Armenia v. Dugger, 88-3416

• Decision Date: 16 March 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-3416,88-3416
• Citation: 867 F.2d 1370
• Parties: Frank ARMENIA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Richard L. DUGGER, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1370

867 F.2d 1370

Frank ARMENIA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Richard L. DUGGER, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 88-3416.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

March 16, 1989.

Michael L. O'Neill, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Daytona Beach, Fla., for petitioner-appellant.

Margene A. Roper, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, Fla., for respondent-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before RONEY, Chief Judge, HATCHETT, Circuit Judge, and HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judge.

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we determine that a Florida statute which imposes felony punishment on a strict liability basis does not violate the due process clauses of the Constitution of the United States. We affirm.

FACTS

On December 2, 1983, a runaway automobile passed across the right-of-way in which Frank Armenia operated his automobile. Although a collision occurred, the state of Florida's accident reconstruction experts established that Armenia could not have avoided the collision. Jennings Cole Overstreet, a passenger in the runaway automobile, died from injuries sustained in the accident. Armenia's blood sample, taken immediately following the accident, revealed a blood alcohol level of .21; under Florida law, Armenia was legally intoxicated.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The state of Florida charged Armenia with causing the death of Overstreet by operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages. Fla.Stat. 316.1931(2) (driving while intoxicated manslaughter) [hereinafter the DWI-manslaughter statute]. ¹ The trial judge in the Circuit Court of Osceola County, Florida, at the conclusion of the case, instructed the jury on manslaughter using the standard jury instructions:

Before you can find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, the State must prove Over Armenia's objection, the trial court also gave the following instructions requested by the state:

the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that Jennings Cole Overstreet is dead; second, the death was caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by the defendant; and third, that the defendant was intoxicated at the time that he operated the motor vehicle.

The term 'caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by any person while intoxicated' is defined as the equivalent of stating that death resulted from the misconduct which had its inception at the time said person took control of the car and continued to operate it while not in possession of his faculties.

Proof of negligence in the operation of an automobile is not necessary to establish the offense of manslaughter by operation of an automobile while intoxicated.

The jury returned a verdict finding Armenia guilty of manslaughter, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years imprisonment. Armenia appealed. In Armenia v. State, 479 So.2d 260 (Fla. 5th D.C.A.1985), the court affirmed Armenia's conviction, but certified to the Florida Supreme Court the following question as one of great public importance:

IS IT NECESSARY TO PROVE THAT THERE WAS A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MANNER OF OPERATION OF DEFENDANT'S MOTOR VEHICLE OR HIS INABILITY TO AVOID THE ACCIDENT BECAUSE OF HIS INTOXICATION AND THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM TO CONVICT FOR A VIOLATION OF SECTION 316.1931, FLORIDA STATUTES (1983)?

The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative and approved the state appellate court's decision. Armenia v. State, 497 So.2d 638 (Fla.1986). Citing Baker v. State, 377 So.2d 17 (Fla.1979), the Florida Supreme Court held that it was not necessary to prove a causal relationship between the manner of operation of the motor vehicle or Armenia's ability to avoid the accident in order to convict him of manslaughter. According to the Florida Supreme Court, the Florida DWI-manslaughter statute does not require a specific causal connection between a defendant's intoxicated driving and the victim's death as an element of the crime of homicide by intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle. The Florida Supreme Court read the causation element of the DWI-manslaughter statute as requiring only that the state prove the victim's death resulted from the operation of a vehicle while the driver was intoxicated.

Having exhausted state remedies, Armenia filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. In the habeas corpus petition, Armenia challenged his conviction arguing that Florida's DWI-manslaughter statute is unconstitutional because it imposes felony punishment on a strict liability basis.

