Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. State ex rel. Moore

• Decision Date: 01 October 1923
• Docket Number: 23390,23309
• Citation: 133 Miss. 334,97 So. 552
• Parties: EDWARD HINES YELLOW PINE TRUSTEES et al. v. STATE ex rel. MOORE, Land Com'r. STATE ex rel. MOORE, Land Com'r, v. EDWARD HINES YELLOW PINE TRUSTEES, et al
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

97 So. 552

133 Miss. 334

EDWARD HINES YELLOW PINE TRUSTEES et al. v. STATE ex rel. MOORE, Land Com'r. STATE ex rel. MOORE, Land Com'r, v. EDWARD HINES YELLOW PINE TRUSTEES, et al

Nos. 23309, 23390

Supreme Court of Mississippi

October 1, 1923

In Case No. 23,309:

STATE ex rel. MOORE, Land Com'r, v. EDWARD HINES YELLOW PINE TRUSTEES et al. (In Banc.) January 1, 1920

1. PUBLIC LANDS. State patent to public land highest evidence of title.

A patent to public land by the state is the highest evidence of title.

2. PUBLIC LANDS. State patent carries presumption that all legal prerequisites to its issuance have been complied with.

A patent to public land by the state carries with it the presumption that all the legal prerequisites necessary to its issuance have been complied with; that the officers charged with executing such grants have performed their duties in regard to the several acts required to be done by them.

3. PUBLIC LANDS. State patent cannot be questioned except for fraud or mistake.

A patent to public land issued by the state cannot be questioned either in a court of law or equity, except on the ground of fraud or mistake.

4. PUBLIC LANDS. State patent to state functionary for public purposes to be liberally construed.

A patent of public land by the state to a functionary of the state, to be used for public purposes, is to be liberally and not narrowly construed.

5. PUBLIC LANDS. Federal and state swamp land acts liberally construed to effect reclamation.

The Federal Swamp Land Act of September 28, 1850 (U. S. Comp. St section 4958-4960), by which the swamp and overflowed lands in this state were granted to the state for the purpose of reclaiming such swamp and overflowed lands, as well as chapter 34, Laws of 1852 (Pearl River Swamp Land Act), by which the state granted to the commissioners of the southern district of Pearl river the swamp and overflowed lands lying and situated on or near Pearl river and included in said federal grant, for the purpose of reclaiming the swamp and overflowed lands on said river, have been liberally construed to that end for a long period of years by the federal and state officials intrusted with the execution of said statutes, as well as by the courts.

6. PUBLIC LANDS. Acts of secretary of state in listing and patenting swamp lands conclusive, except for fraud, accident or mistake.

Chapter 34, Laws of 1852, constituted the secretary of state a special tribunal to determine what lands were embraced in the grant by the state to the commissioners of the southern district of Pearl river, of the swamp and overflowed lands in said district lying and situated on or near Pearl river, and included in the grant from the federal government to the state by the act of September 28, 1850 (U. S. Comp. St sections 4958-4960), and his acts in selecting and listing said lands to said commissioners and patenting same to the grantees of said commissioners are conclusive as to the character and location of such lands and as to whether they came within the terms of said act, except for fraud accident, or mistake in such selection, listing, and patenting. And the fact that the secretary of state listed to said commissioners lands which were not in fact lying and situated on or near Pearl river, and on certificates of sale by said commissioners, issued patents to the grantees thereof, is no evidence that such patents were procured as the result of fraud, accident, or mistake.

7. PUBLIC LANDS. Statute authorizing Attorney-General to cancel fraudulent swamp land entries construed.

Chapter 44, Laws of 1890, made it the duty of the Attorney-General to institute the necessary legal proceedings "to cancel all entries of swamp and overuowed lands which, in his opinion were made in violation of law and where the interest of innocent purchasers under said fraudulent entries do not intervene to prevent such cancellation." Held: If this statute did not go to the extent of ratifying and confirming every patent theretofore issued by the state to swamp and overflowed lands where the rights of innocent purchasers had intervened, even though such grants had been procured by fraud, accident, or mistake, it did go to the extent of amounting to a declaration of the legislative policy of this state to that effect.

