south driven by P. R. Todd, one of the appellants; that the bus came around a curve at a reckless rate of speed and came over on appellee's side of the highway, ran into appellee's car, knocking it over; that appellee's left arm was crushed and mangled and had to be amputated just above the elbow; that he received other injuries causing concussion of the brain, upsetting his entire nervous system; appellee still expectorates blood, his spine and back were injured, the muscles and tendons being torn loose; that he has spent considerable sums for doctors' bills, is permanently injured, and prays for judgment in the sum of $ 50,000.

The appellant, Arkansas Motor Coaches, Ltd., filed separate answer denying all the material allegations in the complaint; denied that the bus was on the wrong side of the highway, and denied the injuries and damages alleged by appellee. It stated that the collision was due to appellee's negligence in driving his car without lights on the wrong side of the highway, and pleaded contributory negligence. By way of cross-complaint appellant alleged that its bus was damaged by reason of the negligence of appellee in driving on the wrong side of the highway without lights at a reckless rate of speed and asked for damages in the sum of $ 500.

P. R. Todd, appellant, filed separate answer denying all the material allegations of the complaint and pleading contributory negligence.

Appellee filed answer to the cross-complaint denying all the material allegations in said cross-complaint.

The evidence introduced in behalf of appellee was to the effect that on July 17, 1937, appellee was driving on highway No. 7 going to Hot Springs; that he was driving a Plymouth sedan; that appellee had gone to Hot Springs to see a lady friend; she was not there and he then went to the Queen Mary boat between Arkadelphia and Hot Springs and talked to Miss Marie Crittendon and asked her about the lady he had gone to Hot Springs to see; that when the collision occurred appellee was going north towards Hot Springs on the right-hand side driving about 30 or 35 miles an hour; that he noticed an approaching car and the bus coming around the car; he turned his car to the right and at the time could feel the bumping and knew he was off of the pavement, and that is the last he knew; he was unconscious; that at the time of the collision the bus was two-thirds on appellee's side of the road and the bus was traveling between 65 and 70 miles an hour; the first thing that appellee remembered after the collision he was in an automobile, and the next thing Dr. Tribble was trying to get him to consent to amputate his left arm; his left arm was amputated about three inches above the elbow; eleven stitches were taken in his face, and his back and chest injured and the side of his head; he occasionally spits up blood, but did not do this before the accident; his spine troubles him all the time; his right wrist was sprained and is not completely well; has not had a restful moment since the accident and has to take sedatives and aspirin; never was drunk before the injury; was in the hospital sixteen days; his left arm is the one that is off; was left-handed; wrote with his left hand; worked for the Ford Motor Company in Chicago and made $ 55 a week; he had finished high school; medicine and hospital bills were $ 291.

Appellee's evidence was corroborated by Dr. James H. Wells, Mrs. Cordia Reed, a registered nurse, and Miss Clytie McMillian, another registered nurse, and several other witnesses. Dr. Wells and the nurses and several other witnesses who were with appellee immediately after the accident testified that he was not drinking and they could not smell whiskey on his breath.

The evidence introduced on behalf of appellants tended to show that the collision was caused by appellee's negligence; that he was driving rapidly and without lights, although the witnesses for appellant contradicted each other about the lights.

The case was tried by a jury and the jury returned a verdict for $ 20,000. This appeal is prosecuted to reverse said judgment.

Appellants' first contention is that the court erred in refusing to give its instruction No. 1. This instruction directed the jury to return a verdict for appellants. It was based on the theory that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. The evidence, as we have already said, is in conflict, but the clear, positive statements of appellee and his witnesses are to the effect that it was wholly the fault of appellants that caused the collision; that appellee was on the right side of the road, and in fact, turned his car so far to the right that he got on the shoulder, and that the bus came over on appellee's side of the road at a reckless rate of speed and struck appellee's car. The testimony introduced by appellants is in conflict with this.

We recently held: "We there said that we would not reverse a judgment because the verdict upon which it was based was so clearly against the weight of the evidence as to shock the sense of justice of a reasonable person, and that we could reverse a judgment for lack of testimony only in cases where there was no substantial evidence to support it. We may, therefore, determine only whether there is any testimony of a substantial character to support the verdict, and we must in passing upon that question, in conformity with settled rule of practice, give to the testimony tending to support the verdict its highest probative value along with all inferences reasonably deducible from the testimony." Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hill, 192 Ark. 154, 90 S.W.2d 210; Chalfant v. Haralson, 176 Ark. 375, 3 S.W.2d 38.

Again this court recently said: "The jury's verdict is conclusive here on questions of fact, even though we might believe that the preponderance of the evidence was the other way. This court does not pass on the credibility of witnesses nor the weight to be given to their testimony." C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Britt, 189 Ark. 571, 74 S.W.2d 398.

This court has held in a long line of cases that if there is any substantial evidence to support the finding of a jury, its verdict will not be disturbed by this court on account of the insufficiency of the evidence.

The Supreme Court cannot substitute its judgment for a jury's finding supported by competent evidence. B. & O. Rd. Co. v. McGill Bros. Rice Mill, 185 Ark. 108, 46 S.W.2d 651; Richards v. McCall, 187 Ark. 61, 58 S.W.2d 432; Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Holt, 186 Ark. 672, 55 S.W.2d 788; S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Balesh, 189 Ark. 1085, 76 S.W.2d 291; M. P. Rd. Co. v. Sellers, 188 Ark. 218, 65 S.W.2d 14; Sparkman Hdw. Lbr. Co. v. Bush, 189 Ark. 391, 72 S.W.2d 527; Dixie Bauxite Co. v. Webb, 187 Ark. 1024, 63 S.W.2d 634.

Many other cases might be cited in support of the rule, and this court must accept as final the jury's conclusion as to the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony, and if appellee's evidence is substantial, then the fact that it is contradicted by appellants' witnesses, or the fact that we might think it was against the preponderance of the evidence, does not justify us in setting aside the verdict.

It is next contended that the court erred in refusing to declare a mistrial because of the remarks of appellee's...