Arnazzi v. Quad/Graphics, Inc.

Decision Date17 June 2005
Docket NumberNo. 31860.,31860.
Citation621 S.E.2d 705
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
PartiesJames W. ARNAZZI, Plaintiff Below, Appellant v. QUAD/GRAPHICS, INC., and Robert Knighten, Defendants Below, Appellees.

Syllabus by the Court

1. "A circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo." Syllabus Point 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).

2. "A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law." Syllabus Point 2, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994) (citations omitted).

3. "The circuit court's function at the summary judgment stage is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Syllabus Point 3, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).

4. "Summary judgment is appropriate where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, such as where the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case that it has the burden to prove." Syllabus Point 4, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).

5. "Questions of negligence, due care, proximate cause and concurrent negligence present issues of fact for jury determination when the evidence pertaining to such issues is conflicting or where the facts, even though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them." Syllabus Point 7, Stewart v. George, 216 W.Va. 288, 607 S.E.2d 394 (2004) (citations omitted).

Harry Patton Waddell, Esq., Martinsburg, West Virginia, Attorney for Appellant.

Ancil G. Ramey, Esq., Bryan R. Cokeley, Esq., Scott E. Johnson, Esq., Steptoe & Johnson, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for Appellees.

PER CURIAM:

In the instant case, the Circuit Court of Berkeley County granted summary judgment for the appellees and defendants below, Quad Graphics, Inc. and Robert Knighten, a Quad Graphics supervisor. The circuit court ruled that the appellant and plaintiff below, James Arnazzi, did not establish the existence of a material issue of fact on the element of proximate cause in a case brought under present W.Va.Code, 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii) [2003]; and that the appellant therefore had not made out a prima facie case that would allow a jury to find for the appellant. Finding that the evidence before the circuit court did establish the existence of a material issue of fact with respect to probable cause, we reverse the circuit court's decision.

I.

"A circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo." Syllabus Point 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). "A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law." Syllabus Point 2, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994) (citations omitted). "The circuit court's function at the summary judgment stage is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Syllabus Point 3, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). "Summary judgment is appropriate where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, such as where the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case that it has the burden to prove." Syllabus Point 4, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994)

W.Va.Code, 23-4-2(2) [2003] authorizes suits for damages against employers by employees who are injured on the job — in certain narrow, statutorily-defined circumstances. The statutory circumstance at issue in the instant case requires that the employee, to prevail in such a suit, prove:

(A) That a specific unsafe working condition existed in the workplace which presented a high degree of risk and a strong probability of serious injury or death;

(B) That the employer had a subjective realization and an appreciation of the existence of the specific unsafe working condition and of the high degree of risk and the strong probability of serious injury or death presented by the specific unsafe working condition;

(C) That the specific unsafe working condition was a violation of a state or federal safety statute, rule or regulation, whether cited or not, or of a commonly accepted and well-known safety standard within the industry or business of the employer, which statute, rule, regulation or standard was specifically applicable to the particular work and working condition involved, as contrasted with a statute, rule, regulation or standard generally requiring safe workplaces, equipment or working conditions;

(D) That notwithstanding the existence of the facts set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (C), inclusive, of this paragraph, the employer nevertheless thereafter exposed an employee to the specific unsafe working condition intentionally; and

(E) That the employee exposed suffered serious injury or death as a direct and proximate result of the specific unsafe working condition.

W.Va.Code, 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii) [2003].

The specific unsafe working condition at issue before the circuit court in the instant case was the lack of legally-required training of the appellant on the safe use of a forklift.1 The evidence showing this lack of training — and that the lack of training qualified as a specific unsafe working condition and met the standards set forth in the statute — was substantial.2

For purposes of their motion for summary judgment, the appellees conceded that there was sufficient evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the appellant, to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact with respect to the first four "elements" of a cause of action under W.Va.Code, 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii) [2003] ("A" through "D" above) — so as to withstand a motion for summary judgment on those elements. It was also conceded by the appellees for purposes of their motion that the appellant had suffered a serious injury.

However, the appellees argued that on the fifth or "proximate cause" element, there was no evidence presented or pointed to by the appellant tending to show that the appellant's injury was proximately caused by a lack of required safety training. (The fifth element, set out in section (E) above, requires proof that the employee ". . . suffered serious injury or death as a direct and proximate result of the specific unsafe working condition.") (emphasis added). The circuit court agreed with the appellees' argument, and granted summary judgment for the appellees.

II.

It is well established in West Virginia that ordinarily the issue of proximate cause is a jury question to be decided based upon the totality of the evidence:

Questions of negligence, due care, proximate cause and concurrent negligence present issues of fact for jury determination when the evidence pertaining to such issues is conflicting or where the facts, even though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them.

Syllabus Point 7, Stewart v. George, 216 W.Va. 288, 607 S.E.2d 394 (2004) (citations omitted).

The appellees argue that the appellant failed to establish a triable issue of material fact on the issue of proximate cause because the appellant did not in his deposition point to any specific fashion in which the required forklift safety training would have tended to avert the accident in question.

In his deposition, the appellant said that he did not personally know what information or other content would have been in the required forklift safety training. The appellant said that he would not speculate on how the training might have averted his injury, other than by possibly making him more careful — perhaps so careful that he would have refused to go into the narrow aisle where the accident occurred.

The appellant also stated in his deposition that he had no recollection of ever engaging in or being reprimanded for any improper conduct while driving the forklift, and that he did not know with any certainty how the accident had occurred. He speculated that a piece of cardboard or wood extending from a pallet in the narrow aisle might have stuck into the forklift operator's "cab" area and caught the appellant's foot. The appellant denied ever driving his forklift while having his foot outside the confines of the forklift's cab.

Based on the appellant's failure to acknowledge any actual or potentially unsafe conduct on his part, and on his inability to point specifically to how the safety training (that he did not receive) might have averted the accident and injury, the appellees argue that no proximately causal connection can be established between the specific unsafe workplace condition of a lack of mandatory forklift safety training and the accident and injury to the appellant. Therefore, argue the appellees, summary judgment was appropriate.

However, the appellant's failure at his deposition to acknowledge or admit to potentially unsafe conduct was not the only evidence on this issue. An accident report on the incident that was prepared by an employee of the appellee Quad/Graphics listed the cause of the accident as being a violation of a safety rule, and stated that the appellant had his foot outside the cab.

Additionally, the appellees' designated corporate deposition witness testified that the appellant had been observed driving with his foot outside the cab. Another of the appellee's employees so testified, and there was other evidence suggesting that the appellant had not always operated his forklift with proper caution, attention, care, etc....

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