Armstrong v. Morrill

Decision Date01 December 1871
Citation20 L.Ed. 765,14 Wall. 120,81 U.S. 120
PartiesARMSTRONG v. MORRILL
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

ERROR to the District Court of the United States for West Virginia; the case having been thus:

Lot M. Morrill brought ejectment, on the 15th of April, 1857, in the District Court for the Western District of Virginia (now the court below), both having circuit court jurisdiction, against Armstrong and others, to recover 1500 acres of land. In one count Morrill alleged that he was possessed of it when the defendants wrongfully entered; in another, that James Dundas and Benjamin Kugler were so possessed. An amended declaration alleged, in its first court, the possession to have been jointly in Morrill, Dundas, and Kugler; and in its second, to have been in Morrill alone. In a new count still, the possession was alleged to have been in William M. Tilghman.

The plaintiff's title rested on a survey to Albert Gallatin, dated June 12th, 1770, for a large tract (of which that in controversy was said to be part), followed by a patent dated February 10th, 1786, for the tract described in the survey. In 1794 Gallatin conveyed to Robert Morris, of Philadelphia, who, in 1795, made a deed of the tract to Thomas Willing, John Nixon, and John Barclay, and the survivors and survivor in fee, in trust for a land association, called the North American Land Company. Messrs. Nixon and Barclay accepted the trust. Mr. Willing's action appeared before the court no otherwise than by a paper which the plaintiffs offered in evidence, thus:

'I Thomas Willing, of the city of Philadelphia, do hereby declare and make known unto all whom it doth or may concern, that immediately on my receiving notice that Robert Morris had conveyed certain estates of land to John Nixon, John Barclay, and myself, in trust for the North American Land Company, I did positively refuse to accept or to act under the trust so intended to be created, and that I have at no time since accepted the said trust, or acted in any wise as trustee in relation thereto.

'Witness my hand, this 19th day of December, 1806.

'THOMAS WILLING.'

The death of Mr. Willing, who was president of the first Bank of the United States, and otherwise, in his day, one of the best known characters in Philadelphia, and the genuineness of his signature, were sworn to ex parte, by one of his sons and by two other witnesses, and the signature was certified by the examiner of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in 1844, to have been 'proved' before him in due form of law. The instrument had also, along with the affidavits and the examiner's certificate of probate, been admitted to record by the clerk of Cabell County, Virginia, where apparently some of the lands lay.

The title being in this state, the legislature of Virginia, on the 27th of February, 1835, passed an act, by whose second section it was enacted that all lands not then in the actual possession of the owner, by himself or his tenant in possession, and which had not been entered for taxation on the books of the commissioners of the revenue, on which the taxes had not been paid, shall become 'forfeited to the Commonwealth,' after July 1st, 1836.

The 3d section of the act ran thus:

'That all right, title, and interest which may hereafter be vested in the Commonwealth by virtue of the provisions of the section of this act next preceding herein, shall be transferred and vested in any and every person or persons (other than those for whose default the same have been forfeited and their heirs or devisees), who are now in possession of said lands, or any part or parcel of them, for so much thereof as they have just title or claim to, legal or equitable, bon a fide claim held or derived under grants from the Commonwealth dated prior to April 1st, 1831, who shall have discharged all taxes duly assessed and charged against her, him, or them upon such lands, and all taxes that ought to have been assessed and charged thereon, from the time when he, she, or they acquired his, her, or their title thereto, whether legal or equitable.'

Under this act, the land conveyed by Mr. Morris became forfeited.

In 1844 the legislature passed 'An act for the relief of James Dundas and Benjamin Kugler,' who had apparently become large shareholders of the North American Land Company, and who by sundry conveyances were then vested with whatever estate Nixon had been vested with by the deed of 1795, of Mr. Morris to Messrs. Willing, Nixon, and Barclay. By this act of 1844, Dundas and Kugler were authorized to redeem the lands forfeited under the already-quoted act of 1835; on which redemption by them the title vested by the forfeiture was released by the terms of the act to them for the benefit of the land company.

