Armstrong v. Chance
| Docket Number | S-18452,7681 |
| Decision Date | 19 January 2024 |
| Parties | JASON THOMAS ARMSTRONG, Appellant, v. LACIE REBECCA ANN CHANCE, Appellee. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
1
JASON THOMAS ARMSTRONG, Appellant,
v.
LACIE REBECCA ANN CHANCE, Appellee.
No. S-18452
No. 7681
Supreme Court of Alaska
January 19, 2024
Appeal from the Superior Court No. 1WR-22-00017 CI of the State of Alaska, First Judicial District, Wrangell, M. Jude Pate, Judge.
John R. Grele, Law Office of John R. Grele PC, San Francisco, for Appellant.
No appearance by Appellee.
Before: Maassen, Chief Justice, Carney, Borghesan, and Henderson, Justices. [Pate, Justice, not participating.]
OPINION
MAASSEN, CHIEF JUSTICE
I. INTRODUCTION
A woman arrived in Alaska with her daughter and filed a petition for a domestic violence protective order against the boyfriend she had left in California. The superior court issued a series of ex parte 20-day protective orders followed by a longterm protective order.
The man appealed the long-term protective order, arguing in part that the superior court lacked the personal or subject matter jurisdiction necessary to grant such an order against someone who had never set foot in the state. Although we reject the man's argument about subject matter jurisdiction, we agree that the superior court lacked the personal jurisdiction necessary to justify an order imposing affirmative and long-term obligations on an out-of-state respondent who has no contacts with Alaska. We have already issued a summary order vacating the long-term protective order; this opinion explains our reasoning.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Facts
Jason Armstrong and Lacie Chance are the parents of a five-year-old daughter. They never married, but at the time of the superior court proceedings they had been in a relationship for eight years. They lived together in California until late April 2022, when Chance left with their daughter and relocated to Wrangell.
The day after Chance arrived in Alaska, she filed a petition for a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) against Armstrong in the superior court in Wrangell. The petition sought both a 20-day protective order and a long-term protective order (typically of one-year duration). The petition alleged "about 7 years" of domestic violence, including physical and mental abuse of both Chance and her daughter. The petition requested temporary custody of the daughter, asked that Armstrong be awarded no visitation, and asked for no child support.
B. Proceedings
The superior court issued a 20-day protective order on April 28, 2022, finding probable cause to believe that Armstrong had committed or attempted to commit assault or reckless endangerment. The order granted temporary custody of the parties' daughter to Chance and denied Armstrong any visitation rights because of a perceived risk to the safety of Chance and the child. The order set a hearing on Chance's request for a long-term protective order for May 17.
Meanwhile, Armstrong pursued his own remedy in California. The California superior court granted his ex parte application on May 13, issuing a temporary emergency order for the return of the child to Armstrong's custody in California and setting a hearing for June 6.
The Alaska hearing began on May 17 and continued over four days. Armstrong appeared telephonically and by videoconference through his California attorney. Both parties presented witnesses. Armstrong maintained throughout the proceedings that the Alaska courts did not have jurisdiction over the matter because he had never been to Alaska and all the alleged acts of domestic violence happened in California. The court overruled Armstrong's jurisdictional objections, finding it had "temporary jurisdiction at least [to] the extent for [the court] to hear the domestic violence claims," and acknowledging that Armstrong had preserved the issue for appeal.
