Armuchee Alliance v. King

Decision Date18 April 1996
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 4:96-cv-35-HLM.
Citation922 F. Supp. 1541
PartiesThe ARMUCHEE ALLIANCE, Plaintiff, v. Joe W. KING, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Howell Franklin Wright, Jr., Joseph Mendelson, III, phv, Dew & Smith, Monroe, GA, Donald E. Davis, nam, Calhoun, GA, Mark Burnett, nam, Dalton, GA, Denise L. Newton, Rocky Face, GA, Janis Walraven, Sugar Valley, GA, Andrew C. Kimbrell, phv, Dew & Smith, Monroe, GA, for plaintiff.

Robin Michael, Department of Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Div., U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Joe W. King, Robert Joslin, Daniel Glickman, Jack Ward Thomas and George Martin.

ORDER

HAROLD L. MURPHY, District Judge.

This case is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment 10 and Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment and Dismissal Of Plaintiff's Complaint 12.

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) authorizes summary judgment when all "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." A district court "can only grant summary judgment `if everything in the record ... demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists.'" Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 952 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting Keiser v. Coliseum Properties, Inc., 614 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir.1980)).

It has long been established that the party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Bingham, Ltd. v. United States, 724 F.2d 921, 924 (11th Cir.1984). The moving party's burden is discharged by "`showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In assessing whether the movant has met this burden, the district court must view the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Reynolds v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 989 F.2d 465, 469 (11th Cir.1993). Once the moving party has supported its motion adequately, the nonmovant has the burden of showing summary judgment is improper by coming forward with specific facts that demonstrate there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

When considering motions for summary judgment, the court does not make decisions as to the merits of disputed factual issues. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Ryder Int'l Corp. v. First American Nat'l Bank, 943 F.2d 1521, 1523 (11th Cir.1991). Rather, the court only determines whether there are genuine issues of material fact to be tried. Applicable substantive law identifies those facts that are material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510 ("It is the substantive law's identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs."). Disputed facts which do not resolve or affect the outcome of a suit will not properly preclude the entry of summary judgment because such facts are not material. Id.

In addition to materiality, courts also must consider the genuineness of the alleged dispute. "Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is `genuine.'" Id. (emphasis added). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. Moreover, for factual issues to be genuine, they must have a real basis in the record. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. The nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1355. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)). "This standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. "The inquiry under each is the same: whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. at 2511-12.

II. Background

This case involves a challenge to the controversial Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Program, provided for in a rider to the Rescissions Act of 1995 (the "Salvage Timber Rider"). Pub.L. No. 104-19, § 2001, 109 Stat. 240-47 (1995). Plaintiff claims (1) Defendants violated express provisions of the Salvage Timber Rider; and (2) the Salvage Timber Rider is unconstitutional. Before discussing the merits of Plaintiff's case, the Court will outline relevant provisions of the Salvage Timber Rider, discuss the facts that led Plaintiff to file this suit and summarize the parties' arguments.

A. Relevant Provisions Of The Salvage Timber Rider
(a) DEFINITIONS ...
(3) The term "salvage timber sale" means a timber sale for which an important reason for entry includes the removal of disease or insect-infested trees ... or trees imminently susceptible to fire or insect attack. Such term also includes the removal of associated trees or trees lacking the characteristics of a healthy or viable ecosystem.
§ 2001(a)(3).
(b) COMPLETION OF SALVAGE TIMBER SALES ...
Using the expedited procedures provided in subsection (c), the Secretary of Agriculture shall prepare, advertise, offer, and award contracts during the emergency period for salvage timber sales from Federal lands.... During the emergency period, the Secretary concerned is to achieve, to the maximum extent feasible, a salvage timber sale volume level above the programmed level to reduce the backlogged volume of salvage timber.
§ 2001(b)(1).
(c) EXPEDITED PROCEDURES FOR EMERGENCY SALVAGE TIMBER SALES —
(1) SALE DOCUMENTATION —
(A) PREPARATION — For each salvage timber sale conducted under subsection (b), the Secretary concerned shall prepare a document that combines an environmental assessment under section 102(2) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (including regulations implementing such section) and a biological evaluation under section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 ((16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2)) and other applicable Federal law and implementing regulations. A document embodying decisions relating to salvage timber sales proposed under authority of this section shall, at the sole discretion of the Secretary concerned and to the extent the Secretary concerned considers appropriate and feasible, consider the environmental effects of the salvage timber sale and the effect, if any, on threatened or endangered species....
(B) USE OF EXISTING MATERIALS —
In lieu of preparing a new document under this paragraph, the Secretary concerned may use a ... biological evaluation written before July 27, 1995, or information collected for such a document or evaluation if the ... information applies to the Federal lands covered by the proposed sale.
(C) SCOPE AND CONTENT — The scope and content of the documentation and information prepared, considered, and relied on under this paragraph is at the sole discretion of the Secretary concerned.
§ 2001(c)(1).
(f) JUDICIAL REVIEW —
(1) PLACE AND TIME OF FILING — ... Any challenge to such sale must be filed in such district court within 15 days after the date of initial advertisement of the challenged sale.
(2) EFFECT OF FILING ON AGENCY ACTION — For 45 days after the date of the filing of a challenge to a salvage timber sale to be conducted under subsection (b) ... the Secretary concerned shall take no action to award the challenged sale.
(3) PROHIBITION ON RESTRAINING ORDERS, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS, AND RELIEF PENDING REVIEW — No restraining order, preliminary injunction, or injunction pending appeal shall be issued by any court of the United States with respect to any decision to prepare, advertise, offer, award, or operate a salvage timber sale....
(4) STANDARD OF REVIEW — The courts shall have authority to enjoin permanently, order modification of, or void an individual salvage timber sale if it is determined by a review of the record that the decision to prepare, advertise, offer, award, or operate such sale was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with applicable law (other than those laws specified in subsection (i)).
(5) TIME FOR DECISION — Civil actions filed under this subsection shall be assigned for hearing at the earliest possible date. The Court shall render its final decision relative to any challenge within 45 days from the date such challenge is brought, unless the court determines that a longer period of time is required to satisfy the requirements of the United States Constitution.
§ 2001(f).
(i) EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS — The documents and procedures required by this section for the preparation, advertisement, offering, awarding, and operation of any salvage timber sale subject to subsection (b) ... shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of all applicable Federal environmental and natural resource laws.
§ 2001(i).
B. Facts

On September 20, 1995, an aerial survey of the Armuchee Ranger District of the Chattahoochee National Forest ("the Forest") revealed numerous infestations of the Southern Pine Beetle. As a result, Dan Glickman, Secretary of Agriculture, Jack Ward Thomas, Chief of the U.S. Forest...

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