The act contained, however, in its second section, this proviso:

'Provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to deprive any persons having a legal or equitable title to these lands, by virtue of a subsequent grant from the Commonwealth, or otherwise, of his, her, or their right, title, or interest, but the rights of such claimants shall remain the same as if this act had never been passed.'

Dundas and Kugler having, in May, 1845, redeemed the land, now put in evidence the certificate of the Auditor of Public Accounts of Virginia, to show that the taxes had been paid in pursuance of the act of 1844, and in 1845 the heirs of Barclay, who had survived Nixon, conveyed all his estate in the lands to Dundas and Kugler, as trustees of the North American Land Company. These two conveyed to Morrill, the plaintiff.

So far as to the plaintiff's title; as to which it will be observed that if any title passed to Mr. Willing by the deed of Mr. Morris to him, Nixon, and Barclay, and had not passed from him by his disclaimer of 1806, then his estate, whatever it was, had not been conveyed to any one.

Now as to the defendant's title. Surveys having been made in different parts of the State, subsequent to the treaty of 1783, which included within their exterior boundaries smaller tracts of prior claimants, and these being reserved to such claimants in the certificates granted by the surveyors, doubts arose as to the authority of the governor to grant patents in such cases. The legislature of Virginia accordingly passed, June 2d, 1788,1 an act to authorize the governor to issue them. This act made a recital and enactment thus:

'Whereas sundry surveys have been made in different parts of the Commonwealth, which include in the general courses thereof, sundry smaller tracts of prior claimants, and which, in the certificates granted by the surveyors of the respective counties, are reserved to such claimants; and the governor or chief magistrate is not authorized by law to issue grants upon such certificates of surveys.'

And it enacted:

SECTION 1. 'That it shall and may be lawful for the governor to issue grants with reservation of claims to lands included within such surveys, anything in any law to the contrary notwithstanding.'

With this statute in force, one Samuel M. Hopkins obtained a survey and patent from the State of Virginia, dated July 1st, 1796.

The survey was for 200,000 acres, and gave boundaries including a much larger area, closing with this statement, to wit:

'An allowance of 227,460 acres is made in the calculation of area of this plat for prior claims included within boundary thereof.'

The patent followed the boundaries of the survey in its grant of the 200,000 acres, and concluded as follows:- 'But it is always to be understood that the survey upon which this grant is founded includes 227,460 acres, exclusive of the above quantity of 200,000 acres, all of which having a preference by law to the warrants and rights upon which this grant is founded, liberty is reserved that the same shall be firm and valid, and may be carried into grant or grants; and this grant shall be no bar in either law or equity to the confirmation of the title or titles to the same as before mentioned and reserved, with its appurtenances; to have and to hold the said tract or parcel of land, with its appurtenances, to the said Samuel M. Hopkins (except as before excepted) and his heirs forever.'

This title of Hopkins became afterwards vested in one Watson.

Evidence was given tending to show that the patent to Hopkins embraced within its exterior boundaries the entire tract claimed by the plaintiffs, and that the defendants and those under whom they claimed had paid the taxes and assessments thereon, from the month of September, 1834, to the year 1840.

In addition to this paper-title the defendants set up also one founded on adverse possession. They had taken actual bon a fide possession of the land in 1827, and had kept possession up to November 1st, 1836, when the premises in controversy were forfeited to the State, any they continued to occupy them throughout the term that the title was vested by the forfeiture in the State, and so also after May, 1845 (when by the redemption the tract was revested in its original owners), to the time when the suit was instituted, April 15th, 1857. Such possession before the forfeiture was, however, it will be observed, not for the term of fourteen years, the time then required by law in Virginia to bar a recovery, nor did such possession subsequent to the date of the revestiture, and before the bringing of this suit continue long enough to bar a recovery. The term before the forfeiture and the term after the revestiture tacked together constituted, however, an adverse possession of fourteen years, and would maintain the defence.

The defendants below—who had objected to the reception in evidence of what was called the disclaimer of Mr. Willing (the paper printed supra, pp. 121-2), and had excepted to its admission maintained:

I. As related to the construction of the patent to Hopkins.

1. That by its terms it covered all lands lying within its exterior boundaries, except such as came within the reservation contained...

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