Arndt v. Hosford

• Decision Date: 21 May 1891
• Citation: 82 Iowa 499,48 N.W. 981
• Parties: ARNDT v. HOSFORD ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

82 Iowa 499

48 N.W. 981

ARNDT

v.HOSFORD ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 21, 1891.

Appeal from district court, Harrison county; C. H. LEWIS, Judge.

Action to recover an amount alleged to be due for services rendered by plaintiff as an attorney. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff. He appeals.Bolter Bros. and Cyrus Arndt, for appellant.

L. Brown, for appellees.

ROBINSON, J.

The plaintiff claims that he rendered services as an attorney for and at the request, and for the benefit, of Hattie Hosford, in two actions specified, and that such services were reasonably worth the sum of $400. Judgments were rendered in each action in favor of Mrs. Hosford, and a lien for the amount due to plaintiff was secured in the manner provided by section 215 of the Code. For the purpose of releasing such lien, the defendant Hattie Hosford, as principal, and defendants Reuben Newton and E. Puddy, as sureties, executed a bond, as provided by section 216 of the Code, which was duly approved by the proper clerk, and filed in his office. The plaintiff demands judgment on the bond, and also generally for the amount claimed. The defendants deny that Mrs. Hosford is indebted to plaintiff in any sum whatever, and alleges that the services for which a recovery was sought were rendered for S. H. Cochran, who had been fully paid for them. The defendants Newton and Puddy further pleaded that they were induced to sign the bond in suit by virtue of an agreement made between plaintiff and Mrs. Hosford, by which plaintiff agreed that he would make no charges or claim against Mrs. Hosford in the cases specified, and also by reason of statements made to them by plaintiff at various times during the progress of the trials, to the effect that the services he rendered in the cases were for the benefit of Cochran, who was the attorney employed to take charge of them, and with whom he exchanged work. They also returned certain special findings. A motion for a new trial was filed by plaintiff, and overruled, the special findings were set aside, and judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff on the general verdict.

1. At the proper time the plaintiff asked the court to instruct the jury as follows: “(1) The incontrovertible evidence shows that, if any conversation ever occurred between plaintiff, Arndt, and E. Puddy and R. Newton, concerning the question of Arndt's appearing free of charge, it occurred before the filing of plaintiff's attorney's liens. You are therefore instructed not to consider this evidence, as the same constitutes no defense to his action on the bond. (2) The only questions for your determination are: Was plaintiff employed to act as attorney for Mrs. Hosford in the proceedings referred to, and did he perform service for her? What were the services of plaintiff reasonably worth?” The court refused to give these instructions, and charged the jury, in effect, that, if the sureties were told by plaintiff that he was not to receive any compensation for his services from Mrs. Hosford, and executed the bond relying upon and in consequence of such statements, the plaintiff could not recover of them. Appellant complains of this action of the court, and insists that no estoppel was proven; that, when the bond was executed and filed, the sureties knew that he was claiming compensation; and that the bond was in terms executed for the purpose of releasing his lien. We think it is true that the facts proven do not constitute an estoppel, but the appellant is not in condition to take advantage of that fact. The proof corresponds with and sustains the separate answer of the sureties. That, taken with the averments of the petition, showed that the alleged agreement of plaintiff with Mrs. Hosford, and his statements to the sureties, were made before notice of the lien was given, and that the bond was given with knowledge of the claim now made by plaintiff. The answer of the sureties was therefore demurrable. Plaintiff did not, however, demur, but waived the defect in the pleading by going to trial on the issues the answer presented. He...