Armstrong v. State

• Citation: 30 Fla. 170,11 So. 618
• Parties: ARMSTRONG v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 07 October 1892
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

11 So. 618

30 Fla. 170

ARMSTRONG v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court

October 7, 1892

Error to circuit court, Duval county; W. B. Young, Judge.

Robert Armstrong was convicted of murder, and brings error. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. Where the defense of insanity is relied upon, the rule in force in this state is that if the evidence introduced tends to rebut the presumption of sanity on the part of the accused, and the jury entertain a reasonable doubt, after due consideration of all the evidence, as to his sanity, it is their duty to acquit.

2. The statutory definition of murder, 'the unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed,' includes the element of a rational agency, and it devolves upon the state to show this, as well as any other element of the crime. The law, however, presumes that all men are sane, and, in the absence of evidence indicating a contrary state of mind, both court and jury are justified in acting upon this presumption and where the evidence establishes the criminal act, and indicates nothing as to the mental capacity of the accused to commit the deed, a conviction is not only authorized, but should be had. If, however, there arises from the evidence coming from any quarter, a reasonable doubt as to the sanity of the accused, the presumption of the law is overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal, unless the state meets and overcomes this reasonable doubt arising in his favor.

3. Nonexpert witnesses cannot express a general opinion as to sanity, nor can they give an opinion independent of the facts and circumstances within their own knowledge, but they can detail the facts known to them which show insanity, and thereupon express an opinion as to the sanity of the person whose mental condition is being investigated. The value of such testimony will depend largely upon the opportunities of the witnesses for correct observation of the appearances and conduct of the person whose mind is claimed to be unsound, as well as the character of such appearances and conduct.

4. Where insanity of a permanent type, or of a continuing nature, or possessed of the characteristics of an habitual or confirmed disorder of the mind, as distinguished from temporary or spasmodic mania, or disorders of mind produced by the violence of disease, is shown to have existed a short time prior to the commission of an act, it is presumed to continue up to the time of the commission of the act, unless this presumption is overcome by competent testimony.

5. The verdict of a jury will not be set aside on evidence of facts complicated and contradictory, and which require an investigation into the character and credit of witnesses whose testimony it is necessary to compare and weigh; nor will the verdict be set aside as against the weight of the evidence, unless it preponderates so strongly against the verdict that the court cannot conclude such verdict was the result of a due consideration of the evidence; but a verdict that is clearly against the evidence should be set aside. The evidence in this case considered, and held not to sustain the verdict.

COUNSEL

Frank W. Pope, for plaintiff in error.

The Attorney General, for the State.

OPINION

MABRY J.

Plaintiff in error, Robert Armstrong, was indicted in the Duval circuit court for the murder of Carleton Lowe, and has been twice tried and convicted in Duval county of the alleged offense. The first conviction occurred in May, A. D. 1890, and on writ of error to this court the judgment of the trial court was reversed, and a new trial awarded. 27 Fla. 366, 9 South. Rep 1. This reversal was upon the ground of misdirection of the jury by the court. In December A. D. 1891, another trial resulted in a verdict of guilty, and a sentence of death, and, by writ of error, the proceedings of the second trial are now before us for review. Before sentence was passed upon plaintiff in error he made a motion for a new trial on various grounds, the first three of which are, in substance, that the verdict was against the evidence, against the law, and against the charge of the court. The overruling of this motion is assigned as error in this court, and counsel for plaintiff in error contends that the evidence, all of which is presented to us by bill of exceptions, does not sustain the verdict. This necessitates an examination and due consideration of the evidence on our part to see if this contention of counsel must be sustained.

