Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc.

• Citation: 575 U.S. 320,135 S.Ct. 1378,191 L.Ed.2d 471
• Decision Date: 31 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–15.,14–15.
• Parties: Richard ARMSTRONG et al., Petitioners v. EXCEPTIONAL CHILD CENTER, INC., et al.
• Court: United States Supreme Court

575 U.S. 320

135 S.Ct. 1378

191 L.Ed.2d 471

Richard ARMSTRONG et al., Petitioners

v.EXCEPTIONAL CHILD CENTER, INC., et al.

No. 14–15.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Jan. 20, 2015.

Decided March 31, 2015.

Carl J. Withroe, Boise, ID, for Petitioners.

Edwin S. Kneedler for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Petitioners.

James M. Piotrowski, Boise, ID, for Respondents.

Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Brian Kane, Assistant Chief Deputy, Attorney General, Steven L. Olsen, Chief of Civil Litigation, Boise, ID, Carl J. Withroe, Counsel of Record, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, ID, for Petitioners.

James M. Piotrowski, Counsel of Record, Herzfeld & Piotrowski, LLP, Boise, ID, Stephen P. Berzon, Stacey M. Leyton, Matthew J. Murray, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Respondents.

Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Steven L. Olsen, Chief of Civil Litigation, Carl J. Withroe, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, ID, Peg M. Dougherty, Deputy Attorney General, Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, Boise, ID, for Petitioners.

Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV.

We consider whether Medicaid providers can sue to enforce § (30)(A) of the Medicaid Act. 81 Stat. 911 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) ).

I

Medicaid is a federal program that subsidizes the States' provision of medical services to "families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services." § 1396–1. Like other Spending Clause legislation, Medicaid offers the States a bargain: Congress provides federal funds in exchange for the States' agreement to spend them in accordance with congressionally imposed conditions.

In order to qualify for Medicaid funding, the State of Idaho adopted, and the Federal Government approved, a Medicaid "plan," § 1396a(a), which Idaho administers through its Department of Health and Welfare. Idaho's plan includes "habilitation services"—in-home care for individuals who, "but for the provision of such services ... would require the level of care provided in a hospital or a nursing facility or intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded the cost of which could be reimbursed under the State plan," § 1396n(c) and (c)(1). Providers of these services are reimbursed by the Department of Health and Welfare.

Section 30(A) of the Medicaid Act requires Idaho's plan to:

"provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and the payment for, care and services available under the plan ... as may be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of such care and services and to assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available to the general population in the geographic area...." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).

Respondents are providers of habilitation services to persons covered by Idaho's Medicaid plan. They sued petitioners—two officials in Idaho's Department of Health and Welfare—in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, claiming that Idaho violates § 30(A) by reimbursing providers of habilitation services at rates lower than § 30(A) permits. They asked the court to enjoin petitioners to increase these rates.

The District Court entered summary judgment for the providers, holding that Idaho had not set rates in a manner consistent with § 30(A). Inclusion, Inc. v. Armstrong, 835 F.Supp.2d 960 (2011). The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

567 Fed.Appx. 496 (2014). It said that the providers had "an implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause to seek injunctive relief against the enforcement or implementation of state legislation." Id., at 497 (citing Independent Living Center of Southern Cal. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1065 (C.A.9 2008) ). We granted certiorari. 573 U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 44, 189 L.Ed.2d 897 (2014).

II

The Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2, reads:

"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."

It is apparent that this Clause creates a rule of decision: Courts "shall" regard the "Constitution," and all laws "made in Pursuance thereof," as "the supreme Law of the Land." They must not give effect to state laws that conflict with federal laws. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 210, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). It is equally apparent that the Supremacy Clause is not the " ‘source of any federal rights,’ " Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107, 110 S.Ct. 444, 107 L.Ed.2d 420 (1989) (quoting Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 613, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979) ), and certainly does not create a cause of action. It instructs courts what to do when state and federal law clash, but is silent regarding who may enforce federal laws in court, and in what circumstances they may do so.

Hamilton wrote that the Supremacy Clause "only declares a truth, which flows immediately and necessarily from the institution of a Federal Government." The Federalist No. 33, p. 207 (J. Cooke ed.1961). And Story described the Clause as "a positive affirmance of that, which is necessarily implied." 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1831, p. 693 (1833). These descriptions would have been grossly inapt if the Clause were understood to give affected parties a constitutional (and hence congressionally unalterable) right to enforce federal laws against the States. And had it been understood to provide such significant private rights against the States, one would expect to find that mentioned in the preratification historical record, which contained ample discussion of the Supremacy Clause by both supporters and opponents of ratification. See C. Drahozal, The Supremacy Clause: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution 25 (2004); The Federalist No. 44, at 306 (J. Madison). We are aware of no such mention, and respondents have not provided any. Its conspicuous absence militates strongly against their position.

Additionally, it is important to read the Supremacy Clause in the context of the Constitution as a whole. Article I vests Congress with broad discretion over the manner of implementing its enumerated powers, giving it authority to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying [them] into Execution." Art. I, § 8. We have said that this confers upon the Legislature "that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers [the Constitution] confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it," McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). It is unlikely that the Constitution gave Congress such broad discretion with regard to the enactment of laws, while simultaneously limiting Congress's power over the manner of their implementation, making it impossible to leave the enforcement of federal law to federal actors. If the Supremacy Clause includes a private right of action, then the Constitution requires Congress to permit the enforcement of its laws by private actors, significantly curtailing its ability to guide the implementation of federal law. It would be strange indeed to give a clause that makes federal law supreme a reading that limits Congress's power to enforce that law, by imposing mandatory private enforcement—a limitation unheard-of with regard to state legislatures.

To say that the Supremacy Clause does not confer a right of action is not to diminish the significant role that courts play in assuring the supremacy of federal law. For once a case or controversy properly comes before a court, judges are bound by federal law. Thus, a court may not convict a criminal defendant of violating a state law that federal law prohibits. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 499, 509, 76 S.Ct. 477, 100 L.Ed. 640 (1956). Similarly, a court may not hold a civil defendant liable under state law for conduct federal law requires. See, e.g., Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. ––––, –––– – ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2466, 2476–2477, 186 L.Ed.2d 607 (2013). And, as we have long recognized, if an individual claims federal law immunizes him from state regulation, the court may issue an injunction upon finding the state regulatory actions preempted. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–156, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).

Respondents contend that our preemption jurisprudence—specifically, the fact that we have regularly considered whether to enjoin the enforcement of state laws that are alleged to violate federal law—demonstrates that the Supremacy Clause creates a cause of action for its violation. They are incorrect. It is true enough that we have long held that federal courts may in some circumstances grant injunctive relief against state officers who are violating, or planning to violate, federal law. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of United States,

9 Wheat. 738, 838–839, 844, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824) ; Ex parte Young, supra, at 150–151, 28 S.Ct. 441 (citing Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 220, 21 L.Ed. 447 (1873) ). But that has been true not only with respect to violations of federal law by state officials, but also with respect to violations of federal law by federal officials. See American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 110, 23 S.Ct. 33, 47 L.Ed. 90 (1902) ; see generally L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 152–196 (1965). Thus, the Supremacy Clause need not be (and in light of our textual analysis...