Armfield v. Moore

Decision Date31 December 1852
Citation44 N.C. 157
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesNEEDHAM ARMFIELD v. DAVID MOORE & JAMES MOORE.
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Where a fact has been agreed on or decided in a Court of record, neither of the parties thereto shall thereafter be allowed to call it in question, as long as the judgment or decree stands unreversed.

As, where A. and B. filed their petition in the County Court for a partition of slaves, alleging that they were tenants in common, and after decree made, and report of commissioners confirmed, A. sold his share:-- Held, in a suit between A.'s vendee and B., for the share of A. so sold, B. is estopped from denying A.'s title, though it should appear that A. was not, in truth, tenant in common, but that the share allotted to him belonged to B. en auter droit.

And as B. is estopped from asserting title en auter droit, a fortiori, is it no defence for him that the disputed title is outstanding in a third person.

This was an action of REPLEVIN, brought to recover two slaves, tried at Union Superior Court of Law, Spring term, 1851, before his Honor, Judge BATTLE. The following is the case transmitted to this Court:--

“The plaintiff in support of his action, introduced one Leander Harkness, who proved the execution of a bill of sale to him for the slaves in question, from one Jane Moore, bearing date 23d May, 1849; that in a few days thereafter the witness hired the said slaves, together with others from the plaintiff, and took them to Brewer's gold mine, in South Carolina; that he kept possession of said slaves until September, 1849, when, on a certain Sunday, whilst witness was absent at a camp meeting, they suddenly disappeared without his knowledge. A witness named Belk was then called by the plaintiff, who testified that on the same day the said slaves disappeared, he saw them in the possession of the defendant, in a secret place, in Union County, and that the defendant, David Moore, informed him that they had been stolen from his child in North Carolina; and he had been down in South Carolina and had stolen them back.

The defendants, to justify the taking of the slaves, introduced the minutes of Union County Court, showing that letters of administration on the estate of one Melton Moore had been granted to the defendant, James Moore, at January term, 1848; and proved that Melton Moore died in October, 1847. They then introduced one Vaughn, who testified that Melton Moore, in November, 1846, intermarried with one Jane Carnes, (under whom the plaintiff claimed,) in South Carolina, who was one of the daughters of Esther Carnes, of said State, and that a few days after their marriage, they came into North Carolina to reside. That, in the year 1845, the said Jane and her two sisters were living together--Jane being then about twenty-one years of age, and the other two younger--the youngest about seventeen. That one Thomas K. Cureton, who was the administrator with the will annexed of one Joshua Gordon, hired out the said slaves, with the other slaves which were bequeathed by said Joshua Gordon to the children of Esther Carnes, to the lowest bidder; and that he paid said Jane Carnes for keeping them that year; and that, in 1846, he hired out said slaves to one Robert Carnes. The defendants then introduced one A. Moore, who stated that all the slaves, bequeathed by said Gordon to the children of Esther Carnes, were, in January, 1847, brought by his brother James, who also intermarried with Catherine, the sister of Jane Carnes, into Union County; and that said slaves were in their possession until the death of Melton Moore, in the Fall of that year.

The plaintiff, for the purpose of showing that Melton & James Moore acquired no legal title, by virtue of their marital rights, to said property, put in evidence a copy of the will of Joshua Gordon, and of the letter of administration, with said will annexed, to said Cureton by the ordinary of Lancaster District, South Carolina, (which form a part of the case sent up); and he also read in evidence the deposition of said Cureton, to show that as administrator, &c., he had never assented to the said legacies. The plaintiff then introduced Elizabeth Harkness, (a sister of Jane Moore,) who testified that at the time Melton & James Moore obtained possession of said slaves in South Carolina, they took them clandestinely, and without the knowledge or consent of said Cureton.

The plaintiff then also offered in evidence a copy of the record of the County Court of Union, showing that at January Term of said Court, 1848, a petition was filed by James Moore and wife Catharine, Elizabeth Carnes by her guardian the said James, and Jane Moore, alleging that they were tenants in common of four slaves, which descended to them from Joshua Gordon, deceased, their grandfather,” and praying a partition thereof between them. And it appeared by said record that a partition was regularly ordered by the said Court--a report thereof returned by the Commissioners appointed to make it, and the same confirmed by the Court; and that in the said partition the woman slave in controversy who afterwards had issue, fell to the lot of the said Jane Moore, who sold to the plaintiff, as above set forth.

For the plaintiff it was contended, 1. That the caption of the slaves in South Carolina by the defendants, was tortious and wrongful, and on that ground the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict. 2. That the defendants were estopped in consequence of the proceedings had in Union County Court from denying the title of Jane Moore. 3. That there was no evidence of the assent either express or implied, of the administrator cum testamento annexo of Gordon to the legacies bequeathed to the children of Esther Carnes, and no title therefore vested in Melton Moore during his life. His Honor overruled the first and second grounds taken by the plaintiff; and instructed the jury that from the possession of the Moores in North Carolina, and the length of time that the administrator, with the will annexed, acquiesced in that possession, there was evidence from which they might infer his assent; and if they should be satisfied of such implied assent, they should find for the defendants--otherwise for the plaintiff. There were a verdict and judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed.”

This case was argued at a former term at Morganton, by

Wilson, for the plaintiff ; and by

Osborne and Hutchinson, (and Moore, at this term) for the defendant .

PEARSON, J.

At January Term, 1848, of the Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions for the County of Union, a petition was filed in the name of James Moore, one of the defendants, and Catharine his wife, Elizabeth Carnes, an infant by her guardian James Moore, and Jane Moore, setting forth that the said James, Elizabeth and Jane held in their possession as tenants in common four slaves “which had descended to the said Jane, Catharine and Elizabeth from their grandfather, one Joshua Gordon;” that Jane had intermarried in the year 1847 with one Melton Moore who is since dead, and that Catharine had intermarried with James Moore. The prayer was, that commissioners he appointed to make partition; and such proceedings were thereupon had, that commissioners were appointed, who made partition by which one of the slaves was allotted to Jane Moore, one to James Moore, and the other two to Elizabeth, with a charge for equality of partition. At July Term, 1848, the report was filed and confirmed, and the parties respectively took possession of the negroes allotted to them. Afterwards, in May, 1849, Jane Moore sold the negro woman, who had been allotted to her, to the plaintiff, Armfield, who kept possession of her until September, 1849, when the defendant, James Moore, aided by his father, the other defendant, David Moore, took the woman and her child out of Armfield's possession, who thereupon brought this action of replevin.

At January term, 1848, of the Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions, for the County of Union, (the same term when the petition for partition was filed,) James Moore was appointed the administrator of Melton Moore, his deceased brother. The ground of defence to the action of replevin is that Jane Moore was not in fact entitled to one-third of the slaves, as a tenant in common, at the time of the partition; for that, in truth, that third part belonged to James Moore, as administrator of her deceased husband.

We concur with his Honor, who tried the case below, as to the matter of assent by the executor of Gordon, upon which point he put the case; but the case evidently depends upon the question of estoppel, and in regard to that, we differ from his Honor.

According to my Lord Coke, an estoppel is that which concludes and “shuts a man's mouth from speaking the truth.” With this forbidding introduction, a principle is announced, which lies at the foundation of all fair dealing between man and man, and without which, it would be impossible to administer law as a system. The harsh words,...

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