Miller v. Toler

• Decision Date: 20 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–0352.,11–0352.
• Citation: 729 S.E.2d 137,229 W.Va. 302
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Joe E. MILLER, Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, Defendant Below, Petitioner v. Christopher L. TOLER, Plaintiff Below, Respondent.

229 W.Va. 302

729 S.E.2d 137

Joe E. MILLER, Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, Defendant Below, Petitioner

v.Christopher L. TOLER, Plaintiff Below, Respondent.

No. 11–0352.

Supreme Court of Appeals of

West Virginia.

Submitted April 11, 2012.

Decided June 6, 2012.

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Benjamin

July 20, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

1. “In cases where the circuit court has amended the result before the administrative agency, this Court reviews the final order of the circuit court and the ultimate disposition by it of an administrative law case under an abuse of discretion standard and reviews questions of law de novo.” Syl. Pt. 2, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996). Syl. Pt. 1, Clower v. W. Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 223 W.Va. 535, 678 S.E.2d 41 (2009).

2. “The purpose of this State's administrative driver's license revocation procedures is to protect innocent persons by removing intoxicated drivers from the public roadways as quickly as possible.” Syl. Pt. 3, In re Petition of McKinney, 218 W.Va. 557, 625 S.E.2d 319 (2005).

3. The judicially-created exclusionary rule is not applicable in a civil, administrative driver's license revocation or suspension proceeding.

Darrell V. McGraw, Esq., Attorney General, Scott E. Johnson, Esq., Senior Assistant Attorney General, Elaine L. Skorich, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, WV, for the Petitioner.

Charles A. Stacy, Esq. Bluefield, VA, for the Respondent.

WORKMAN, Justice:

This case is before the Court upon the appeal of the Petitioner Joe Miller, Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter “the Commissioner”), from an Order of the Circuit Court of Mercer County, West Virginia, reversing the Commissioner's revocation of the Respondent Christopher L. Toler's driver's license. The circuit court found that the Respondent was driving while under the influence of alcohol; however, because the circuit court also found that the vehicle equipment checkpoint at which the Respondent was stopped was unconstitutional, the Commissioner's decision to revoke the Respondent's license was reversed. The Commissioner argues that the circuit court erred: 1) in applying the prophylactic exclusionary rule to exclude all evidence in this case because the judicially-created exclusionary rule does not apply to civil proceedings; and 2) in excluding all the evidence because West Virginia § 17C–5A–2(f) (2008)¹ creates only a limited exclusionary rule that requires the suppression of secondary breath test evidence if administered without lawful custody, but does not otherwise bar the admission of other evidence.²

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On December 28, 2008, Senior Trooper C.N. Workman and three or four other State Police Officers conducted a vehicle equipment checkpoint on State Route 71, near Montcalm, Mercer County, West Virginia. The purpose of the checkpoint was to check license, registration, insurance, and brake lights. At the checkpoint, Senior Trooper Workman asked the Respondent for his license, registration and insurance card. The trooper walked back to inspect the Respondent's registration and brake lights. Upon returning the Respondent's license and registrationto the Respondent, Senior Trooper Workman testified that he smelled alcohol. The trooper testified that the Respondent admitted to consuming a couple of beers. The Respondent failed the standardized field sobriety tests. The Respondent was administered a preliminary breath test that measured .119. Senior Trooper Workman placed the Respondent under arrest for driving under the influence.

The Division of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) received the West Virginia D.U.I. Information Sheet on December 31, 2008. The DMV then issued an order, dated January 16, 2009, revoking the Respondent's privilege to drive in West Virginia. The Respondent timely requested an administrative hearing, challenging the probable cause for the stop and the secondary chemical test, as reflected in a “Hearing Request Form” that was received by the DMV on January 27, 2009.³

On September 10, 2009, there was an administrative hearing regarding the Respondent's license revocation. Senior Trooper Workman testified about the vehicle equipment checkpoint. Senior Trooper Workman also testified that it was his understanding that this type of checkpoint could be done at any time and any location. He stated that they would typically check seat belts or lights, as well as registration, insurance and license. He further testified that every vehicle was to be checked. Senior Trooper Workman testified that he was not aware of any departmental guidelines that required prior approval before conducting a vehicle equipment checkpoint. The trooper also stated that he was not aware of any need to get pre-approval regarding location or duration of the checkpoint before conducting this type of checkpoint. Finally, the trooper testified regarding the evidence he obtained as a result of the vehicle safety checkpoint that led to the arrest of the Respondent for driving under the influence.⁴

