Armstrong v. Lake Champlain Granite Co.

• Decision Date: 26 November 1895
• Parties: ARMSTRONG v. LAKE CHAMPLAIN GRANITE CO.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

147 N.Y. 495

42 N.E. 186

ARMSTRONG

v.LAKE CHAMPLAIN GRANITE CO.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 26, 1895.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, Third department.

Action by William H. Armstrong against the Lake Champlain Granite Company. From a judgment of the general term (24 N. Y. Supp. 1144, mem.) affirming a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Richard L. Hand, for appellant.

Chester B. McLaughlin, for respondent.

ANDREWS, C. J.

This action was brought to restrain the defendant from quarrying granite upon lot 27, Split Rock tract, in Essex county. Both parties claim title to the granite. The plaintiff claims under two deeds from Philip S. Baldwin, the common source of title, to John Bridgford and others, one dated March 30, 1871, and the other May 18, 1871. By the first deed, which recites a consideration of $800, Baldwin conveyed to the grantees ‘all the mineral ores' on the tract, ‘together with all needed ways and privileges for mining and raising and removing said mineral ores, excepting and reserving such mineral ores as were originally reserved by the state of New York, and reserving all other rights and interests an said lands save said mineral ores and the right to raise and remove the same.’ By the second deed, which makes no reference to the first deed, but which recites the same money consideration, the grantor conveyed ‘all the mineral and ores [on the same premises], with the right to mine and remove the same; also, the right to sink shafts, and sufficient surface to erect suitable buildings for machinery, and other buildings necessary and usual in mining and raising ores; also, the right of ingress and egress for mining purposes, and to make explorations for minerals and ores, saving reservations to the state of New York.’ In June, 1890, the plaintiff, by conveyance to him, acquired the right vested in the original grantees of Baldwin under the deeds mentioned. In March, 1889, the defendant, as grantee of a prior corporation in which, through mesne conveyances, the title to the lands remaining in Baldwin after the conveyance to Bridgford and others in 1871 was vested, acquired such title. Before the conveyance to the defendant, and about the year 1880, a vein of granite 300 to 400 feet in width had been discovered on the premises. The land was thickly wooded, and the granite discovered was overlaid by soil from 4 to 6 feet deep. Prior to the defendant's purchase the vein had been uncovered to some extent, and some work had been done by the defendant's grantors in getting out granite for market. The defendant took immediate possession of the premises under its deed, and commenced active operations in developing the granite, and up to June, 1890, when the plaintiff acquired his alleged title, the defendant had expended, in opening the quarry, erecting buildings and machinery, and in necessary work for conducting the business, the sum of about $35,000.

The determination of the controversy in this case depends upon the interpretation of the second deed from Baldwin to Bridgford and others of May 18, 1871. Under the deed of March 30, 1871, which conveyed only the ‘mineral ores' on the lot, it is plain that the granite did not pass. The word ‘ore’ has a definite signification, and designates a compound of metal and other substance. Granite neither in a popular nor scientific sense is a mineral ore. The second deed conveys the ‘minerals and ores,’ and also amplifies by words, if not in fact, the mining privileges and the right to use the surface given by the first deed. There is no explanation of the circumstances which led to the giving of the second deed. There is nothing to show that it did not express the real intention of the parties. We think the necessary inference from the comparison of the two deeds is that the second was intended to convey rights not included in the prior grant, and that the words ‘minerals and ores' cannot be cut down to the same meaning as ‘mineral ores' in the first deed, upon any assumption that no new consideration was given for the second deed, or that the whole purpose of the second deed was to define more clearly than was done by the first deed the incidental mining privileges intended to be granted, and not to enlarge the grant as to the kind of minerals granted. If the first deed has any importance in the case, it strengthens rather than weakens the position of the plaintiff. The whole question, as above intimated, turns on the interpretation of the words ‘minerals and ores' in the second deed. In view of the conclusion we have reached and to avoid possible misconceptions in the future, it is proper to state that, in our opinion, the evidence given and admitted on behalf of the defendant, under objection by the plaintiff, that the purpose of Bridgford and his cograntees in securing the deeds of 1871 was to acquire the iron ore then supposed to exist on the premises, and of their statements, contemporaneouslywith the purchase, that they had purchased the iron ore on the lot, was incompetent to explain or confine the meaning of the words ‘minerals and ores' in the deed of May 18, 1871. The evidence would have been incompetent if it had related to the motives of the parties to the deed, sought to be established by the oral statements or negotiations between them prior to or contemporaneous with its execution. The words of a deed, unambiguous in themselves, cannot be controlled by proof that the parties used them with a definite and limited meaning, for the purpose of that particular instrument. Such proof might, under some circumstances, be competent in an action between the parties to reform the instrument, but not in determining the rights of the parties under the instrument as written. The incompetency of the evidence received as to the motives of the original grantees and of their statements as to what they intended to purchase or had purchased is still more manifest in view of the fact that they were disclosed and the statements made to third parties not connected with the sale. See Voorhees v. Burchard, 55 N. Y. 98.

The defendant was also permitted, under objection, to give evidence of witnesses, who lived or had owned property in the Champlain valley, that the word ‘minerals' was understood, ‘about there,’ to mean iron ores. It is unnecessary to determine in this case whether the usage or understanding in a particular district of the meaning of words used in a deed of mining property, which limits and controls their general meaning, is admissible for the purpose of fixing rights thereunder. It is sufficient to say that the evidence offered and received upon that subject in this case only went to the extent of showing that certain persons understood that the term ‘minerals,’ when used, did not include granite, but ores containing metals. The evidence was quite insufficient to establish a settled and recognized usage which shall override the legal meaning of the word. It was not shown that any transaction had taken place based upon the alleged usage, or that such usage was known to either of the parties to the deeds of 1871. In a mining case (Tucker v. Linger, 21 Ch. Div. 18), Jessel, M. R., speaking of a custom relied upon in that case, said: ‘The custom must be collected, not from what witnesses say they think the custom is, but from what was publicly done throughout the district.’ See Railway Co. v. Robinson, 37 Ch. Div. 386, and remarks of the Vice Chancellor in Darvill v. Roper, 3 Drew. 301.

Putting aside, therefore, the extraneous evidence received upon the construction of the words ‘minerals and ores' in the deed of 1871, the questions arise (1) whether, under a grant of ‘minerals,’ on specified premises, granite is included in the absence of limiting words; and (2) whether, if comprehended in the general term, it is excluded from the deed of May 18, 1871, by reason of the context, in connection with the fact that it can only be got by quarrying. It is plain that an owner of land who grants the minerals to another does not use the word as synonymous with mineral substances, because, if this meaning was attached to the grant, it would...