Armstrong v. City of Edgewater, 32942
| Decision Date | 08 November 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 32942,32942 |
| Citation | 157 So.2d 422 |
| Parties | Dana T. ARMSTRONG and Kenneth May, Appellants, v. CITY OF EDGEWATER, a municipal corporation, and David L. Wiggins, Jr., etc., Appellees. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert H. Matthews and Fred R. Brannon, Jr., New Smyrma Beach, for appellants.
Louis Ossinsky, Sr., of Ossinsky & Krol, Daytona Beach, for City of Edgewater. Joseph Hirschman, Daytona Beach, for David L. Wiggins, Jr.
We have for review by direct appeal a decree of the circuit court holding Chapter 63-1310, Laws of Florida, 1963, to be unconstitutional.
We must determine whether the subject statute is invalid because of vagueness, ambiguities and the lack of a sufficient title.
The appellee Wiggins filed a complaint for a declaratory decree construing Chapter 63-1310, supra. He contended that it was invalid. The appellee City of Edgewater was the defendant. The appellants Armstrong and May were permitted to intervene in the trial court. For reasons which we shall subsequently epitomize, the chancellor found the statute to be unconstitutional. The intervenors have appealed. In this Court the City joins Wiggins, the successful plaintiff below, in resisting the appellants' assault on the final decree.
The appellants contend that, although inartfully drafted, the assaulted statute adequately reflects a clear legislative intent and that under recognized rules of statutory construction certain words which were obviously omitted inadvertently may be inserted to effectuate the intent of the Legislature.
The appellees rely upon the view of the chancellor to the effect that the statute is fatally defective because of an insufficient title and because its language is so vague and confusing that it is totally unenforceable.
Chapter 27532, Laws of Florida, 1951, is the basic legislative charter of the City of Edgewater. Under this charter the governing body consisted of five city councilmen who elected a mayor from among their own number. The councilmen were nominated by petition and elected by a plurality in a general city election. Section 138 of the 1951 act reads in part as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
By Chapter 29049, Laws of Florida, 1953, certain sections of the 1951 charter act were amended. One amendment provided for four city councilment to be elected from voting districts and a mayor to be elected by popular vote from the city at large. The 1953 act continued the procedure for nominating the city officials by petition and electing them by a plurality in the general election. Section 138, as amended by the 1953 act, reads in part as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
Chapter 63-1310, Laws of Florida, 1963, purports to be a further amendment of the provisions of the 1951 act as amended by the 1953 act. The title to Chapter 63-1310, supra, reads in part as follows:
'AN ACT AMENDING SECTIONS 8, 131, 135, 138, 138(e), and 139 of CHAPTER 27532, LAWS OF FLORIDA, ACTS OF 1951, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 29049, LAWS OF FLORIDA, ACTS OF 1953, BEING THE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF EDGEWATER, IN VOLUSIA COUNTY, FLORIDA, BY AMENDING SECTION 8, SO AS TO PROVIDE FOR A PRIMARY ELECTION TWO (2) WEEKS PRIOR TO THE GENERAL CITY ELECTION WHEN MORE THAN TWO (2) CANDIDATES QUALIFY FOR THE OFFICE OF COUNCILMAN OR MAYOR, * * *' (Emphasis added.)
Chapter 63-1310, supra, added Section 8(a) which reads as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
It is perfectly clear from even a casual reading of Chapter 63-1310, supra, that the principal change in the election machinery of the City sought to be accomplished was the nomination of the mayor and councilmen in a primary and election in the general election when more than two candidates sought these several offices. However, the amendment of Section 138 of the charter provision as contained in Chapter 63-1310, supra, reads in part as follows:
'Section 138. NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES--PETITIONS FOR PLACE ON BALLOT. Candidates for the office of city councilman shall be nominated only by petition. The name of any qualified elector of the city shall be printed upon the ballot to be used at each regular or primary municipal election as a candidate for the office of city councilman, if there is filed with the city clerk a petition in accordance with the following provisions, to-wit:
(a) Such petition shall state the name of each person whose name is presented for a place upon the ballot and that he is a candidate for the office of city councilman.' (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that in providing for nomination by petition, the 1963 amendment of Section 138, supra, makes reference to 'candidates for the office of city councilman * * *' and omits the words 'or mayor' which appear in this section as it was amended by the 1953 act quoted above. The effect of this omission, if permitted to stand, would be to create a hiatus in the procedure for nominating a mayor. The City charter provides for the office of mayor. Section 14, Chapter 29049, Laws of 1953. The title to the 1963 statute announces that the act contains provisions for the nomination of both mayor and councilmen by primary. Section 8(a) of the 1963 act provides for the nomination of a mayor and the city councilmen in a primary where more than two seek the office. Nevertheless, in amended Section 138 of the 1963 statute the words 'or mayor' were omitted from the provision which requires a petition to be filed for the purpose of placing the name of a candidate on a primary or general election ballot.
It is obvious from a comparison of Section 138, in the 1963 statute with the section as it appeared in former acts, the draftsman of the 1963 act based the new statute on the section as it read in the 1951 statute, which did not provide for an elected mayor, instead of on the 1953 statute which did so provide. An examination of Section 138, as we have quoted it from the three statutes in the forepart of this opinion, will clearly establish the accuracy of this observation.
In examining acts of the Legislature our judicial obligation is to sustain them if it is possible to do so. When we are called upon to construe a legislative enactment our primary objection should be to ascertain the legislative intent. If the intent is clear from the content of the statute, our function is to interpret the act so as to effectuate that intent if we can do so by the application of accepted rules of statutory construction.
Courts are, of course, extremely reluctant to add words to a statute as enacted by the Legislature. They should be extremely cautious in doing so. The recognized rule, however, is that when a word has obviously...
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