Armstrong v. Lockheed Martin Beryllium Corp.

• Decision Date: 12 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-1456-CIV-T-17E.,96-1456-CIV-T-17E.
• Citation: 990 F.Supp. 1395
• Parties: Gail M. ARMSTRONG, Plaintiff, v. LOCKHEED MARTIN BERYLLIUM CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, f/k/a Loral American Beryllium Corporation, a Delaware corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

990 F.Supp. 1395

Gail M. ARMSTRONG, Plaintiff, v. LOCKHEED MARTIN BERYLLIUM CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, f/k/a Loral American Beryllium Corporation, a Delaware corporation, Defendant.

No. 96-1456-CIV-T-17E.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.

December 12, 1997.

Alex Lancaster, Amy L. Sergent, Lancaster & Eure, Sarasota, FL, for Gail M. Armstrong, plaintiff.

Daniel H. Kunkel, Kunkel, Miller & Hament, Sarasota, FL, for Lockheed Martin Beryllium Corporation, defendant.

ORDER

McCOUN, United States Magistrate Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the court on Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment and/or Dismissal (Doc. 27) and supporting memorandum of law (Doc. 28). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (Doc. 36). By its motion, Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims of disability discrimination brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (hereinafter "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (Counts I and II), and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (hereinafter "FCRA"), Fla. Stat. ch. 760.01, et seq. (1995) (Count III).

Defendant argues first that Plaintiff's state law claim, Count III, is barred because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff did not dual file her Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC") charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (hereinafter "Florida Commission"), and that she did not wait for expiration of 180 days before requesting and receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC, thereby terminating the administrative investigation.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff also failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to the ADA claims, Counts I and II, because they exceed the scope of her EEOC charge. As additional grounds for summary judgment and/or dismissal, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because Plaintiff was not a qualified individual with a disability as defined by the statute. Defendant further contends that, even if Plaintiff's demands for accommodation were reasonable, Plaintiff cannot refute Defendant's undue hardship defense. Finally, Defendant claims that the Plaintiff's damages are limited as a matter of law.

I.

In its motion, Defendant sets forth a lengthy "Statement of the Undisputed Facts." (Doc. 27, at 3-25). In her response, Plaintiff, "for the most part," adopts Defendant's factual allegations, but objects to "inaccuracies" with respect to three areas of contention: the assignment of answering operator calls to other workers and the economic feasibility for the Company to hire another administrative employee to answer operator calls; when Plaintiff informed Loral of her medical condition; and the life activities affected by her condition.¹

The undisputed facts show that Plaintiff, Gail M. Armstrong, was employed by Loral American (hereinafter "Loral") on a full-time, permanent basis as an engineering clerk in late 1980. During the early 1990s, as a result of downsizing in the company, Plaintiff's duties were expanded to include the following duties: accounts payable clerical duties, accounts receivable clerical duties, entering customer purchase orders, sorting company mail, entering and recording customer blue prints, and answering operator calls on a rotating basis.

Loral laid off its switchboard operator/receptionist during downsizing and subsequently installed a voice mail system. When a caller using the system dialed zero for operator assistance, a loud bell would ring over the paging system indicating an "operator call" to be answered. Plaintiff and other clerical workers were each scheduled to answer operator calls from their desks one-half day per week and to back up the person assigned to answer calls the rest of the day. Plaintiff claims that answering operator calls made her nervous and anxious because the bell rang loudly and the calls would distract her from her regular duties.

Plaintiff was first diagnosed with a mental illness in November 1993.² She has been treated continuously by Dr. Barbara Por Srur since that time. Plaintiff also began consulting Roger Rowe, a mental health counselor referred by Dr. Srur, in November 1994.

In or about March 1995, Plaintiff asked General Manager Stan Bell if she could move two accounting files to her office to reduce the stress caused by running to and from opposite ends of the building, but her request was denied. By October 1995, Plaintiff requested assistance with the increased workload.

On October 24, 1995, Plaintiff requested a two-week leave of absence, supported by a letter from Dr. Srur. The request was granted,³ and Plaintiff did not work until January 3, 1996, when she returned to work with a letter from Dr. Srur that released her to work with restrictions to accommodate her illness, including a restriction that Plaintiff should not be required to answer operator calls. After reviewing the letter and discussing the restrictions with Plaintiff, Langenbach and Human Resources Manager Vicki Derreberry advised Plaintiff that she would not be permitted to work until she was able to do so without restrictions. On February 2, 1996, Plaintiff sent a letter to Loral American requesting accommodation and claiming that she had a disability of major depression.

On February 8, 1996, Plaintiff attended an independent medical examination with Dr. James Slocum, a doctor provided by Defendant's insurance carrier. After a one-time evaluation of Plaintiff, Dr. Slocum released Plaintiff to return to work without restrictions.

Plaintiff returned to work on February 26, 1996. Because Defendant had hired another engineering clerk, Connie Hardesty, Defendant placed Plaintiff in a production control clerk position, which still required Plaintiff to answer operator calls one-half day per week. The next day, Plaintiff wrote a memo requesting the accommodation of not having to answer operator calls. This request was supported by a letter faxed by Dr. Srur on February 28, 1996, which stated that plaintiff was on medication for anxiety and answering operator calls exacerbated her condition.

On March 6, 1996, Plaintiff was assigned to answer operator calls and again refused to answer the calls, explaining that she was unable to do so. Derreberry sent Plaintiff home and invited her to return to work the next day. Later that day, Dr. Srur called Derreberry and again stated that answering the operator calls caused Plaintiff anxiety.

On March 12, 1996, Derreberry and General Manager Bell met with Plaintiff and gave her a written warning that continued refusal to answer operator calls would be viewed as insubordination and handled in accordance with company procedures. The following day, Plaintiff again refused to answer the operator calls, and Loral terminated Plaintiff's employment.

On or about January 8, 1996, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC alleging she was terminated or "effectively terminated" by reason of her disability and discrimination by reason of a failure to provide reasonable accommodations. On the charge form, the Plaintiff did not check the box requesting that the charge be dual filed.

On July 25, 1996, Plaintiff brought this disability discrimination action pursuant to the ADA and the FCRA. Plaintiff alleges that Loral American's refusal to accommodate her disability and subsequent termination of her employment constituted disability discrimination. Defendant moves for summary judgment on all claims.

II.

The court shall grant summary judgment for the moving party only when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The court may look to "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits," in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate. Id.. The movant bears the exacting burden of demonstrating that there is no dispute as to any material fact in the case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ. Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir.1993); Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir.1983).

Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Howard v. BP Oil Company, Inc., 32 F.3d 520, 524 (11th Cir.1994). The nonmovant must designate specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial beyond mere allegations or the party's perception of discrimination. See Perkins v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, 902 F.Supp. 1503 (M.D.Fla.1995). He or she must set forth by affidavit or other appropriate means specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Because evidence of a genuine issue of material fact must be such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Hairston, 9 F.3d at 919, only reasonable doubts as to the existence of genuine facts may be considered, Browning v. Peyton, 918 F.2d 1516, 1520 (11th Cir.1990). It is the substantive law that identifies those facts which are material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

When deciding a motion for summary judgment, "[i]t is not part of the court's function ... to decide issues of material fact, but rather [it is to] determine whether such issues exist to be tried ..." and "[t]he court must avoid weighing conflicting evidence or making credibility determinations." Hairston, 9 F.3d at 919 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242). The only determination for the court in a summary judgment proceeding is whether there exists genuine and material issues of fact to be...