Armbrister v. Roland Intern. Corp.
Decision Date | 14 August 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 84-1115-CIV-T-17.,84-1115-CIV-T-17. |
Citation | 667 F. Supp. 802 |
Parties | Herman H. ARMBRISTER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ROLAND INTERNATIONAL CORP., et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
John A. Bussian, Miami, Fla., Richard F. McMenamin, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs.
Sylvia H. Walbolt, Alan C. Sundberg, Tampa, Fla., for defendants.
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This cause is before the Court on motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants, and on Plaintiffs' responses thereto. The motions and responses are accompanied by numerous exhibits, affidavits, and depositions, which have been made a part of this record. Hearing was held before this Court on all summary judgment issues on July 19, 1987.
Two years ago, Defendants moved for partial summary judgment. On June 18, 1985, this Court determined that all material facts had not been established, and denied the motion, "subject to renewal when deemed appropriate." By subsequent order of the Court, discovery was limited to the statute of limitations issues. Discovery on those issues is now concluded. Because there are fifteen named Plaintiffs, there are fifteen separate motions for summary judgment. However, the basic underlying issues are the same as to each element of the complaint.
This circuit clearly holds that summary judgment should only be entered when the moving party has sustained its burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact when all the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sweat v. The Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d 655 (11th Cir.1983). All doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Hayden v. First National Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 595 F.2d 994, 996-97, (5th Cir.1979), quoting Gross v. Southern Railroad Co., 414 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.1969). Factual disputes preclude summary judgment.
The Court also said, "Rule 56(e) therefore requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at p. ___, 106 S.Ct. at p. 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d at p. 274. After careful evaluation of all of the motions, responses, and exhibits, this Court finds that there are no genuine issues of fact left for determination by a jury, and that summary judgment as to all but Count X of the complaint should be granted based on application of the relevant statutes of limitation.
This action was filed August 16, 1984. In question are interstate land sales of parcels in three properties in Florida: Flagler Estates, Orlando Pines, and Imperial Acres. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged in a scheme to defraud them by misrepresenting the nature and value of the land that they were buying. Plaintiffs were approached and sold their land by sales representatives of Defendants, usually through the use of direct mail advertising and telephone solicitation. Most Plaintiffs never actually saw the property that they bought. Most of the land sales occurred in the early or mid-1970's, although Plaintiffs continued making payments on the land long after the initial contract date. (Defendants' Ex. A).
Defendant Roland International Corporation is a Delaware corporation licensed in the State of Florida. Defendants Florida Leisure and Florida General are Florida corporations. Defendants Joel Friedland, Gerald Robins, and Howard R. Scharlin are individuals who were and are officers and directors of the corporate Defendants at all times relevant to this action.
Defendants are not, and never were, in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiffs. Defendants were the sellers of the properties in question, and Plaintiffs the buyers. Consequently, the transactions involved were clearly arms length transactions, and being such, the buyers had a duty to protect their own interests. Sellers did not have special knowledge of the property peculiar only to sellers. A mimimal inquiry by the buyers would have disclosed all facts relevant to the land in question. The law is designed to protect the interests of all citizens. However, the Court cannot insulate individuals from their own stupidity.
Flagler Estates consists of acreage in St. Johns County, Florida. The sales contracts for this property, as with all properties involved, were accompanied by a Florida Public Offering Statement, which purchasers were required to read and sign. . A signed receipt, acknowledging that buyer had read the statement, was required to be returned to the seller with the contract. Most sales of property in Flagler Estates took place in 1971 and 1972.
The Public Offering Statement which accompanied sales of Flagler Estates disclosed the following:
All Plaintiffs who purchased land in Flagler Estates signed and returned the receipt portion of the Florida Public Offering Statement, which contained the above caveats.
On the back of the sales contract itself appears the following. "This purchase agreement and attached legal description, constitute the entire agreement and the Purchaser acknowledges that no additional representations have been made."
The contract also included a guarantee that purchaser or his agent could inspect the property within six months of purchase and obtain a refund if not satisfied.
Orlando Pines consists of unimproved acreage in Polk County, Florida. Sales in this area were made in 1970—1975. The Public Offering Statement which accompanied all sales of land in this parcel contained the following warnings, which appeared in a paragraph on the very front page, in large red capital letters. (Plaintiffs' Ex. B).
This property is not useful for building purposes. It is unimproved property, unsurveyed and without roads, drainage, or other improvements. Seller is not obligated to provide any improvements. 35% is marsh or swampy. It is located in an area known as Green Swamp and is subject to flooding. The County ... has not promised or agreed and does not intend to provide streets, drainage, water, utilities or any other improvements to this land.
The Statement went on to disclose the following:
On the last page, in large black capital letters, appeared the following notice to purchasers.
The purchaser should ascertain for himself that the property offered meets his personal requirements and expectations. Misunderstandings as to the desirability of the property may arise when the purchaser fails to understand the nature of the property offered or the terms of the contract.
The large red paragraph already quoted appears twice in the Statement; once on the front page, and once directly above the receipt attesting that the buyer had read the Statement, which buyer was required to send back to seller with the sales contract.
In bold, black letters on the last page, appear the following. BE SURE AND READ YOUR CONTRACT BEFORE YOU SIGN and also the sentence DO NOT SIGN UNLESS YOU HAVE READ THE OFFERING STATEMENT.
All Plaintiffs who purchased land in Orlando Pines signed and returned the receipt indicating they had read the Florida Public Offering Statement, which contained the above caveats.
Upon the face of the sales contract itself appears the following, in large bold black letters.
This property is unimproved unsurveyed acreage without physical access to each individual tract; without drainage or other improvements. 35% is marsh or swampy and is subject to flooding.
On the back of the contract appears the following. "This purchase agreement and attached rider(s) if any, constitute the entire agreement and the Purchaser acknowledges that no additional representations have been made."
Imperial Acres consists of acreage in Polk County, Florida. Sales in this area were made to all but one Plaintiff in 1977. (Plaintiff Gagnier made a purchase in 1973). The Public Offering Statement for Imperial Acres contained the following, in large red capital letters on the front page. (Plaintiffs' Ex. C).
... The property described herein is not...
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