Armstrong v. State

Decision Date15 September 2020
Docket NumberNo. 1D19-2744,1D19-2744
Parties Christopher ARMSTRONG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Christopher Armstrong, pro se, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Damaris Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED . Appellant is warned that any future filings that this Court determines to be frivolous may result in the imposition of sanctions, including a prohibition against any further pro se filings in this Court and a referral to the appropriate institution for disciplinary procedures as provided in section 944.279, Florida Statutes (2019) (providing that a prisoner who is found by a court to have brought a frivolous or malicious suit, action, claim, proceeding, or appeal is subject to disciplinary procedures pursuant to the rules of the Department of Corrections).

Lewis and Nordby, JJ., concur; B.L. Thomas, J., concurs with opinion.

B.L. Thomas, J., concurring with opinion.

I concur in the opinion affirming the denial of relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 of Appellant's meritless claim that his forty-year prison sentence was an illegal upward-departure sentence. There can be no illegal "departure" sentences for any felony committed after October 1, 1998, where those sentences are imposed within the statutory-maximum term under section 921.002(1)(g), Florida Statutes. Lane v. State , 981 So. 2d 596, 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (quoting § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2006) ) ("[t]he trial court judge may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any [felony] offense."). Appellant was legally sentenced to forty years in prison for burglary with a person assaulted, as the statutory maximum term for his conviction was life in prison. Id. ; § 810.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). He was also subject to thirty years in prison for each of the four convictions of sexual battery with threats reasonably believed for a total potential sentence of 120 years imprisonment. §§ 921.002(1)(g), 794.011(4)(a) Fla. Stat. (2008) ; George v. State , 213 So. 3d 966, 968 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) ("[T]he Florida Supreme Court and this Court have held that multiple punishments for separate and distinct acts of sexual battery during a single criminal episode are not barred by double jeopardy principles.") (citations omitted).

I would now require Appellant to show cause why he should not be subject to sanctions, including an order to the Clerk of this Court to refuse to accept any future filings unless signed by a member of the Florida Bar. See Baker v. State , 878 So. 2d 1236, 1243 (Fla. 2004) (citing McCrae v. State , 437 So. 2d 1388, 1391–92 (Fla. 1983) ) (Alderman, C.J. concurring) (holding that courts must limit successive postconviction cases and bar postconviction "attacks" on appellate courts "to give due weight to the finality and the presumption of legality of a final judgment and to restore the public's confidence in our criminal system of justice. ") (emphasis added). The public has a right to appellate review in meritorious cases and to prevent the undue obstruction caused by meritless postconviction claims filed in the trial and appellate courts. In this case, it is particularly important to provide an analysis of Appellant's horrific crimes and his prior legal actions, none of which have been previously addressed in writing by this Court, due to the lack of doubt of Appellant's guilt at trial and his prior meritless postconviction actions.

Background

In 2009, the victim of these crimes was a senior university student studying for final exams. The night of the incident she came home to a surprise birthday party arranged by her roommate and a few friends. Later in the evening, Appellant and his codefendant Quentin Revels joined the party and were welcomed to stay. As the night progressed, the two men offered to cook for the small group, and the victim allowed them to use her kitchen. After Revels left to buy the ingredients, the victim told her roommate she was tired and went into her bedroom at about 4:00 a.m., while the party continued. The victim's roommate later checked the victim's bedroom door, which was unlocked, and the roommate assumed the victim was asleep.

At 4:36 a.m., Appellant texted Revels and told him people were leaving the party. Seconds later, Appellant texted Revels, "I'm in the house with old girl. Come to the side of the house by girl that's sleep [sic] window." Three minutes later, Appellant texted "In the front."

