Armour v. Lunsford

Decision Date08 July 1941
Docket Number13752.
Citation15 S.E.2d 886,192 Ga. 598
PartiesARMOUR v. LUNSFORD et al.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Mrs. Lucinda M. Armour died on September 13, 1939. On October 9 of the same year three of her four heirs at law James Lunsford, a grandson, and Mrs. J. L. Smith and Mrs. W H. Settles, daughters, filed an equitable petition against Mrs. Estelle Armour, widow of a son of the deceased, seeking to set aside four deeds executed by the deceased to the defendant during the last five years of the grantor's life, the only other heir at law being a son of the defendant. The grounds on which the relief was sought were mental impairment due to the grantor's age, and undue influence alleged to have been exerted upon her by the grantee. It does not appear that any demurrer was filed. The trial resulted in a verdict and decree in favor of the plaintiffs, canceling the deeds attacked. A motion for new trial was overruled, and the defendant excepted.

The petition contained the following allegations: 'Prior to the year___,' Mrs. Lucinda M. Armour lived at the home of T. W. Lunsford in Wilkes County, but in that year the defendant, who had recently returned to this county from California, caused the deceased to remove from the home of T W. Lunsford to a house owned by the deceased, where the defendant resided with her until her death. Before her removal from the home of T. W. Lunsford, Mrs. Lucinda M Armour owned described real and personal property, and had an income from a pension of $30 per month as the widow of a Confederate veteran. At the time of her death she was ninety-two years of age. On December 4, 1934, the defendant procured from the deceased, for a purported consideration of $5, a deed to 135 acres of land, and on March 23, 1935, August 14, 1937, and December 17, 1937, she procured from the deceased deeds to other lands for purported cash considerations of $10, $10, and $1 respectively. Said deeds were recorded within a few days after their execution, except the one executed on December 17, 1937, which was recorded on October 5, 1938. Petitioners show that since Mrs. Lucinda M. Armour allowed Mrs. Estelle Armour to live with her, she has been under her complete domination and control, and that she has used her influence over this aged lady to gain possession of her property. That Mrs. Lucinda Armour was eighty-seven years of age at the time the first conveyance was made, and being of ripe age at this time, as she grew older she became more childish until she was entirely subject to the will of the defendant. * * * That by paying her marked attention, taking charge of all her business affairs, handling all her money, giving her directions as to all of her acts and doings, and being closely associated with her every day, she was finally able to gain control of the will of the said Mrs. Lucinda M. Armour, so that she yielded childlike obedience to her and would perform any act which the said Mrs. Estelle Armour requested. That the various deeds herein set out * * * were procured by the said Mrs. Estelle Armour solely because of the undue influence exerted over this aged person, who because of extreme old age was wholly unaware of the legal consequences of her acts, and by these artifices she caused the said Mrs. Lucinda M. Armour to convey all her property except the small tract of land in Oglethorpe County, which petitioners are informed is worth less than $500. That for several years prior to her death the said Mrs. Lucinda M. Armour was wholly unable to understand business transactions, but that Mrs. Estelle Armour would cause the instruments herein named to be prepared and would then summon witnesses and direct Mrs. Lucinda M. Armour to sign the same, though she was incapable of knowing for what purpose said conveyances were being made. That James Lunsford resides in Elbert County, Mrs. J. L. Smith in the State of Texas, and Mrs. W. H. Settles in Madison County, Georgia, and that none of petitioners knew or had reason to believe that Mrs. Estelle Armour was acquiring the property of Mrs. Lucinda M. Armour until after her death in September, 1939.'

