Arkay, LLC v. City of Charleston

• Decision Date: 29 June 2016
• Docket Number: Opinion No. 5419,Appellate Case No. 2014–001466
• Citation: 791 S.E.2d 305,418 S.C. 86
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Arkay, LLC and Robert R. Knoth, Respondents, v. City of Charleston, City of Charleston Board of Zoning Appeals, Andrew Pinckney Inn, and Michael A. Molony, Appellants.

418 S.C. 86

791 S.E.2d 305

Arkay, LLC and Robert R. Knoth, Respondents,

v.City of Charleston, City of Charleston Board of Zoning Appeals, Andrew Pinckney Inn, and Michael A. Molony, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2014–001466

Opinion No. 5419

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard January 13, 2016

Filed June 29, 2016

Rehearing Denied October 27, 2016

Charlton de Saussure, Jr., of Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, P.A., and Frances Isaac Cantwell, both of Charleston, for Appellants City of Charleston and City of Charleston Board of Zoning Appeals; Wilbur E. Johnson, of Young Clement Rivers, LLP, of Charleston, for Appellant Andrew Pinckney Inn; and Thomas S. Tisdale, Jr., of Hellman Yates & Tisdale, P.A., of Charleston, for Appellant Michael A. Molony.

Capers G. Barr, III, of Barr, Unger & McIntosh, LLC, of Charleston, for Respondents.

WILLIAMS

, J.:

In this zoning case, the City of Charleston (the City), the City of Charleston Board of Zoning Appeals (the Board), the Andrew Pinckney Inn, and Michael A. Molony (collectively “Appellants”) appeal the circuit court's reversal of the Board's denial of Arkay, LLC's (Arkay) application for a special use exception to operate a carriage horse stable. Appellants contend the court erred in (1) finding the special use exception ordinance described a stable as a “use” rather than a physical structure, (2) relying upon the law of horizontal property regime (HPR) as a means of satisfying the separation requirement, and (3) failing to reconcile and construe the zoning and tourism ordinances in a consistent manner. We reverse.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Robert R. Knoth owns and operates Carolina Polo & Carriage Company (Carolina Polo), one of five franchised horse carriage tour businesses in Charleston, South Carolina. From 1990 to 1996, Carolina Polo's stable was located at 45 Pinckney Street in the historic City Market District. After losing its lease, Carolina Polo relocated to a building on the other side of the same block at 16 Hayne Street. From 1996 to 2009, another horse carriage company ran its business out of the 45 Pinckney Street location. In 2013, Carolina Polo lost its lease at 16 Hayne Street, but Knoth was able to purchase the prior location at 45 Pinckney Street. Knoth placed the property title in the name of Arkay, of which he is the sole member.

In the mid–1990s, the Charleston City Council (the Council) enacted legislation under its zoning code to regulate the horse carriage tour business in the city. Pursuant to section 54–206(p) of the City of Charleston Code of Ordinances (2015), horse stables are permitted in general business and urban commercial zoning districts if they are granted a special use exception by the Board. The Board must grant a special use exception if it finds an applicant has met seven criteria, including when a stable is not located within 100 feet of a residentially zoned district. From the adoption of this legislation until 2009, 45 Pinckney Street—located within 100 feet of a residential district—operated as a nonconforming use under the City's zoning ordinances.

At the time of Arkay's purchase, the 45 Pinckney Street building no longer qualified as a nonconforming use because it was not used as a horse stable for more than three years between 2009 and 2013. Accordingly, in March 2013, Arkay applied for a special use exception to operate a stable at 45 Pinckney Street—a property zoned for general business—to house Carolina Polo's carriage horses. The Preservation Society of Charleston, the Historic Ansonborough Neighborhood Association, and several neighbors opposed the application. At the evidentiary hearing, Arkay conceded the frontage of the building at 45 Pinckney Street was within 93.5 feet of the closest residential district to the north. Arkay argued, however, that the separation requirement only applied to the use of stabling, not the physical structure.

To separate the “stabling activity” from the residential district, Arkay proposed an HPR to divide the building at 45 Pinckney Street into two units. In the southern rear portion of the building, Unit A would consist of six stalls in which the horses would be fed, groomed, and stored. In the northern front portion of the building, Unit B would contain two offices and be subject to an appurtenant easement for the benefit of Unit A for ingress and egress to Pinckney Street. Unit B would also be subject to a recorded covenant prohibiting the use of that space as a stable. Additionally, Units A and B would be separated in the middle of the building by a common area consisting of two tack rooms, two restrooms, an area for customer waiting, and an area for customer loading and unloading. Because its horse stalls would be located 119 feet from the nearest residential zone, Arkay contended the stabling activity complied with the zoning ordinance's separation requirement. Alternatively, Arkay applied for a de minimisvariance of 6.5%, arguing only half of the frontage of the building failed to meet the 100–foot requirement by 6.5 feet.