Armstrong appealed both the superior court's factual findings and its assertion of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. He asked that we vacate the superior court's judgment and reverse the long-term protective order. We concluded that the Alaska court did not have personal jurisdiction over Armstrong, and we therefore vacated the DVPO in a summary order with an explanation to follow.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"We apply our independent judgment to questions of law, including statutory interpretation."[1] "We review questions regarding both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction de novo, as 'jurisdictional issues are questions
of law subject to this court's independent judgment.' "[2] Under de novo review, we adopt "the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy."[3]
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Armstrong attacks both the superior court's subject matter jurisdiction - which he appears to argue has a residency requirement - and its assertion of personal jurisdiction, which he argues violated his right to due process. We reject Armstrong's first argument but agree with his second.[4]
A. The Superior Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Chance's Domestic Violence Petition.
Subject matter jurisdiction is "the legal authority of a court to hear and decide a particular type of case."[5] In Alaska the superior court "is the trial court of general jurisdiction, with original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal matters."[6] The statute defining the superior court's jurisdiction states expressly that "a petition for a protective order under AS 18.66.100-18.66.180" is "an action that falls within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the superior court and the district court" and thus may be filed in either.[7]
Consistent with these jurisdictional statutes, AS 18.66.100(a) provides that "[a] person who is or has been a victim of a crime involving domestic violence may file a petition in the district or superior court for a protective order against a household member."[8] The appropriate venue is mandated by rule.[9] Alaska Civil Rule 3(h) provides:
A petition or request for a protective order on domestic violence under AS 18.66 or a protective order on stalking or sexual assault under AS 18.65 may be filed in either the judicial district or the court location closest to
(1) where the petitioner currently or temporarily resides;
(2) where the respondent resides; or
(3) where the domestic violence, stalking, or sexual assault occurred.
Other than these venue restrictions - not at issue here, as it is undisputed that Chance filed her petition in "the judicial district . . . where [she] currently or temporarily reside[d]" - no Alaska statute or rule limits an Alaska trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over domestic violence claims. This is with good reason, as many
other courts have recognized: "[A] state has the legitimate right to protect anyone within its borders from abuse regardless of the geographical source of the abuse."[10]
In support of his contrary position, Armstrong cites the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Williams v. North Carolina, [11] which he suggests stands for the proposition that due process requires the petitioner to be domiciled in the state in which the petition is filed. Williams did not involve a domestic violence petition; in Williams the Supreme Court held that North Carolina was constitutionally required to give full faith and credit to a Nevada divorce when there was no dispute that the parties had been domiciled in Nevada when divorced, as required by Nevada law.[12] The Court expressly avoided deciding whether the same full faith and credit should be accorded a divorce granted to parties who were temporary residents of Nevada as opposed to domiciled there;[13] the case thus has nothing to offer on the question of whether temporary residence in a state is enough to allow the state's courts to adjudicate a petition for a domestic violence restraining order.
Alaska's divorce statutes require that at least one spouse be a resident at the time a divorce action is commenced in the state.[14] The DVPO statutes, on the other hand, make no mention of a residency requirement, and we see no other indication that the legislature intended there to be one. Indeed, such a requirement would run afoul of what we now expressly recognize as Alaska's "legitimate right to protect anyone within its borders from abuse regardless of the geographical source of the abuse."[15] We therefore conclude that the superior court had the subject matter jurisdiction necessary to consider Chance's petition for a long-term DVPO.
B. The Superior Court Did Not Have Personal Jurisdiction Over Armstrong And Therefore Could Not Grant A Long-Term DVPO Against Him.
Our holding that the superior court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over Chance's DVPO petition requires us to answer a second question: Did the court have the personal jurisdiction necessary to bind Armstrong? Our answer is that it did not, given the prohibitions and obligations the order contained.
1. The superior court lacked personal jurisdiction over Armstrong because he has no contacts with the state.
"Alaska's long-arm statute, AS 09.05.015, lays out a list of circumstances under which personal jurisdiction may be exercised."[16] The list is not exclusive; the
statute includes a "catch-all" provision,[17] which we have interpreted as allowing courts to exercise jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[18] The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Due Process Clause requires a court to have either general[19] or specific jurisdiction[20] over a defendant. General jurisdiction requires that the defendant be domiciled in the forum state,[21] while specific jurisdiction requires that the defendant have "minimum contacts" with the forum state.[22] The minimum contacts analysis "usually means that the party
must 'purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus...
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