Revels and Appellant continued to exchange text messages. At 6 a.m., Revels texted Appellant, "Brah want some p----." Appellant texted back, "Come to the side window. I got you. Or come in the house." At 6:02, Revels texted, "I had to leave because they go [sic] to sleep." He then texted, "Call me ASAP." At 6:03, Appellant texted "I'm in with the girl that sleep [sic], the other one." At 6:06, Appellant texted, "Trying to get through the window." At 6:07, Revels texted Appellant, "Answer the damn phone or you're stuck." Appellant responded, "I'm never stuck. I'm with the old girl." At 6:10, Revels texted Appellant, "Answer the damn phone." At 6:11, Appellant texted back, "I'm in the bed with homegirl." Revels replied, "Just answer the damn phone, then." At 6:14, Appellant answered, "I can't. She sleep [sic]. Come to the first window." At 6:19, Revels texted, "I'm trying to get the laptop and get some p----. You got some. I want some." A minute later, Appellant texted, "I'm getting some," to which Revels promptly replied, "I want some. Where they at[?]". At 6:28, Appellant answered, "Come to the side. The window is up."

At some point, the victim awoke. She testified, "[a]s soon as I opened my eyes, the first thing I saw was a person standing next to my bed. I was sleeping on the right side of my bed and the person was standing on the left side, on the other side of the bed. And then I looked next to me and there was a person in the bed next to me also." She identified Appellant as the man who had been standing. She thought the man in the bed was Revels. She began to scream, but Revels twisted her head and threatened to kill her. She testified that she was afraid because she thought Revels would kill her.

She testified that her shorts and panties had been removed while she had been asleep. Revels commanded her to place a pillow over her head. After she put the pillow on her face, one of the men forcefully performed oral sex on her.

The victim cried and both men told her "to shut up, stop crying, you're being too loud." Regarding which of the men had performed oral sex on her, the victim later testified: "I was thinking it was the guy that was in my bed, but the pillow was on my face. But I assumed it was the guy that was already in my bed." After Revels committed two acts of forced sexual intercourse and two acts of forced oral sex, he then forced the victim to take a shower to remove evidence of the crimes. To ensure that the victim obeyed his commands, Revels pulled the shower curtain back while she showered.

The victim was sexually battered four times by Revels, while Appellant was found guilty of burglary with a person assaulted, as he intended to commit the burglary to commit sexual battery. In Appellant's trial, the jury was instructed on the law of principals, and he was found guilty of the sexual batteries, regardless of whether Revels alone committed the sexual offenses.1 Appellant aided, abetted, or counseled Revels to burglarize the victim's home with the intent to sexually batter the victim, while both men threatened to kill her numerous times, and that threat was reasonably believed.

The evidence at the separate trials was overwhelming against both men. After the assault, the victim continued to cry, so Revels gave her a ring. He told her "his life was in her hands" and wrote down his name, his phone number, and Appellant's phone number on a post-it note. When the victim, her roommate, and a friend drove to the hospital, they saw a green Mustang, registered to Appellant, which contained two men; the car looked like the car in which Appellant and Revels had arrived at the party.

Law enforcement quickly linked the car to Appellant, who consented to a search of the car. They arrested Appellant. While in police custody, Appellant's phone rang, and Revel's number and photo appeared on Appellant's phone. The police then drove to the area of the victim's home, saw a man on a cell phone calling a number, and Appellant's phone, which was now in the police car, began ringing. The police arrested Revels and interviewed him.

Revels confirmed that the victim's statement was essentially accurate. He confessed he entered the victim's home through her window and forced her to have sexual intercourse and oral sex with him. He also admitted to giving her information about his tattoo and writing the information on the note. He admitted Appellant was his "God-brother" and that the two had been in the victim's bedroom. Revels stated that Appellant had been in the bed with the victim and had claimed that he had sexual intercourse with the victim before Revels joined. Revels also admitted to threatening to kill the victim. The victim identified Revels in court as the man in her bed during the criminal ordeal. Revels’ DNA, fingerprints, and palm print were collected from the victim's body and home.

When Appellant was arrested, he initially denied being in the victim's home, but he then changed his story and admitted he had been in the victim's bedroom. However, he claimed he dove to the floor when Revels came into the bedroom. Appellant also claimed that he got off the floor, wished the victim a happy birthday, and left. He changed his story a second time and admitted he saw Revels get into the victim's bed and cover her mouth. He stated he thought Revels was going to rape the victim and that Revels told the victim to be quiet.

The jury in Appellant's trial...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT