Arndt v. Lapel

Decision Date24 June 1932
Docket NumberNo. 41316.,41316.
PartiesARNDT v. LAPEL.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from District Court, Adair County; J. H. Applegate, Judge.

This is an action in equity to quiet title to a quarter section of land in Adair County, Iowa. There was a general denial and an affirmative defense, asking that the deed under which the plaintiff claimed title be set aside and canceled because it was procured by undue influence, also claiming the incompetency of the grantor and that the deed was testamentary in character and subsequently revoked. The trial court found for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. The facts appear in the opinion.

Affirmed.R. W. Cockshoot and Swan, Martin & Martin, all of Atlantic, for appellant.

Musmaker & Musmaker, of Greenfield, for appellee.

GRIMM, J.

The petition in this case was filed in February, 1931. It alleges, in substance, that the plaintiff is the widow of Fred Arndt, who died March 23, 1930, and that the defendant, Ella Lapel, is his daughter and sole heir at law.

For brevity, Fred Arndt, the deceased, will hereinafter be called the grantor.

It is claimed that the plaintiff obtained title to the quarter section of land involved, by virtue of a warranty deed from said Fred Arndt, the former owner, and that the daughter, Ella Lapel, makes some claim to the real estate. The daughter answered by way of general denial, and further states, in substance, that prior to November, 1918, the grantor and the defendant, his daughter, were the best of friends and relied upon each other for counsel and advice; and that in November, 1918, the plaintiff, then Anna George, and the grantor, arranged to be married. The defendant was not invited to the marriage, and from that time on, it is alleged, the plaintiff, formerly Anna George, now Anna Arndt, sought, by every means, to alienate the affections of father and daughter and to influence the grantor against his daughter, Ella Lapel.

It is alleged that in July, 1929, the grantor had an attack of sickness in the nature of a slight stroke; that in September, 1929, he had a second stroke, as a result of which he was taken to his bed in October, 1929.

It is alleged that by undue influence and improper persuasion, plaintiff secured from said grantor, in 1929, the warranty deed in question. It is alleged that the execution of the deed was kept from the defendant until after the death of the grantor. It is claimed that the grantor endeavored to have the deed and other papers which he had executed returned, and that the grantor was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the deed, and that the deed was procured by undue influence and duress.

By way of a reply, the plaintiff alleges that at the time of their marriage on November 26, 1918, the grantor had purchased, on contract, a half section of land, including the quarter section in controversy, and that he was still indebted thereon in the sum of $18,000. It is alleged that the plaintiff, from time to time, advanced, with interest, the sum of $15,000, which money was used, in the main, in canceling the contract on the land. It is alleged that prior to the time said advancements were made, said grantor represented to the plaintiff that he would convey to her the 160 acres of land in controversy.

By a subsequent amendment to the answer, the defendant claims that as a part of the said transaction in which the deed was procured, the grantor was induced to make a will, that the deed was testamentary in character, and no sufficient delivery of the same was ever made, to show a contrary intent.

It is alleged that the said will was revoked on the 4th day of March, 1930, and that the revocation included the deed.

The trial court quieted the title to the quarter section of land in controversy in the plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.

The record in this case is quite lengthy, about thirty-five witnesses having been examined. We shall not attempt to set out, or even refer to, all of the evidence, but will only refer to sufficient of the evidence to indicate, in a most general way, the positions taken by the parties and some of the proof in relation thereto.

At the time of the death of the grantor, on March 23, 1930, he was about seventy years of age. The defendant, Ella Lapel, at the time of the trial, was forty-nine years of age and the only daughter of the grantor. She was married when she was twenty-two years of age. She was educated and taught school and thereafter married. It is quite apparent from the record that the marriage was not considered a satisfactory one. She at one time brought suit against her husband for divorce, but afterwards dismissed the action. The grantor apparently took a dislike to him. At the time of the trial, the defendant was engaged in the millinery and dry goods business. She had been thus engaged for approximately fifteen years.

Prior to November 26, 1918, when the grantor married the plaintiff herein, he had been a widower for a number of years. He lived only two and one-half blocks from the home of the defendant, and the father and daughter were, during all that time, very closely associated with each other. While they maintained separate homes, they were back and forth together a great deal. The father came to the store in the mornings and built the fires and emptied the ashes for the daughter and did various other kinds of work around the place, purely as a kindness to his daughter. On the other hand, the daughter assisted the father at his home by doing his washing, ironing, and mending, renovating his house, and otherwise similarly assisting him. The father took care of his daughter's minor child, Agnes, while the daughter worked in the store. Without further expression of details, it may be said that the father and daughter were unusually fond of and kind to each other and much in each other's company prior to the time of the second marriage of the grantor.