The first witness who testified for the state was Paul G. Phillips, who stated that he was chief of police then and at the time Carleton Lowe was killed. He knew Carleton Lowe was dead. Saw his dead body. He died February 26, A. D. 1890, in Duval county, Fla. Witness saw the dead body for the first time at the undertaker's shop in the city of Jacksonville, February 27, A. D. 1890. Witness examined the body, and found three pistol or gunshot wounds, one where the ball struck the badge on the breast, another right below the left nipple, and one right across his forehead,--went diagonally across, and took the skin and flesh to the bone. The ball below the left nipple went through and came out at his back below the shoulder blade. Witness indentified a badge which was on deceased, and stated that one ball was imbedded in the badge. It was a policeman's badge, and is worn on the left breast.

Charles Caricio testified for the state that he first saw the assused the night of February 26, A. D. 1890, at De Moya's store, where witness clerked. The accused came in about 15 minutes after 9 o'clock at night, and asked for a cigar. Witness gave him one, and he put his hand in his right-hand pocket, and pulled out a dime, and threw it down on the counter. Witness gave accused a nickel in change. He said: 'They are a two-cent cigar, he guessed he would have to pay five cents for it.' De Moya told him it was a five-cent cigar straight to everybody. The accused offered witness some bananas, but the latter said he had just eaten some. Accused then took out the bananas, and ate them, and threw the peelings on the floor. De Moya asked accused kindly not to throw the peelings on the floor, but he kept on. De Moya asked accused again not to throw the peelings on the floor, as some of the customers would come in and break their necks. Accused said, 'Here you are,' and threw two on the floor again. Then De Moya went outside the store, and accused followed him, and walked about 50 yards from the store. Deceased was in front of the store, and asked accused to pick up the peelings. De Moya asked deceased to make accused pick up the peelings. Accused told deceased that he would not pick up the peelings, and deceased said, 'Oh, yes; you will;' and accused said again he would not pick them up. Deceased then went up to accused, and he then said, 'Yes; I will;' and then went in and picked up the peelings. After accused picked up the peelings, he said to De Moya, 'Now you are satisfied, ain't you?' and De Moya said, 'You were brave; you thought there was no policeman on this block.' The accused then walked about 50 yards from the store, came back, and asked deceased to show him the number of his badge. Deceased threw back his coat, and said, 'There it is.' Accused walked off about three yards, came back, and asked deceased again to show his badge. Deceased put his finger to it, and said, 'There it is.' Accused came back the third time, and asked deceased to show his badge. Deceased said, 'Damn you, there it is.' Accused took hold of it with his hand, and turned it around. Deceased grabbed accused. Witness then saw three flashes, and heard three reports. This was about five minutes after accused came back the third time. Witness then went back to the end of the store, and opened the back door, and De Moya and witness ran up Adams street. As they were running witness heard some one run in the store and halloo, 'Oh,' and then fall. Accused had his right hand in his right-hand pocket all the time. He was about two feet from deceased when he fired.

De Moya, testifying for the state, corroborated Caricio in every particular in his testimony. In addition, De Moya said the accused was the man who did the shooting, and he shot deceased before he hit accused. When deceased grabbed accused, the former threw up the hand in which he held the club when the shooting commenced. Deceased struck accused after he was shot. The accused appeared to be under the influence of liquor when in witness' store.

Frank Land testified for the state that he was standing near De Moya's store, and saw the accused shoot deceased Carleton Lowe. Deceased told accused to pick up some bananaskins from the floor of De Moya's store, which accused at first said he would not do. Deceased told him if he did not he would maul his damn head off. Accused then picked them up, and started off, and got a couple of feet; then, turning, asked deceased to let him see his badge. Deceased showed it to him. Accused started off, and deceased told him to go on; he was a good runner. Accused, after going a few feet, went back again, and asked deceased to show his badge. Deceased again showed it to him. Accused again started off, and again turned, and asked to see deceased's badge. Deceased turned back his coat, and said, 'There, damn you, there it is.' The accused took hold of it as if to look at it, when deceased grabbed, and threw up his hand in which he held the club, when accused shot him. Accused shot before he was hit by deceased. Deceased struck accused after the first shot was fired. Witness was certain that accused fired before he was hit by deceased. He fired before he was struck, and twice afterwards. One shot struck the badge, one the forehead,...