8. PUBLIC LANDS. Constitutional provision held not applicable to certain named lands.

Section 6, art. 8, of the Constitution of 1868, which appropriated the proceeds of all lands then belonging to the state theretofore granted by the United States known as swamp and overflowed lands, except those lying and situated on Pearl river in the counties of Hancock, Marion, Lawrence, Simpson, and Copiah, by its terms expressly excluded the lands here involved because they are lying and situated on or near Pearl river in the meaning of chapter 34, Laws of 1852.

9. CASES EXPLAINED AND DISTINGUISHED.

Tynes v. Southern Pine Co., 100 Miss. 129, 54 So. 885, explained and distinguished.

In Case No. 23, 309:

HON. G. WOOD MAGEE, Special Judge.

APPEAL from circuit court of Pearl River county, HON. G. WOOD MAGEE, Special Judge.

In Case No. 23,390:

APPEAL from chancery court of Pearl River county.

HON. D. M. RUSSELL, Chancellor.

Separate actions by the state, on the relation of R. D. Moore, Land Commissioner, against the Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees and others. From a judgment on a directed verdict, defendants appeal, and from a decree dismissing the state's bill, it appeals. Reversed and dismissed as to the first case, and affirmed as to last case.

Circuit court case reversed and dismissed, and chancery court affirmed.

J. W. Cassedy, Hathorn & Williams, Rawls & Hathorn, for appellant. In Case No. 23390 and for appellees in Case No. 23309.

First. Neither the board of commissioners of the Southern District of Pearl river nor the secretary of state nor the governor were given any power or authority, by the legislative act of 1852, to deal with, to sell, or to dispose of the lands involved in this suit.

In discussing this contention of appellant, it is necessary to bring under review and to construe the legislative act of 1852, in order to determine whether the lands involved in this suit were embraced within the purview of that act. In construing the act, it is well to keep in mind those fundamental rules of construction which guide courts to a proper construction of statutes. In 36 Cyc. 1106, this rule of construction is given: "The great fundamental rule in construing statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. This intention, however, must be the intention expressed by the statute, and where the meaning of the language used is plain, it must be given effect by the court, or they would be assuming legislative authority."

Again in 36 Cyc., 1114, this further rule is stated: "In the interpretation of statutes, words in common use are to be construed in their natural, plain and ordinary signification. It is a well-settled rule that so long as the language used is unambiguous, a departure from its natural meaning is not justified by any consideration of its consequences, or by public policy; and it is the plain duty of the court to give it force and effect."

The title of the act of March 12, 1852, recites that it is to provide for the appropriation of the "swamp and overflowed lands on the Pearl river."

The words used in the legislative act to describe the lands dealt with are: "the swamp and overflowed lands lying and situated on Pearl river."

There are three conjoint elements which go to make up a description of the lands dealt with and covered by this legislative act. These three conjoint elements of description are (a) that the lands must be swamp lands donated to the state under the act of Congress approved September 28, 1850; and (b) that such lands must be within the five counties named in the act of March 12, 1852; and (c) that they must be such of said lands within said five counties as are situated on Pearl river. It is just as essential that the lands shall be on Pearl river as it is that they shall be within the counties named in the act. To hold that the lands involved in this suit, located on Wolf river and a tributary of Pascagoula river, twenty miles and more from Pearl river, unaffected by the waters of that river, and near the eastern boundary line of the county, were dealt with and covered by said legislative act, would be to ignore this important and essential conjoint element of description used in the act to describe the lands and would be, in effect, to construe the act as dealing with and covering all the lands within the county, and not simply with those lands therein "lying and situated on Pearl river."

Even if section 2 of the act of March 12, 1852 had described the lands as being all those swamp lands "on or near Pearl river" within the five counties named in the act, instead of describing them as being those swamp lands therein "lying and situated on Pearl river," and if these words are to be construed in their natural, plain and ordinary signification, as courts uniformly construe such words when used in statutes, then even these words would not embrace the lands involved in this suit, situated, as they are, outside of the Pearl river water-shed, twenty miles and more from Pearl river, within a few miles of the eastern boundary line of the county, and actually located on Wolf river and on Pascagoula river.

Second. The lands involved in this suit were, by the express terms of the Constitution of 1868, set aside and appropriated for the support of free schools within the state.

The state of Mississippi having provided by the act of March 12 1852, for the disposal of those swamp lands, and only those swamp lands, ...