Armour & Co. v. Indus. Bd. of Illinois

• Decision Date: 06 December 1916
• Docket Number: No. 10640.,10640.
• Citation: 275 Ill. 328,114 N.E. 173
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: ARMOUR & CO. v. INDUSTRIAL BOARD OF ILLINOIS.

275 Ill. 328

114 N.E. 173

ARMOUR & CO.

v.INDUSTRIAL BOARD OF ILLINOIS.

No. 10640.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 24, 1916.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 6, 1916.

Error to Appellate Court, Third District, on Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Charles H. Bowles, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act to obtain compensation for the death of Grover C. Richardson, opposed by Armour & Co., the employer. Compensation was awaided, writ of certiorari to review the holding of the Industrial Board quashed by the circuit court, and, on the proceedings being taken to the appellate court, the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed, and the employer petitions for certiorari. Judgment of the Appellate Court affirmed.Alfred R. Urion, Walter C. Kirk, and Charles J. Faulkner, Jr., all of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

Acton & Acton, of Danville, for defendant in error.

CARTER, J.

The Industrial Board of this state rendered a decision against plaintiff in error, Armour & Co., August 6, 1914, awarding, under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1913, the sum of $2,919 to the estate of Grover C. Richardson. After this court had held unconstitutional the part of the act of 1913 which provided that this court might review directly the decisions of the Industrial Board (Courter v. Simpson Construction Co., 264 Ill. 488, 106 N. E. 350), plaintiff in error, under the authority of that decision, caused to be issued from the circuit court of Cook county a common-law writ of certiorari to review the holding of the board. That court quashed the writ of certiorari, and on the proceedings being taken to the Appellate Court the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. The cause has been brought here on petition for certiorari.

By the stipulation of facts found in the record it appears that Grover C. Richardson was employed by Armour & Co. at Danville, Ill., doing general work in connection with the handling and shipping of products by that company in said city. He began work October 23, 1913, and continued in the employment of Armour & Co. until his death, four days later, from injuries received while operating a freight elevator in plaintiff in error's plant, in the usual course of his employment, and in the discharge of duties arising therefrom. He was caught in some manner between the elevator platform and the second floor of the building, but it is unknown just how the accident occurred. Due notice was given the employer of the accident, and claim filed with the Industrial Board within six months of the time of the injury. It further appears from said stipulation that plaintiff in error, Armour & Co., is a corporation organized under the laws of New Jersey and licensed to do business in Illinois; that it operates a number of wholesale distributing houses in several cities of Illinois; that in the conduct of its business at the various wholesale distributing points it is a separate and distinct corporation from Armour & Co., a corporation organized under the laws of this state for operating packing and slaughtering establishments. The New Jersey corporation purchases practically all its goods from the Illinois corporation. The business of the New Jersey corporation at Danville, Ill., as well as at the other wholesale distributing houses in different cities of the state, consists in receiving meats and provisions and distributing them at wholesale to dealers in the surrounding territory. The business at Danville is conducted in a three-story and basement brick building at 39-41 Washington avenue, the title to which is in the New Jersey corporation.The third floor of the building is used for smoking meats; the second floor for storing smoked meats, provisions, canned goods, etc.; the first floor, part of which is used for shipping purposes and part for offices, is equipped with a cooler, where fresh meats are held pending sale; the basement is used for the storage of barreled goods and pickled and salted meats. No manufacturing or preparation of products is conducted in said building, except the smoking of meats on the third floor. No power-driven machinery of any kind is employed on the premises, with the exception of one 10 horse power electric freight elevator running from the basement to the top floor, operated by means of ropes attached to an electric mechanism. It can be operated from all floors, and it is not necessary for the person who operates it to ride thereon; but employés frequently ride on it when operating it for freight purposes, the rule of the company being that it should not be operated for passenger purposes only. Goods are received in the plant from railway cars which are switched alongside the building and unloaded by trucks, the meat and other goods being taken from the building for distribution among dealers by wagons and auto trucks. The carcass meats are pushed to and from the cooler by the aid of hooks suspended from and running along hanging rails. The products of this building are stored therein only the length of time requisite to sell them to dealers in Danville and the vicinity-in the case of fresh meats rarely longer than a week, but smoked meats are stored from one to three weeks or more. No goods are stored for other persons, for hire or otherwise. The deceased left him surviving a widow and two minor children. Plaintiff in error, the New Jersey corporation, has never elected to come under said Workmen's Compensation Act.

Counsel for plaintiff in error contend that it does not come within the provisions of said Workmen's Compensation Act of 1913. Counsel for defendant in error, on the other hand, contend that plaintiff in error is liable under the provisions of paragraph (b) of section 3 of said act, which reads:

‘The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall only apply to an employer engaged in any of the following occupations, enterprises or businesses, namely: * * * 4. The operation of any warehouse or general or terminal storehouses. * * * 8. In any enterprise in which statutory or municipal ordinance regulations are now or shall hereafter be imposed for the regulating, guarding, use or the placing of machinery or appliances, or for the protection and safeguarding of the employés or the public therein; each of which occupations, enterprises or businesses are hereby declared to be extrahazardous.’ Laws 1913, p. 339.

Counsel for defendants in error contend that plaintiff in error is within the provisions of clause 8 above, because the operation and use of elevators in said city were regulated by a general ordinance of the city of Danville in force at the time of the accident.

Did the Legislature intend that a building used for the purposes such as the one here in question is used should be considered as a ‘warehouse,’ as that word is employed in said clause 4 of paragraph (b)? Webster's Dictionary defines ‘warehouse’ as:

‘A storehouse for wares or goods; a receiving house. The term is broadly used, and may include any structure used to store goods in. A wholesale shop or store, or sometimes a large retail establishment.’

According to the Century Dictionary a warehouse is:

‘A house in which wares or goods are kept; a storehouse. Specifically, (a) a store in which goods are placed for safekeeping; a building for the temporary deposit of goods for compensation; * * * (c) a store for the sale of goods at wholesale; also, often, a large retail establishment.’

It is also defined as ‘a place adapted to the reception and storage of goods and merchandise’ (Bouvier's Law Dict. [3d Rev.] 3424; Black's Law Dict. [2d Ed.] 1218); also as ‘a place used by the occupant for the storage of goods, and the term is synonymous with storehouse’ (30 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law [2d Ed.] 38); and ‘a place where goods are received in store for profit’ (40 Cyc. 400). Obviously, from these various definitions, the meaning of this word in any given case...