Armstrong v. Shirvell
| Decision Date | 11 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 11-11921 |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER ARMSTRONG, PLAINTIFF, v. ANDREW SHIRVELL, DEFENDANT. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
ARTHUR J. TARNOW
Before the Court are Defendant Andrew Shirvell's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law [199] and Motion for New Trial or Motion to Amend the Judgment Regarding Damages [200], filed on September 21, 2012.
Beginning on August 7, 2012, a jury trial was held on Plaintiff's claims of defamation, invasion of privacy/false light, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and stalking. On August 16, 2012, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff on all claims. The jury awarded Plaintiff damages in the amount of $4.5 million.
In the instant motions, Defendant seeks judgment as a matter of law on all claims, a new trial, and in the alternative, a remittitur of the damages awarded.
For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law [199] and Motion for New Trial or Motion to Amend the Judgment Regarding Damages [200] are DENIED.
Defendant Shirvell brings his Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law [199] pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. In ruling on a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law after a verdict has been returned, this Court may allow the judgment to stand, order a new trial, or direct entry of judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 50(b). In reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law, this Court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and must give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Tuck v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., 7 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1993)(citations omitted). In considering the evidence, this Court "may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations, as these are jury functions." Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 657 (6th Cir. 1999)(citations omitted). Moreover, dismissal is improper "where the nonmovant presented sufficient evidence to raise a material issue of fact for the jury." Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, the decision to grant judgment as a matter of law is appropriate "'whenever there is a complete absence of pleading or proof on an issuematerial to the cause of action or when no disputed issues of fact exist such that reasonable minds would not differ.'" Id.(quoting O'Neill v. Kiledjian, 511 F.2d 511, 513 (6th Cir. 1975)).
Defendant Shirvell first argues that Plaintiff Armstrong is not a private individual, and is instead either a public figure, a public official, or a limited-purpose public figure, and therefore the jury's finding of negligent defamation must be vacated as a matter of law. To make a showing of defamation under Michigan state law four elements must be proven:
(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by publication [defamation per quod].
Mitan v. Campbell, 474 Mich. 21, 24 (2005) (internal citations omitted). When the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, the plaintiff has the additional burden of showing clear and convincing evidence of actual malice on the part of the defendant. Faxon v. Michigan Republican State Cent. Comm., 244 Mich. App. 468, 474 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001). Actual malice means that the "injurious falsehood was made knowing that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was true." Id.
A public figure is a person who holds "pervasive power" or as to whom there is "clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974). Courts may not "lightly assume that a citizen's participation in community and professional affairs rendered him a public figure for all purposes." Id. The "designation has been applied sparingly," only to "those persons whose names have become household words." Bufalino v. Detroit Magazine, Inc., 433 Mich. 766, 788-89 (1989).
"What determines whether an officer is a public official for First Amendment purposes is the presence or absence of 'substantial responsibility' and 'control' over governmental processes that affect the lives, liberty and property of citizens." Woodruff v. Ohman, 29 Fed. Appx. 337, 348 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (U.S. 1966)).
A limited purpose public figure is someone who "voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351. A controversy for these purposes must be more than a cause celebre or a matter that attracts public attention. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (U.S. 1976); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979). The defamer cannot be the person actually engaged in andaffected by the alleged controversy. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979) ().
During trial, this Court ruled that Plaintiff Armstrong was a private individual. Defendant Shirvell now presents much the same evidence as previously shown to the Court, and again argues that Armstrong is a public figure, a public official, or a limited-purpose public figure. Specifically, Defendant argues that the election of Plaintiff Armstrong as the student body president at the University of Michigan, mention of Armstrong's name in news publications as the first openly gay student president, and Armstrong's public statements openly identifying his sexual orientation render Plaintiff Armstrong a public figure.
Again, this Court does not find Defendant's arguments persuasive. The mention of Plaintiff Armstrong in a limited number of mostly local news publications does not render Armstrong a "household word[]." Bufalino, 433 Mich. at 789. Moreover, Plaintiff's position as student body president did not provide Plaintiff with control or responsibility for government processes, and therefore, does qualify him as a public official. Woodruff, 29 Fed. Appx. at 348. Finally, Defendant Shirvell also fails to identify a public controversy in which Plaintiff was involved, other than the attention brought on Plaintiff by Defendant's own statements and actions. Defendant suggeststhat through Armstrong's advocacy on behalf of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people, and his open identification of his own sexual orientation, Plaintiff has "thrust himself into public controversy." However, the only showing Defendant attempts to make of an actual controversy is a one-sentence quote from an article that simply identifies Plaintiff as the first openly gay student president of the University, and states that Plaintiff intended to pursue creating a gender-neutral campus housing option. Again, a matter of public interest is not in and of itself a public controversy. As such, Plaintiff is also not a limited-purpose public figure.
Therefore, as this Court ruled at trial, Plaintiff is a private individual for the purposes of Defendant's claims. Moreover, a private plaintiff that is able to prove actual malice is entitled to damages associated with this claim, including damages to reputation or feelings. Glazer v. Lamkin, 201 Mich. App. 432, 437 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
Defendant then argues that the evidence presented at trial does not support the jury's finding of actual malice. Defendant basis this argument on his own testimony, in which he states that he believed the statements he made pertaining to Plaintiff Armstrong were true. However, Defendant's state of mind was a material issue of fact for consideration by the jury. See Jackson, 191 F.3d at 657. This Court must consider Defendant's testimony in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and the Court may notmake any determinations as to the credibility of this evidence, for that is the role of the jury. See id. Therefore, this Court declines to overrule the jury's verdict as to the claim of actual malice.
Next, Defendant argues that the jury's findings on the claims of defamation and invasion of privacy/false light should be vacated as a matter of law because the statements at issue are substantively true, constitute constitutionally protected speech, or are rhetorical hyperbole. Plaintiff's complaint included nearly forty allegedly actionable statements made by Defendant. At trial, the jury was presented with approximately fifteen pages of allegedly defamatory statements. Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law [199], now before the Court, makes no specific mention to any particular statement, and instead refers the Court to two previous filings, Defendant's February 24, 2012 Motion for Summary Judgment [111] and a January 21, 2011 response to a grievance filed with the attorney grievance committee. These two documents make specific reference to less than half of the statements at issue in this case. Of the unspecified statements, Defendant also fails to delineate which statements he alleges are true, which are allegedly protected opinion speech, and which are allegedly rhetorical hyperbole. This Court cannot dismiss the jury verdict based on Defendant's generalized claims.
Defendant also asserts that the findings as to the claims of defamation and invasion of privacy/false light should be vacated as a matter of law because they ...
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