Armstrong v. Van De Vanter

• Decision Date: 23 December 1899
• Citation: 59 P. 510,21 Wash. 682
• Parties: ARMSTRONG v. VAN DE VANTER, Sheriff, et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

59 P. 510

21 Wash. 682

ARMSTRONG v. VAN DE VANTER, Sheriff, et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 23, 1899

Appeal from superior court, King county; O. Jacobs, Judge.

Habeas corpus, on the petition of William G. Armstrong, against A T. Van De Vanter, sheriff, and others. From a judgment remanding the petitioner, he appeals. Reversed.

Piles, Donworth & Howe, for appellant.

James F. McElroy, John B. Hart, and Addison W. Hastie, for respondents.

DUNBAR J.

In August, 1899, the appellant being restrained of his liberty in King county, Wash., by the sheriff of said county and one Frank Tyrell, claiming to act as agent of the state of Illinois filed his petition in the superior court praying for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The writ was issued, but, after a hearing before the superior court the petitioner was ordered remanded, and the proceedings dismissed. From this judgment the petitioner has appealed.

The facts preceding the arrest of the petitioner are as follows: On the 18th day of May, 1899, an alleged complaint was filed before a justice of the peace in the city of Chicago, of which the following is a copy:

'State of Illinois, County of Cook, City of Chicago--ss.: The complaint and information of J. S. Taylor, of Chicago, in said county, made before James C. Martin, Esquire, one of the justices of the peace in and for said county, on the 18th day of May, 1899. Said complainant, being first duly sworn, upon his oath says that on or about the 14th day of May, A. D. 1899, in county and state aforesaid, a person about 5 feet 10 inches tall, medium complexion, whose Christian and surname is unknown to affiant, but whose person is well known, and who will be pointed out by affiant to the officer executing the warrant, did unlawfully attempt to influence the decision of your affiant, who was serving at that time as a juror in a matter pending in court; contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided. That this complainant has just and reasonable grounds to believe, and does believe, that said described person committed said offense, and therefore prays that he may be arrested, and dealt with according to law. [Signed] John F. Taylor.

'Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day of Mary, A. D. 1899. James C. Martin, Justice of the Peace. [Seal.]'

The warrant was issued upon this complaint, which was never served, nor were any subsequent proceedings had before said justice of the peace on said complaint or warrant. At the June term, 1899, of the criminal court of Cook county an indictment was found against the appellant and Daniel Coughlin, the latter of whom it is conceded was the person attempted to be described in the complaint above referred to. It is unnecessary, in consideration of our view of the case, to set this indictment out in full, but in substance it charged the said Coughlin and Armstrong with unlawfully, feloniously, fraudulently, maliciously, wrongfully, and wickedly conspiring together with a fraudulent and malicious intent to wrongfully and wickedly do an illegal act injurious to the administration of public justice, viz. to hire a certain witness, to wit, John F. Taylor, then and there a witness in a certain criminal cause wherein the people of the state of Illinois were complainants, upon the complaint and information of the said John F. Taylor, to leave the state of Illinois, so that he, the said Taylor, could not then and there be produced as a witness at the examination of said defendant. Embodied in and made a part of the information is the complaint originally made by Taylor before Justice of the Peace Martin. Upon this indictment a requisition was issued by the acting governor of the state of Illinois on the governor of the state of Washington for the arrest of the said William Armstrong. The governor of the state of Washington honored the requisition, the arrest was made, and the appellant turned over to the custody of Tyrell, the agent of the state of Illinois. Upon the issuance of the writ, respondent sheriff, in his return, set forth copies of all the requisition papers filed with the governor of Washington, as well as the warrant of the latter governor. The petitioner, replying to the return, pleaded, among other things, the statute law of the state of Illinois, and controverted the recitals contained in the warrant of the governor of the state of Washington regarding the requisition papers on which said warrant purports to be based, claiming that his confinement, restraint, and imprisonment are in violation of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, in that he is deprived of his liberty without due process of law, that he is denied the equal protection of the laws within the state of Washington, and that his arrest and restraint are in violation of section 2 of article 4 of the constitution of the United States, and of sections 5278 and 5279 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.

The affidavit of John R. Tanner, not having been incorporated in the statement of facts, under the uniform decisions of this court cannot be considered.

The first assignment of error is that the court erred in holding that the executive authority of Illinois has demanded such petitioner, as a fugitive from justice, of the executive of the state of Washington, for the reason that it does not appear by the requisition papers that W. A. Northcott, the person making the demand, is, or was at the time of making the same, the executive authority of the state of Illinois. We think it sufficiently appears from the record, in consideration of the constitution and laws of Illinois, that the extradition requisition was sufficiently attested by the executive authority of Illinois.

The second and third assignments of error embrace, in substance, the objection urged in the first.

The fourth assignment is that the court erred in refusing to go into the question of the sufficiency of the purported indictment included in the requisition papers and in refusing to decide whether said purported indictment charges a crime against said petitioner. On this proposition, after a somewhat extended, and also somewhat unsatisfactory examination of the authorities cited, we are forced to the conclusion that the superior court should have entered upon the investigation of this question. So far as we have been able to determine, this question has not been squarely passed upon by the supreme court of the United States; certainly not in any of the cases cited. In Ex parte Reggel, 114 U.S. 642, 5 S.Ct. 1148, 29 L.Ed. 250, the court approached this question with the following suggestion: 'In connection with this proposition, counsel discusses, in the light of the adjudged cases, the general question as to the authority of a court of the state or territory in which the fugitive is found to discharge him from arrest whenever, in its judgment, the indictment, according to the technical rules of original pleading, is defective in its statement of the crime charged. It is sufficient, for the purposes of the present case, to say that by the laws of Pennsylvania every indictment is to be deemed and adjudged sufficient and good in law which charges the crime substantially in the language of the act of assembly prohibiting its commission, and prescribing the punishment therefor, or, if at common law, so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood by the jury; and that the indictment which accompanied the requisition of the governor of Pennsylvania does charge the crime substantially in the language of her statute.' It is claimed in this case that there is no crime charged, substantially or otherwise, under the laws of the state of Illinois; so that no light can be obtained from the case cited. In Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 6 S.Ct. 291, 29 L.Ed. 544, after referring to section 5278 of the Revised Statutes, the court says: 'It must appear, therefore, to the governor of the state to whom such a demand is presented, before he can lawfully comply with it: First, that the person demanded is substantially charged with a crime against the laws of the state from whose justice he is alleged to have fled, by an indictment or affidavit, certified and authentic, by the governor of the state making the demand; and, second, that the person demanded is a fugitive from justice of the state the executive authority of which makes the demand. The first of these prerequisites is a question of law, and is always open, upon the face of the papers, to judicial inquiry, on an application for a discharge under a writ of habeas corpus. The second is a question of fact which the governor of the state from whom the demand is made must decide upon such evidence as he may deem satisfactory. How far his decision may be reviewed judicially in proceedings in habeas corpus, or whether it is not conclusive, are questions not settled by harmonious judicial decision, or by any authoritative judgment of this court.' It is a little difficult to understand to what the last sentence in this quotation refers, whether to the first or second question discussed. But, in any event, the announcement is that, before the requisition can issue, the person demanded must be substantially charged with a crime against the laws of the state from which he has fled. But the matter actually decided by the court is found from the further expression to this effect: 'It is conceded that the determination of the fact by the executive of the state in issuing his warrant of arrest upno a demand on him, made on the ground whether the writ contains a recital of an expression finding to that effect or not, must be regarded as sufficient to justify the removal until the presumption in its...