Armstrong v. Chi., M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 May 1893
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: ARMSTRONG v CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

53 Minn. 183

54 N.W. 1059

ARMSTRONGvCHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 5, 1893.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

The plaintiff shipped a car load of goods, including some horses, from Redding, Ill., to Chicago, over the C., S. F. & C. R. R., which terminated in Chicago. He intended to have the property transported to Lakefield, in this state, and verbally agreed with the C., S. F. & C. R. R. Co. as to what the charge should be to that point. He, however, entered into a written contract with that company merely for transportation to Chicago for a specified price, and that a person in behalf of the plaintiff should have passage with the car to take care of the property. Plaintiff sent a man with the car, giving him money to pay the freight, but gave him no express authority to enter into any contract in his behalf. At Chicago this agent, in behalf of his principal, contracted with the defendant for the further transportation from there to Lakefield, in which contract it was provided that no claim for loss or damage to the stock should be valid unless made in writing within 30 days after the same should have occurred. After the car reached its destination the defendant retained possession a few days for nonpayment of freight. In an action for alleged negligence in the care of one of the horses after the transportation had ceased, held:

(1) The above condition as to notice was applicable in respect to the carrier's conduct as a warehouseman, that relation being properly incident to that of carrier.

(2) Such a contract, if made by the owner, or if authorized by him, is reasonable and valid.

(3) From the circumstances it must be inferred that the agent in charge of the property was authorized to make any necessary and reasonable contract, as he did do, for its transportation from Chicago to Lakefield. For that purpose he stood in place of the owner.

Appeal from district court, Jackson county; Brown, Judge.

Action by S. S. Armstrong against the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company to recover the value of a horse alleged to have died because of defendant's negligence in the care of the animal during transportation. Plaintiff had judgment, and, from an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed.

For former report, see 47 N. W. Rep. 459.

Andrew C. Dunn, for appellant.

Thos. J. Knox, for respondent.

DICKINSON, J.

A former appeal in this action is reported in 45 Minn. 85,47 N. W. Rep. 459. Upon a second trial a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals from an order refusing a new trial. The nature of the complaint, and the particular ground upon which recovery was sought, are stated in the opinion on the former appeal. The case, as now before us, involves some questions not before presented.

After the plaintiff had introduced his evidence in chief, he voluntarily elected to rest his right to recover on the alleged negligence of the defendant in respect to the care of the horse after it had reached its destination, at Lakefield. It appeared that the plaintiff shipped the horse, with some other horses and various kinds of personal property belonging to him, the whole comprising one car load, from Redding, Ill., and that the final destination was Lakefield, in this state. The transportation was by the Chicago, Santa Fe & California Railroad from Redding to Chicago, and from Chicago to Lakefield it was over this defendant's road. The plaintiff personally entered into a written or printed contract with the former road for transportation from Redding to Chicago, for which the freight named was $14. This contract contained a provision for the transportation, with the car, of a person, in behalf of the owner, to take care of the stock. It contained some provisions in the nature of restrictions upon the liability of the carrier, including one making it condition precedent to a right of action against the carrier for damages that a claim for damages should be made in writing, within 10 days from the time the stock should be removed from the car. This written contract makes no provision for, or allusion to, a shipment beyond Chicago. The plaintiff sent a man by the name of Hepler with the car, to take care of the property, from Redding to Lakefield, and gave him money to pay the freight to the latter place. At Chicago, when the car was transferred to and shipped over the road of this defendant, Hepler assumed, in behalf of the plaintiff, to enter into a formal contract with the company for the transportation to Lakefield, and which contained this, among other provisions: “Sixth. That no claim for loss or damages to stock shall be valid unless presented to the company in writing within thirty days after the same shall have occurred.” This contract also recognizes Hepler as being in charge of the property, and served as a pass for himself, he not being called upon to pay fare. When the car reached Lakefield, Hepler had not money enough to pay the freight demanded, and for that reason the defendant refused to let him take the property away, and so it remained in the control of the defendant a few days. It is claimed that the horse contracted lung fever during that time, for want of proper care on the part of the defendant, and the horse died of that disease a few days after it was delivered to the plaintiff.

The authority of Hepler to make a contract containing a limitation like that above recited, and the legal effect of such a contract, if authorized, are the important points in this case. It is contended on the part of the respondent that the sixth clause of the contract above recited is to be construed as referring only to claims for damages on account of some neglect or fault of the defendant in respect to its duties as carrier, as...