Armour v. State of Ohio
| Decision Date | 27 September 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. C88-1104Y.,C88-1104Y. |
| Citation | 775 F. Supp. 1044 |
| Parties | Ezell ARMOUR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The STATE of OHIO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
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Percy Squire, Bernadette J. Bollas, Bricker & Eckler, Columbus, Ohio, Robert A. Douglas, Sr., Youngstown, Ohio, for plaintiffs.
Andrew I. Sutter, Catherine M. Cola, Theresa R. Schaefer, Atty. Gen.'s Office, Columbus, Ohio, for defendants.
Before JONES, Circuit Judge, PECK, Senior Circuit Judge, and BATCHELDER, District Judge.
This three-judge district court was convened pursuant to the en banc decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 925 F.2d 987 (6th Cir.1991), in order to hear this challenge to the constitutionality of the apportionment of the Ohio House of Representatives. Plaintiffs allege that the boundary between House Districts 52 and 53 in Mahoning County deliberately and effectively dilutes the minority vote, and therefore violates the Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. For the reasons that follow, we find that the boundary violates both the plaintiffs' constitutional and statutory rights and order appropriate relief.
This case was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio in May of 1988. The plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order preventing the results of the May, 1988 primary election for districts 52 and 53 from being certified and a preliminary injunction prohibiting further elections in those districts until they were brought into compliance with federal law. The district court denied the temporary restraining order, ordered the injunction hearing consolidated with the trial on the merits, and referred both to a magistrate. The magistrate recommended that relief be denied because the plaintiffs could not constitute a majority in a reconfigured district, and the district court adopted the recommendation. On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court should have examined the totality of the circumstances to consider whether the political process in the contested districts is equally open to minority voters. However, the Sixth Circuit voted en banc to vacate the panel opinion, and after additional arguments the court held that the subject matter was exclusively within the jurisdiction of a three-judge district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2284. The Chief Judge of the Sixth Circuit then convened the instant court.
The Ohio General Assembly is composed of two bodies, a 33-member senate, and a 99-member house of representatives. The method of apportioning the districts of the assembly is established by the Ohio Constitution. The current provision was enacted in 1967, after the previous plan was held unconstitutional. See Nolan v. Rhodes, 378 U.S. 556, 84 S.Ct. 1906, 12 L.Ed.2d 1034 (1964).
The House of Representatives is composed exclusively of single-member districts of substantially equal size. No district may have a population more than five per cent greater or less than the state's population divided by 99, except that this tolerance is increased to ten per cent if it will allow the creation of a house district consisting of a single county. Ohio Const. Art. XI, § 3, § 9. When possible, house districts must be drawn to contain one or more whole counties. Id. at § 7(A). However, when this is not possible, a district is formed by combining the areas of counties, townships, municipalities, and city wards, giving preference in the order named. Id. at § 7(B). If governmental units must be divided to create districts of substantially equal size, "only one such unit may be divided between two districts, giving preference in the selection of a unit for division to a township, a city ward, a city, and a village in the order named." Id. at § 7(C).
Mahoning County lies in northeastern Ohio along the Pennsylvania border, about sixty miles southeast of Cleveland. Much of the county is rural. However, the northeastern quadrant of the county is dominated by the City of Youngstown. Youngstown is roughly rectangular in shape, about half again as wide as it is tall, except that the southeast corner of the rectangle, approximately one-ninth of the total, falls outside the corporate limits. That area is occupied by Campbell City (formerly known as East Youngstown), Struthers, and Coitsville Township. The Mahoning River bisects the city, entering Youngstown in the northwest corner and winding its way southeast to Campbell City before it wanders into Pennsylvania.
In 1981, the population of Mahoning County was 289,487. The ideal house district population was 109,065, and therefore the maximum population for a house district that was not a single county was 114,518. Consequently, Mahoning County was required to contain two whole house districts and share one house district with a neighboring county. Additionally, the City of Youngstown, which had a population of 115,427, had to be divided among two districts.
The populations and racial balances of the districts established by the 1981 Apportionment Board are set forth below:
DISTRICT 52
Total Black % Black
City of Youngstown
Ward 2 16,597 10,341 (62.3%)
Ward 7 17,485 182 (1.04%)
Campbell City 11,619 1,173 (10.1%)
Boardman Twp. (Part) 10,881 52 (0.48%)
Other cities and townships 54,793 578 (1.05%)
_______ ______
Total 110,975 12,326 (11.11%)
======= ======
DISTRICT 53
City of Youngstown
Ward 1 16,667 9,791 (58.74%)
Ward 3 16,761 7,528 (44.91%)
Ward 4 16,168 339 ( 2.1%)
Ward 5 16,430 4,985 (30.3%)
Ward 6 15,719 5,312 (33.79%)
Boardman Twp. (Part) 30,952 173 ( 0.56%)
_______ ______
Total 112,697 28,128 (24.96%)
======= ======
The plaintiffs, black voting age residents of Districts 52 and 53, assert that the apportionment between these districts unlawfully dilutes the black vote. They assert that the boundary between the two districts divides the black population at its point of greatest concentration in a ratio of 35:65. Plaintiffs seek a reapportionment plan which would allocate ninety-nine per cent of Mahoning County's black residents to District 53. They would do this by allocating Youngstown Ward 2 and Campbell City, currently assigned to District 52, to District 53. In exchange, they would assign all of Boardman Township to District 52. Maps showing the configurations of both the current and proposed districts may be found in Appendix I.
Plaintiffs allege that the boundary at issue violates both the Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Fifteenth Amendment claim must be heard by a three-judge district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a). Armour v. Ohio, 925 F.2d 987 (6th Cir. 1991). However, once convened, "the jurisdiction of the District Court so constituted ... extends to every question involved, whether of state or federal law, and enables the court to rest its judgment on the decisions of such of the questions as in its opinion effectively dispose of the case." Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 393-94, 53 S.Ct. 190, 193, 77 L.Ed. 375 (1932); U.S. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 371 U.S. 285, 287-88, 83 S.Ct. 397, 399, 9 L.Ed.2d 317 (1963) () Therefore, consistent with the judicial preference for resolving cases without reference to questions arising under the Federal Constitution whenever possible, Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546-47, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1383-84, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974), we will first address the statutory claim.
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was originally viewed as coextensive with the prohibition against discrimination contained in the text of the Fifteenth Amendment. However, after the United States Supreme Court ruled in City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 1496, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980), that a plaintiff must show discriminatory intent to prevail on a Fifteenth Amendment claim, Congress amended Section 2 "to make clear that plaintiffs need not prove a discriminatory purpose in order to establish a violation." S.Rep. No. 97-417, p. 27, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, pp. 177, 204, quoted in Chisom v. Roemer, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 2364, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991).
Section 2 as amended reads as follows:
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