The defendant answered, admitting the execution of all the deeds referred to in the petition, but denying the exercise of any undue influence upon the deceased. The answer concluded: 'Further answering plaintiff's petition, this defendant says, that for a number of years Mrs. L. M. Armour lived [with] her son-in-law T. W. Lunsford and his wife, who was her daughter; that about 1932 this defendant's son, Robert Armour, visited his grandmother, and said Mrs. L. M. Armour became greatly attached to him; this defendant at the time was residing in the State of California, was regularly employed, and was making a comfortable living for herself and her said son, when said Mrs. L. M. Armour continuously and over a considerable period of time persuaded and insisted on this defendant's removal to Georgia to live with her, proposing that if she would so that she would convey her her property so that she might maintain herself and her son in as comfortable circumstances as she then enjoyed, and this defendant did finally accept her proposal and did remove to Georgia, and did in good faith live with and care for said Mrs. L. M. Armour, who was a woman of great age, but agile in body and clear of mind and who continued to act of her own motion in all matters connected with her affairs until the day of her death; and this defendant has not at any time offered to said Mrs. Armour any sort of persuasion, promise, or inducement whatever to convey her any property whatever, but every act of said Mrs. L. M. Armour was her own voluntary act performed of her own volition and without inducement from this defendant.' By amendment the plaintiffs alleged 'that the deeds made by Mrs. L. M. Armour to Mrs. Estelle Armour described in this petition, while reciting a nominal consideration, were in fact without consideration, and were voluntary deeds.'

The plaintiffs' evidence at the trial was mainly circumstantial. The defendant testified that all of the deeds were deeds of gift, and that grantor stated to her, 'She wanted me to having everything she had.' One of the plaintiffs, referring to the grantor's mental condition, testified: 'I thought her mind was good for a person of her age, but I think her mind weakened with her body.' Other evidence was to the effect that her mental condition was good until, or a short time before, her death. A physician, as a witness for the defendant, testified: 'For her age she was unusually vigorous, mentally and physically. * * * I did not discover in her any form of mental deficiency. * * * I meant she was in good condition to be ninety-two years old.' According to the evidence, the deceased was about eighty-seven years old when the first deed was made in 1934, and was about twenty-two years older than the defendant. The foregoing is not intended as a complete statement of the evidence, as much other evidence was introduced both by the plaintiffs and by the defendant.

The motion for new trial consisted of the general grounds, and one special ground complaining of the following charge to the jury: 'I charge you that if you should find there was great disparity between the ages of Mrs. L. M. Armour and Mrs. Estelle Armour; that the parties occupied a confidential relation to each other; that the deeds were without any consideration...

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19 cases
  • Anderson v. Oakley
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • January 22, 1975
    ...true or false, unless it is stricken from the record. Code § 38-114; Wells v. Ragsdale, 102 Ga. 53(6), 29 S.E. 165; Armour v. Lunsford, 192 Ga. 598, 599(2), 15 S.E.2d 886; Carver v. Carver, 199 Ga. 352(1), 34 S.E.2d 509; Lee v. Boyer, 217 Ga. 27, 120 S.E.2d 757; New Zealand Fire Ins. Co. Lt......
  • Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Strickland
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • February 14, 1953
    ...& Southern Nat. Bank v. Kontz, 185 Ga. 131(6), 147, 194 S.E. 536; Davis v. State, 190 Ga. 100(4), 8 S.E.2d 394; Armour v. Lunsford, 192 Ga. 598(3), 15 S.E.2d 886; Robertson v. Abernathy, 192 Ga. 694, 698(4a), 16 S.E.2d The record in the instant case shows that the trial judge had, prior to ......
  • Holton v. Mercer
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • November 30, 1942
    ... ... need not be proved. The complainant can not deny them ... Peacock v. Terry, 9 Ga. 137; Armour v ... Lunsford, 192 Ga. 598, 15 S.E.2d 886. We do not think, ... however, that these principles control the issue here made, ... under the facts ... ...
  • Holton v. Mercer
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • November 30, 1942
    ...in favor of the defendant, and need not be proved. The complainant can not deny them. Peacock v. Terry, 9 Ga. 137; Armour v. Lunsford, 192 Ga. 598, 15 S.E. 2d 886. We do not think, however, that these principles control the issue here made, under the facts as they appear in this record. In ......
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