Armstrong v. Bray, 13296-6-II
| Decision Date | 25 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 13296-6-II,13296-6-II |
| Citation | 64 Wn.App. 736,826 P.2d 706 |
| Parties | David H. ARMSTRONG, Administrator of the Estate of Mary Lou Bray, Respondent, v. Orval BRAY, Appellant, and Diane Seitz, Lois Haley, Karen Burgstiner and Lester Wray, Additional Respondents, and Sverre O. Staurset, Intervenor and Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Sverre Staurset and Lawrence M. Ross, Tacoma, pro se.
David Armstrong, Armstrong & Cable, Bremerton, pro se.
Frank Shiers, Shiers Kamps & Chrey, Port Orchard, for Diane Seitz, Lois Haley, Karen Bugsteiner and Lester Wray.
M. Lawrence Ross, Tacoma, for Sverre Staurset as intervenor/cross-appellant.
The Estate of Orval Bray appeals a judgment of the Kitsap County Superior Court forfeiting all of the interest in community property that Orval Bray had possessed with his deceased wife. We reverse, holding that Orval Bray did not, by slaying his wife, forfeit his interest in his one-half of their community property.
In 1979, Orval and Mary Lou Bray, husband and wife, executed a statutory community property agreement. See RCW 26.16.120. The agreement provided that all property then possessed by Orval and Mary Lou, as well as all property later acquired by either of them, was to be deemed community property. 1 In addition, it provided that: "upon the death of either of the parties hereto, all of the said properties and property rights of either or both shall be their community property and title thereto should pass to the survivor as the sole and separate property of that survivor thereafter." 2
Several years later, Orval commenced a dissolution proceeding against Mary Lou. Before a decree of dissolution was entered, Orval shot and killed Mary Lou. He was convicted of second degree murder. As security for attorney's fees that he incurred in connection with his defense of the murder charge, Orval gave his attorneys a deed of trust to real estate that he and Mary Lou had held as community property.
David Armstrong, as the administrator of Mary Lou's Estate, commenced an action against Orval in the Kitsap County Superior Court in an effort to preclude Orval from acquiring any property from Mary Lou through any statutes or by virtue of their community property agreement. The superior court granted a summary judgment in favor of Mary Lou's estate.
Orval then sought to partition the community real estate, asking the trial court to set over one-half of the property to him. Sverre Staurset, as substitute trustee of the deed of trust, was permitted to intervene in the lawsuit. The trial court ruled that because Orval had killed Mary Lou, he forfeited all of his interest in their community property. It therefore denied partition and entered a judgment providing that Orval had no interest in the community property that Orval and Mary Lou had possessed. It ruled, as a consequence, that Staurset acquired no interest in the property through the deed of trust. Orval and Staurset have both appealed. 3
The facts are undisputed, the matter having been submitted to the trial court after argument on essentially stipulated facts. 4 The question we must resolve is this: Does one, by slaying his or her spouse, forfeit all of the interest he or she possessed in their community property, or is the slayer merely precluded from acquiring the slain spouse's interest in their community property? That is an issue of first impression in Washington.
To resolve the issue, we must look first to the so-called "slayer" statutes, which provide as follows:
No slayer shall in any way acquire any property or receive any benefit as the result of the death of the decedent, but such property shall pass as provided in the sections following. RCW 11.84.020.
The slayer shall be deemed to have predeceased the decedent as to property which would have passed from the decedent or his estate to the slayer under the statutes of descent and distribution or have been acquired by statutory right as surviving spouse or under any agreement made with the decedent under the provisions of RCW 26.16.120 as it now exists or is hereafter amended. RCW 11.84.030.
Orval Bray argues that these statutes cannot be invoked to deny him ownership of one-half of the community property. Such a result, he asserts, would cause the slayer statute to be penal, contrary to RCW 11.84.900. 5 He stresses also that under Washington law, his interest in any community property possessed by he and his wife was a vested interest. In support of that contention, he cites Lyon v. Lyon, 100 Wash.2d 409, 413, 670 P.2d 272 (1983), in which the court said "each spouse has a present, undivided half interest in each specific item of community property." See also, United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.1970) (); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27 (1937) (). He maintains that, pursuant to RCW 11.02.070, he had a present vested interest in an undivided half of their property at the time of her death that was unaffected by the slayer statutes. RCW 11.02.070 provides:
Upon the death of a decedent, a one-half share of the community property shall be confirmed to the surviving spouse, and the other one-half share shall be subject to testamentary disposition by the decedent, ...