Following the administrative hearing, in an undated final order, the Commissioner of the DMV, based upon the preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, revoked the Respondent's license for a period of ninety days pursuant to West Virginia Code §§ 17C–5A–2(j) (2008) ⁵ and –3(c)(5)(A) (2008) ⁶ and West Virginia Code § 17B–3–9 (2005). ⁷ On September 30, 2010, the Respondent filed an administrative appeal in the Circuit Court of Mercer County, West Virginia. By order entered that same day, the circuit court granted the Respondent's request for a stay of his driver's license revocation that was scheduled take effect on October 13, 2010.

On December 21, 2010, a hearing was held before the circuit court regarding the Respondent's driver's license revocation. A copy of the transcript from this hearing was not a part of the record on appeal.

By Order entered January 31, 2011, the circuit court reversed the Commissioner's final order and reinstated the Respondent's driver's license. In its Order, the circuit court specifically stated that

[t]he parties concurred that the only issue to decide in this case is whether the exclusionary rule applies in an administrative proceeding concerning the revocation of the Petitioner's license to drive a motor vehicle. The parties further agree that this issue ... has not been directly addressed by the West Virginia Supreme Court.” ⁸

(footnote added). In resolving this issue, the circuit court concluded, as a matter of law, that the vehicle equipment checkpoint was unconstitutional, in light of the Court's decision in State v. Sigler, 224 W.Va. 608, 687 S.E.2d 391 (2009).⁹ The circuit court, in reversing the Commissioner's decision, then implicitly applied the exclusionary rule to the civil, administrative driver's license revocation proceeding to exclude the evidence the state trooper had seized as a result of the stop.

II. Standard of Review

The Court's review of the circuit court's order in this case is set forth in syllabus point one of Clower v. West Department of Motor Vehicles, 223 W.Va. 535, 678 S.E.2d 41 (2009):

“ ‘In cases where the circuit court has amended the result before the administrative agency, this Court reviews the final order of the circuit court and the ultimate disposition by it of an administrative law case under an abuse of discretion standard and reviews questions of law de novo.’ Syllabus point 2, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996).”

See Syl. Pt. 1, Miller v. Chenoweth, 229 W.Va. 114, 727 S.E.2d 658 (W.Va.2012).

III. Argument

The issue before the Court is whether the exclusionary rule applies in a civil, administrative hearing ¹⁰ concerning the revocation or suspension of a driver's license.¹¹ The Commissioner argues that the circuit court erred in applying the prophylactic exclusionary rule to exclude all evidence in this case because the judicially-created exclusionary rule does not apply to civil proceedings. Conversely, the Respondent argues that the circuit court properly determined that the appropriate and effective remedy for a constitutional violation would be to exclude evidence stemming from an unconstitutional checkpoint conducted by law enforcement in an administrative, civil proceeding, as well as a criminal proceeding.

The exclusionary rule was created by the United States Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), and is applied to prohibit the introduction of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal seizure conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See State v. Townsend, 186 W.Va. 283, 286, 412 S.E.2d 477, 480 (1991) (“ ‘The general rule is that where there is an illegal seizure of property, such property cannot be introduced into evidence, and testimony may not be given in regard to the facts surrounding the seizure of the property.’ ”)(quoting Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Davis, 170 W.Va. 376, 294 S.E.2d 179 (1982)); accord Miller, ––– W.Va. at ––––, 727 S.E.2d at 662. An understanding of the rationale behind the judicially-created exclusionary rule is necessary for resolution of whether the exclusionary rule should be extended to civil, administrative driver's license revocation or suspension proceedings. As the United States Supreme Court recently stated in Davis v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011), “[t]he Fourth Amendment ¹² protects the ‘rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The Amendment says nothing about suppressing evidence obtained in violation of this command.” Id. at 2426 (footnote added). Thus, “[e]xclusion is ‘not a personal constitutional right,’ nor is it designed to ‘redress the injury’ occasioned by...