After hearing from Arkay, the zoning administrator, and other interested parties, the Board denied the application on June 4, 2013, finding the stable did not meet the 100–foot separation requirement. In reaching its decision, the Board rejected Arkay's argument that the ordinance described “stable” as a use and not a physical structure. The Board noted only one building occupies 45 Pinckney Street and the proposed HPR did not alter that circumstance. The east, west, and south sides of the building share common walls with neighbors, and the front of the building is flush with the sidewalk. While Arkay would store the horses in Unit A, the Board found the building contained only one access to a public street and the horses would have to pass through Unit B to reach Pinckney Street. Because Unit B and the proposed appurtenant easement were areas within 100 feet of a residentially zoned district, the Board held 45 Pinckney Street did not qualify as a site for a stable under the zoning ordinance. The Board also denied Arkay's application for a variance in a separate order on June 4, 2013.

Arkay subsequently appealed the Board's orders to the circuit court. The court issued an order on May 30, 2014,¹ and Appellants filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCP

, motion to alter or amend judgment. In response, the court issued a corrected order dated June 19, 2014, reversing the Board's order denying Arkay's application for a special use exception. Through a plain reading analysis of section 54–206, the court held the zoning ordinance's separation requirement applied only to the use of stabling, not the physical structure. The court first noted section 54–206 is titled “[s]pecial exception uses ” and regulates nineteen different uses of property that can qualify for special zoning exceptions. Accordingly, the court found that, with few exceptions, the special uses set forth in section 54–206 describe specific forms of activity.

Additionally, the court stated the requirements for a stable in section 54–206(p) focus on the use of the property as a horse carriage tour business, not the physical building. Noting section 54–206(p)(2) requires that “[t]he City of Charleston Tourism Commission has issued a Certificate of Appropriateness for the stable,” the court reasoned the certificate described in the City's tourism chapter is not issued for a stable, but rather for a horse carriage vehicle. Thus, the court found the certificate is an aspect of the “use” of the property in general. Similarly, the court found section 54–206(p)(4) prohibits the cleaning, loading, and tacking areas from impeding traffic flow in a public right of way and, therefore, is another regulation on the use of the property.

Most noteworthy, the court found section 54–206(p)(7) requires that “[b ]uildings s [be] designed utilizing appropriate ventilation to prevent objectionable odors from being emitted.” In contrast, the court noted section 54–206(p)(1) only prohibits the “stable” from being located within 100 feet of any residentially zoned district, not the “buildings.” Thus, the court found the Council only intended that the stabling activity and potentially obnoxious characteristics of housing horses be subject to the separation requirement.

The court also noted the city tourism chapter defines stable as “the barn where the animals are kept.” In the urban context of downtown Charleston, the court reasoned the word kept means “preserved or maintained,” which would be accomplished by Arkay's proposed HPR. Lastly, the court held the Board erred in measuring the distance of separation from the nearest residential district to the easement, instead of measuring it to the “use” as a stable. The court explained “the horses will no more be ‘kept’ on the access easement [than] they would be ‘kept’ on the streets of Charleston through which they come and go every day, and from which they enter 45 Pinckney Street.” Because its reversal on the special use exception was dispositive, the court found it unnecessary to address the Board's order denying Arkay's application for a variance. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The appellate court gives “great deference to the decisions of those charged with interpreting and applying local zoning ordinances.” Gurganious v. City of Beaufort , 317 S.C. 481, 487, 454 S.E.2d 912, 916 (Ct. App. 1995)

. This court will not reverse a zoning board's decision unless the board's findings of fact have no evidentiary support or the board commits an error of law. Charleston Cty. Parks & Recreation Comm'n v. Somers , 319 S.C. 65, 67, 459 S.E.2d 841, 843 (1995)

. “[I]ssues involving the construction of an ordinance are reviewed as a matter of law under a broader standard of review than is applied in reviewing issues of fact.” Mikell v. Cty. of Charleston , 386 S.C. 153, 158, 687 S.E.2d 326, 329 (2009). “The determination of legislative intent is a matter of law.” Somers , 319 S.C. at 67, 459 S.E.2d at 843.

LAW/ANALYSIS

A...