Armstrong v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 09 June 1898
• Citation: 46 S.W. 33
• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Parties: ARMSTRONG et al. v. GALVESTON, H. & S. A. RY. CO.

46 S.W. 33

ARMSTRONG et al. v. GALVESTON, H. & S. A. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Texas.

June 9, 1898.

Error to court of civil appeals of Fourth supreme judicial district.

Action by A. Armstrong and others against the Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Company. A judgment for plaintiffs was reversed by the court of civil appeals (43 S. W. 614), and plaintiffs bring error. Reversed.

R. B. Minor, for plaintiffs in error. Upson, Bergstrom & Newton, for defendant in error.

GAINES, C. J.

This suit was brought by plaintiffs in error against defendant in error to recover damages for injuries to cattle, alleged to have been received upon defendant's line while being transported, under a contract of carriage between plaintiffs and defendant, from Spofford, Tex., to Muscogee, in the Indian Territory. The bill of lading was for a through shipment, but limited the liability of the defendant company to damages occurring on its own line. It was also stipulated in the writing that, as a condition precedent to the plaintiffs' right to recover damages for any injuries to the cattle, they should give notice in writing of their claim, before the cattle were delivered or mingled with other stock, to the agent of the company, at Lagrange, Tex., and also that any suit brought for such damage should be commenced within 40 days after it should occur. On the route selected, Lagrange was the point of delivery by the defendant company to its connecting carrier. The defendant pleaded, among other defenses in bar of the recovery, the failure to give notice as stipulated, and also the failure to bring suit in the time limited by the bill of lading. So much of the answer as interposed these defenses was excepted to by the plaintiffs, and the exceptions were sustained by the court. Upon the trial the plaintiffs recovered a judgment, from which an appeal was taken. The court of civil appeals held that the exceptions should have been overruled, and reversed the judgment and remanded the cause. The plaintiff's have brought the case to this court by writ of error; alleging, for the purpose of giving this court jurisdiction, that the decision of the court of civil appeals "practically settles the case."

Article 320 of the Revised Statutes provides, in effect, that common carriers in this state shall not, by stipulations in the bill of lading, restrict their liability as it exists at common law; and the court of civil appeals, in disposing of the case, seem to treat the question as if the plaintiffs, in order to sustain the ruling of the trial court, relied solely upon that provision. They held that the contract was one for an interstate shipment, and that, since it had been ruled that that article applied only to carriage of goods within the state, it did not make void the stipulations in question. This may be correct. But at the time the contract sued upon was entered into there was another statute in force, which is now incorporated in the Revised Statutes as articles 3378 and 3379. These articles are as follows:

"Art. 3378. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, association or combination of whatsoever kind to enter into any stipulation, contract or agreement by reason whereof, the time in which to sue thereon is limited to a shorter period than two years. And no stipulation, contract or agreement for any such shorter limitation in which to sue shall ever be valid in this state.

"Art. 3379. No stipulation in any contract requiring notice to be given of any claim for damages as a condition precedent to the right to sue thereon shall ever be valid unless such stipulation is reasonable, and any such stipulation fixing the time within which such notice shall be given at a less period than ninety days shall be void, and when any such notice is required, the same may be given to the nearest or any other convenient local agent of the company requiring the same. In any suit brought under this and the preceding article it shall be presumed that notice has been given, unless the want of notice is specially pleaded under oath."

If the legislature of the state had the power to make such provisions, as applicable to a contract for a shipment from one state into another, then the stipulations in the bill of lading with reference to the notice to be given and the time within which the suit should be brought were clearly void. Are the articles in question valid and effective as applied to a contract for the carriage of goods from one state into another state or territory? In determining the point, we have not found it necessary to review the numerous cases in the supreme court of the United States in which questions as to the restraints placed upon state legislation by that clause in the federal constitution which gives congress the power "to regulate commerce among the several states" have been discussed. A recent decision of that court seems to settle the question. Railway Co. v. Solan, 18 Sup. Ct. 289. The court in the case cited state the point as follows: "The section of the Code of Iowa [Code 1873, § 1308] referred to in the answer...