Arndell v. Peay
| Decision Date | 10 February 1967 |
| Parties | Amon ARNDELL, Amos Arndell and Ervin Arndell, Appellants, v. Mary Evelyn PEAY and her husband, J. G. Peay, and N. A. Arndell, Appellees. Amon ARNDELL, Amos Arndell and Ervin Arndell, Appellants, v. David MARTIN, Executor under the purported Will of N. A. Arndell, Mary Evelyn Peay, J. G. Peay, Eunice Cottrell, Bonnie McPherson, and Riverside Missionary Baptist Church, Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
J. Granville Clark, Russellville, for appellants.
C. Terry Earle, Greenville, for appellees.
CULLEN, Commissioner.
In these consolidated actions, one involving the will of N. A. Arndell, deceased, and the other involving a deed executed by him before his death, the principal issue was whether Arndell had sufficient mental capacity to execute the instruments. A secondary issue was whether a trust, prevailing over the terms of his will, could be imposed on Arndell's property on the ground that mutual wills previously made by Arndell and his wife were contractual in nature. The actions were tried together before a jury, which after several hours of deliberation was unable to agree. Thereupon the judge directed a verdict in favor of the deed and will and against the existence of a trust. The contestants of the deed and will, who are the three sons of Arndell, have appealed.
Arndell had three sons (the contestants-appellants) and two daughters (who are some of the contestees-appellees). By the deed Arndell and his wife, both in their early eighties, conveyed his farm to one of the daughters and her husband, in consideration of their caring for the grantors for the rest of their lives. Mrs. Arndell died two months after the deed was executed and Mr. Arndell died ten months later. By his will Arndell left the remainder of his property, consisting of cash and investments, to the two daughters, except for bequests of $1.00 each to the three sons.
Around one year before the deed was executed Arndell and his wife had executed separate but identical wills, by which each left his entire estate in fee simple to the other if surviving, otherwise to the five children in equal shares. The wife's will was not probated after her death and there is no showing that she had any appreciable estate. Mr. Arndell's later will of course had the effect of revoking his mutual will, but the argument is made, as hereinbefore mentioned, that the first wills created a trust for the benefit of the five children which is enforceable despite the revocation.
We shall first consider the issue of lack of mental capacity.
The lay evidence for the contestants was that prior to his undergoing a hernia operation, about one month before the deed was executed, Arndell was on excellent terms with his sons, he enjoyed their attentions and services, and he had equal affection for all five children. However, shortly after the day of the operation he became imbued with the idea that the sons had mistreated him and his wife, he complained to other people that the sons had never done anything for him, and he brought up alleged misdeeds of the sons which happened 20 or 25 years previously. He gave a deposition in the suit involving the deed (brought before his death), in which he accused the sons of being 'liars,' 'thieves,' 'cheats,' and 'murderers'. The general import of the lay testimony was that Arndell suffered serious delusions as to the kind of relationships that had prevailed between him and his sons.
The doctor who performed the operation testified upon the basis of his personal observation and hypothetical facts with reference to Arndell's conduct and attitudes after the operation, embracing the times when the deed and will were executed, that Arndell was suffering from senile dementia and did not have mental capacity to execute either document. The appellees argue that use of the hypothetical facts was improper because some of them were controverted. However, the rule is that hypothetical questions may be based on facts as to which there...
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