Armstrong responds by asserting that RCW 11.02.070 has no application to this case because Orval and Mary Lou entered into a community property agreement pursuant to the provisions of RCW 26.16.120. 6 He argues that the Brays' agreement transferred all of the community property of the parties to the surviving spouse, as his or her sole and separate property, upon the death of either spouse. 7 He relies on the aforementioned slayer statutes and, in particular, on RCW 11.84.030, which provides that a slayer is "deemed to predecease the decedent as to property which would have passed ... under any agreement made with the decedent under the provisions of RCW 26.16.120 ..." Armstrong contends that under the Brays' community property agreement, the property that "would have passed" was all of their community property. Because Orval is deemed to have predeceased his wife under RCW 11.84.030, he reasons, all of the community property passed to Mary Lou, and upon her death, to her children pursuant to the provisions of her will. Armstrong suggests that any other interpretation would, in effect, amount to a cancellation or setting aside of a contract, for reasons other than for fraud or other recognized head of equity jurisdiction, contrary to RCW 26.16.120. In addition he argues it would permit Orval to acquire an immediate possessory interest in one-half of the property, a possessory interest which he did not enjoy before his wife's death. In that connection, he points out that Bray removed all doubt about whether he would be awarded less than one-half of the community property...
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Eaden v. Estate of SR (In re Estate of SR)
... ... See id.; see also [326 P.3d 761] Armstrong v. Bray, 64 Wash.App. 736, 741, 826 P.2d 706 (1992). The Haviland court noted that the ... ...
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Eaden v. Estate of SR (In re Estate of SR)
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In re Estate of Whitehead, No. 58624-6-I (Wash. App. 7/2/2007)
...interest in one-half of the community property before the slaying, he did not profit from her death in receiving it.24 At the time of the Armstrong decision, RCW 11.84.900 This chapter shall not be considered penal in nature, but shall be construed broadly in order to effect the policy of t......
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In re Estate of Whitehead
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Table of Cases
...Ardell, In re Estate of, 96 Wn.App. 708, 980 P.2d 771, review denied, 139 Wn.2d 1011 (1999): 4.4(3)(a), 13.10(2) Armstrong v. Bray, 64 Wn.App. 736, 826 P.2d 706 (1992): 12.4(2) Atkinson v. Estate of Hook, 193 Wn.App. 862, 374 P.3d 215, review denied, 186 Wn.2d 1014 (2016): 10.5(1)(a) Auger ......
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Table of Cases
...317, 759 P.2d 1224 (1988): 3.6(2)(a), 3.2(6)(b) Armour & Co.v. Becker, 167 Wash. 245, 9 P.2d 63 (1932): 6.2(2)(c) Armstrong v.Bray, 64 Wn.App. 736, 826 P.2d 706 (1992): 4.17 Armstrong v.Oakley, 23 Wash. 122, 62 P. 499 (1900): 3.3(1), 8.2 ArmstrongsEstate, In re, 33 Wn.2d 118, 204 P.2d 500 (......
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Chapter I. Community Property Agreements
...property agreement controlled by general contract principles and not by at-death disposition statute, RCW 26.16.120); Armstrong v. Bray, 64 Wn. App. 736, 826 P.2d 706 (1992) (slayer statute, RCW 11.84.010, prevented the operation of community property agreement favoring husband convicted of......
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Table of Cases
...Estate, In re, 36 Wn.2d 505, 219 P.2d 112 (1950): 386 Arland's Estate, In re, 131 Wash. 297, 230 P. 157 (1924): 300 Armstrong v. Bray, 64 Wn. App. 736, 826 P.2d 706 (1992): 27, 334 Armstrong's Estate, In re, 33 Wn.2d 118, 204 P.2d 500 (1949): 250, 253 Arnold v. Beckman, 74 Wn.2d 836, 447 P.......