In analyzing Armenia's habeas corpus petition, the district court found the opinions expressed in Caibaiosai v. Barrington, 643 F.Supp. 1007 (W.D.Wis.1986) persuasive. In upholding the constitutionality of Wisconsin's drunk-driving manslaughter statute, the Caibaiosai court stated: ²

The issue raised by petitioner's challenge to Sec. 940.09 [Wisconsin's drunk-driving manslaughter statute] is not whether the legislature made a wise choice in defining the offense, but whether the statute offends a fundamental principle of justice.... It is significant that plaintiff can point to no case in which a court has invalidated a felony-murder conviction on constitutional grounds, although most felony-murder statutes require no proof of specific culpability with respect to the murder. Generally, the state is required to prove only the culpability specified for In this case, I am convinced that it is not fundamentally unfair to impose felony liability based upon proof that the defendant's operation of a motor vehicle caused the death of another and that the defendant operated the vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. Accordingly, I conclude that Sec. 940.09 does not violate the substantive protections of the due process clause. [Citations and footnotes omitted.]

the underlying crime. Despite scholarly criticism of such statutes that impose an additional penalty for the death of another without any independent proof of blameworthiness for the death, the courts have not held them invalid.

Caibaiosai v. Barrington, 643 F.Supp. at 1012-13.

Based on the same logic as expressed in Caibaiosai, the district court held that the Florida DWI-manslaughter statute was not fundamentally unfair nor violative of due process. The district court denied Armenia's petition for writ of habeas corpus, issued a certificate of probable cause for appeal, and granted Armenia the right to appeal without prepayment of costs.

CONTENTIONS

Armenia contends that his conviction violates the basic notions of fundamental fairness enshrined in the due process clauses of the Constitution of the United States by creating a conclusive presumption that he caused the death of the victim. Armenia contends that the statute's revision during the pendency of this case supports his argument. Armenia views the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the DWI-manslaughter statute as: redefining criminal law contrary to basic notions of the presumption of innocence, antithetical to the definitions of crime and valid punishment, and contradictory to the moral foundation of the criminal law. Armenia asserts that the Caibaiosai case does not support the Florida Supreme Court's decision, and in fact, confirms the requirement of causation between a defendant's operation of a vehicle and the victim's death. Thus, Armenia argues that his habeas corpus petition should have been granted.

The state contends that under Florida law, causation is not an element of DWI-manslaughter; therefore, the state is not constitutionally required to prove causation. The state also contends that dispensing with such a requirement does not result in a denial of due process because it is not fundamentally unfair to impose felony liability based on proof that the operation of a motor vehicle caused the death of another. The state argues that causing a death by operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated evinces a mental attitude indicative of blameworthiness, which is deciding to drive while inebriated.

ISSUES

Armenia raised the following issues on appeal:

(1) whether, by interpreting the DWI-manslaughter statute not to require causation, the Florida Supreme Court created an irrebuttable or conclusive presumption of causation, contrary to the due process principle that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged;

(a) whether the DWI-manslaughter statute required as an element to be proven by the state that the death of the victim was caused by the operation of a motor vehicle operated by the intoxicated person;

(b) whether the Florida Supreme Court has interpreted the causation element of DWI-manslaughter not to require proof that Armenia's operation of a motor vehicle caused the victim's death; and

(c) whether the net result of the court's interpretation created a conclusive presumption that an intoxicated driver involved in an accident from which a death ensued caused the death;

(2) whether we should reverse the district court's denial of the habeas corpus petition because the logic of Caibaiosai supports Armenia; and

(3) whether it is fundamentally unfair and a denial of due process to convict a person of what he did not do--cause the

death of a human being by the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated.

DISCUSSION

Crime prevention is the primary responsibility of the states. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134, 74 S.Ct. 381, 384, 98 L.Ed. 561 (1954) (plurality opinion). Federal courts are reluctant to construe the Constitution as allowing federal intrusion upon the administration of justice by the individual states. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2322, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). It is normally within the power of the state to interpret and administer its laws, including strict liability criminal statutes, and its decisions are...