Anna George lived in the first house north of the grantor's home. They became engaged and subsequently married and, as previously noted, the daughter was not invited to the wedding. From that time to the time of the grantor's death, there was more or less trouble between the plaintiff and the defendant. There were intervals when peace was patched up, but in the main there were smouldering envies and jealousies between the two women and the grantor was between two fires.

In the summer of 1929, the grantor began to fail in health. It is the contention of the defendant that he had been ill at various times and a physician had been called, but the defendant was not advised of the situation. The first illness was in July, 1929. It is claimed that this spell of “dizziness” resulted in a partial impairment of the use of his right arm and, to some extent, affected his eyesight. About the 16th of October, he had another spell in the nature of headache, nervousness, inability to sleep, pain in the back of his neck, and dizziness. On October 19, 1929, he collapsed in his house with apparently what was diagnosed as an epileptic fit. He was confined to his bed only a short time and on October 21, 1929, was sitting up in a chair. On that date, a local lawyer prepared the deed in question and the will. The deed was signed by the grantor, with his mark, and witnessed by the lawyer and one Bailey, who chanced to call at the home at that time. The acknowledgment was taken by the attorney. As originally drawn, the will recited that the testator owned a half section of land, describing it. The will also contains the following: “* * * and in connection with this will, I am deeding to my beloved wife, Anna Arndt, the first quarter above described in fee simple except a reservation of a life estate therein for myself.”

The “first quarter,” above referred to, is the quarter section involved in this case.

The will also bequeaths to the wife all personal property, out of which she is expected to pay all charges, except the mortgage indebtedness. The grantor then deeded to Anna Arndt, in trust, for the benefit of his daughter, the other quarter section, “to be so held by my said wife for a period of fifteen years from the date of this will, or until my said daughter may become a widow, at which time, if such shall occur before the fifteen years has elapsed, said quarter section shall become vested in and be the absolute property of said Ella Lapel, in fee simple.”

At the time the deed was executed, a discussion arose about the length of time the trust for the defendant should run, and the grantor finally concluded to change the period of the trust from fifteen years to ten years, and the will, as first drawn, was destroyed and a second was drawn, fixing the period at ten years, which said latter will was executed the next day after the deed was executed.

The deed was delivered to the plaintiff, but she did not place it of record until after the death of the grantor.

Apparently, no physician was called for the grantor from the 19th of October, 1929, until November 25, 1929, except that beginning on October 31st, the grantor had a number of treatments from a chiropractor. The local family physician called to see him on November 25, 1929, and at various intervals from then until February 12, 1930. At that time, he had an attack of the “flu” and the local physician called to see him practically every day until March 15th, when he was removed to the hospital at Des Moines, where he died March 23, 1930.

On March 4, 1930, the defendant asked one Henry F. Miller to go over to the grantor's house. The grantor was then in bed. Miller had known the grantor for a quarter of a century and frequently visited at the house. On this particular afternoon, Miller found the plaintiff and the defendant and the grantor in the grantor's home. After a few minutes, the grantor directed Miller to get Dr. Green, who was the local physician, and Mr. Launder, a lawyer, to come to the house. Miller complied with the request and,...

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6 cases
  • Kunz v. Kunz, 51155
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • December 10, 1963
    ...clear and satisfactory proof of facts to the contrary, it must be concluded that there was a proper delivery of this deed. Arndt v. Lapel, 214 Iowa 594, 243 N.W. 605. Obviously, the conveyance was of plaintiff's interest in that Plaintiff recalls she was given a dollar by defendant, althoug......
  • Stephenson v. Stephenson, 48861
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • February 7, 1956
    ...v. Leonard, supra, 234 Iowa 421, 12 N.W.2d 899; Vannest v. Murphy, 135 Iowa 123, 112 N.W. 236, and cases cited; Arndt v. Lapel, 214 Iowa 594, 600, 605, 243 N.W. 605, 609; Mallow v. Walker, 115 Iowa 238, 88 N.W. 452, 91 Am.St.Rep. 158; Nixon v. Klise, 160 Iowa 238, 141 N.W. 322; McNeer v. Be......
  • Groves v. Groves
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • April 3, 1957
    ...v. Shrope, 197 Iowa 844, 849-850, 196 N.W. 743; Utterback v. Hollingsworth, 208 Iowa 300, 302, 225 N.W. 419, 421; Arndt v. Lapel, 214 Iowa 594, 600-603, 243 N.W. 605; O'Brien v. Stoneman, 227 Iowa 389, 390-393, 288 N.W. 447; Stephenson v. Stephenson, supra, 247 Iowa 785, 74 N.W.2d 679, That......
  • In re Ring
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • April 9, 2020
    ...Wilford on those challenged transactions.Page 18 Undue influence must be present at the exact time the transfer is made. Arndt v. Lapel, 214 Iowa 594, 603, 243 N.W. 605, 609 (1932). To set aside transactions on the ground of undue influence, there must be "such persuasion as results in over......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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