Armstrong v. State, Dept. of Justice
| Decision Date | 01 November 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-237,90-237 |
| Parties | Bradley H. ARMSTRONG, Petitioner and Appellant, v. STATE of Montana, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondent and Respondent. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Erik Rocksund, Columbia Falls, for petitioner and appellant.
Ed Corrigan, Deputy Flathead County Atty., Kalispell, Mark Racicot, Atty. Gen., Peter Funk, Asst. Atty. Gen., Helena, for respondent and respondent.
Bradley H. Armstrong appeals from an order of the District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, denying Armstrong's request that his right to drive be reinstated. We reverse the District Court.
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the District Court erred in its upholding of the implied consent suspension of Armstrong's driver's license in light of the State's concession that the arresting officer lacked legal basis to stop Armstrong's vehicle.
In the early hours of February 21, 1990, Columbia Falls Police Officer Dale Stone made a stop of Bradley H. Armstrong's vehicle. Armstrong was subsequently arrested for being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Sec. 61-8-401, MCA. Armstrong refused to submit to a chemical test of his breath to determine blood alcohol content, and his license was seized pursuant to Sec. 61-8-402, MCA, the implied consent law.
The D.U.I. charge was dismissed shortly thereafter, as the State conceded that the arresting officer did not have reasonable grounds to stop Armstrong's vehicle.
On February 27, 1990, Armstrong filed an appeal and petition to reinstate his license pursuant to Sec. 61-8-403, MCA. In the March 19, 1990 hearing, Armstrong stipulated to his refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test after the arrest. The State stipulated the officer did not have reasonable grounds to stop Armstrong. However, the State contended that probable cause developed after the stop to indicate that Armstrong was driving under the influence of alcohol. The State attempted to frame the issue as whether the officer, in his role as a public safety officer, had a valid investigative or safety reason to stop Armstrong as he drove down an alleyway at 2:30 a.m., from which reasonable grounds subsequently developed to arrest Armstrong for D.U.I. Alternatively, the State argued the license suspension provision of Sec. 61-8-402, MCA, to be an administrative act, separate and distinct from the criminal offense. The District Court concurred with the State's latter approach, and ruled from the bench that suspension under Sec. 61-8-402, MCA, "is an administrative act that doesn't depend for its execution upon the lawfulness of the initial stop," and therefore denied Armstrong's petition. This appeal resulted.
This Court has stated previously that refusal to submit to a chemical test for blood alcohol content is an issue separate and distinct from the criminal action of driving while intoxicated. Gebhardt v. State (1989), 238 Mont. 90, 775 P.2d 1261; In re Blake (1986), 220 Mont. 27, 712 P.2d 1338; Petition of Burnham (1985), 217 Mont. 513, 705 P.2d 603. The suspension of a license is subject to review under Sec. 61-8-403, MCA, which states:
The department shall immediately notify any person whose license or privilege to drive has been suspended or revoked, as hereinbefore authorized, in writing and such person shall have the right to file a petition within 30 days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in the district court in the county wherein such person resides or in the district court in the county in which this arrest was made. Such court is hereby vested with jurisdiction and it shall be its duty to set the matter for hearing upon 10 days' written notice to the county attorney of the county wherein the appeal is filed and such county attorney shall represent the state, and thereupon the court shall take testimony and examine into the facts of the case, except that the issues shall be limited to whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle upon ways of this state open to the public, while under the influence of alcohol, whether the person was placed under arrest, and whether such person refused to submit to the test. The court shall thereupon determine whether the petitioner is entitled to a license or is subject to suspension as heretofore provided. (Emphasis added.)
In a district court's review of the propriety of the license suspension for failure to submit to a...
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