Arnold v. City of Columbia MO, FORD-HENRY
| Decision Date | 10 November 1999 |
| Docket Number | LAUGHLIN-HOFF,FORD-HENRY,No. 99-2344,99-2344 |
| Citation | 197 F.3d 1217 |
| Parties | (8th Cir. 1999) BOBBI S. ARNOLD; TAMERA ADAMS; TODD A. ALBER; ROGER ALLEN; TED A. ANDERSON; N. DANIEL BECKMAN; MITCHELL A. BAXLEY; ROBERT WILLIAM BENNETT; JAMES E. BLASKA; LAWRENCE D. BRADY; STEVEN J. BRAMBLETT; MARK O. BROTEMARKLE; STEVEN A.D. BROWN; BARBARA BUCK; MELVIN E. BUCKNER; CATHY M. DODD; THOMAS G. DRESNER; EARL A. DYE, JR.; DARREN ESTES; LINDA S. FINCHAM; JEFF FORCK; FONTELLA; DEAN L. FRANCE; DANIEL L. GILLESPIE; DANNY GRANT; WILLIAM C. GREEN, JR.; GERALD G. GREENE; KENNETH M. GREGORY; JESSICA E. HADEN; KENNETH HAMMOND; R. KIRK HANKINS; ROBERT A. HARDT; JAMES M. HARMON; DONALD M. HAWKINS; MICHAEL E. HAYES; MICHAEL M. HIMMEL; GARON RAZ HOLMAN; BRUCE L. HOUSTON; ALAN HULETT; KEVIN JOHNSON; SHELLEY J. JONES; KEVIN KEITH; ROBERT KIESLING; CRAIG L. KLEIN; KYLE G. LACY; RICHARD STEVEN LAKE; PHILLIP M. LEDERLE; WILLIAM R. LEE; STEPHANIE LEONARD; BRYAN LIEBHART; JON E. MARTIN; MICHAEL S. MARTIN; EMERSON F. MCGUIRE, II; STEPHEN MONTICELLO; TIMOTHY T. MORIARITY; BRAD L. NELSON; JEFFREY L. NICHOLS; DOUG H. PARSONS; JACK PESTLE; JACK W. PHILLIPS; BRYAN PIESTER; VANCE P. PITMAN; RALPH G. ROSS; ROBERT T. SANDERS; ROGER R. SCHLUDE, JR.; ZIM SCHWARTZE; PLAINTIFF - APPELLANTS, MICHAEL SHAW; PLAINTIFF. JOHN SHORT; REBECCA JEAN SHOWINSKY; LLOYD SIMONS, III; ROBERT SMITH; CHARLES ERIC STEVENSON; WENDY STOKES; MAURICE TAPP; TIMOTHY E. THOMASON; DIANNE ANLIKER TIMMERMAN; TIMOTHY S. TIMMERMAN; KENT A. UNTERSEHER; S. JOHN WARNER; WILLIAM J. WESTBROOK; ERIC WHITE; JOHN H. WHITE; JOHN H. WORDEN, PLAINTIFFS - APPELLANTS. ANTHONY ALLEN; ROBERT FRED BROWN; GARY CANNADAY; JO C. COOPER; CHESTER L. HEYER; FRED P. HOLMES; ROBIN A.; KEVIN MORONEY; SHERRIE M. PLUMMER; MICHAEL J. VALLEY; LARY F. WRIGHT, PLAINTIFFS. v. CITY OF COLUMBIA, MISSOURI, DEFENDANT - APPELLEE. Submitted: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Before McMILLIAN, Beam and Loken, Circuit Judges.
Appellants, current and former police officers employed by the City of Columbia, Missouri, (City) appeal from a final order entered in the United States District Court1 for the Western District of Missouri granting summary judgment in favor of the City on their claims of constitutional deprivations resulting from the City's pay structure. See Arnold v. City of Columbia, No. 98-4046-CV-C-SOW (W.D. Mo. Apr. 16, 1999). For reversal, appellants argue that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the City on their equal protection claim. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Jurisdiction was proper in the district court based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. Jurisdiction is proper in this court based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).
The following is a summary of the essential background facts. In 1990, the City hired a consulting firm, Public Administration Services (PAS), to analyze the pay structure for all City employees and to make recommendations. PAS recommended the creation of a job classification system having 36 pay "grades" and the assignment of jobs to those pay grades using a "Position Appraisal Method." An ordinance was passed by the City which essentially adopted PAS's recommendations.
Police officers were assigned to pay grade 14. Their hourly wages were calculated by dividing the weekly pay assigned to them by 42.5, while the hourly wages for other grade 14 employees were calculated by dividing their respective weekly pay by 40.2 The weekly pay was calculated based upon a set annual rate of pay. All City employees are paid bi-weekly. Police officers are paid based upon the number of hours worked in a pay period. The number of hours worked is also used to compute their overtime pay. The City revised its pay policy with respect to police officers in 1997.
Appellants filed the present action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the City's pay structure violated their equal protection and due process rights. The complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, along with wages and other benefits allegedly due for the years 1991 to 1997. The City moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion. Judgment was entered for the City, and appellants appealed.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. The question before the district court, and this court on appeal, is whether the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). Where the unresolved issues are primarily legal rather than factual, summary judgment is particularly appropriate. See Crain v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 920 F.2d 1402, 1405-06 (8th Cir. 1990).
Appellants argue that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the City on their equal protection claim. Appellants do not dispute the district court's determination that the applicable equal protection standard requires consideration of whether a rational relationship exists between the City's challenged pay structure and a legitimate governmental purpose to be served by it. Appellants contend, however, that the district court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the City has established that nexus. Appellants begin with the assumption that they are similarly situated with other grade 14 employees. Appellants note that police officers must sometimes be called upon to work during their lunch breaks, while the same necessity does not exist for many other types of municipal employees. Thus, consistent with the Fair Labor Standards Act ( FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-218, appellants were entitled to be paid for time spent on their lunch breaks during the years 1991 through 1997, because their lunch breaks were considered to be time spent for the benefit of their employer. See Henson v. Pulaski County Sheriff Dep't, 6 F.3d 531, 534-35 (8th Cir. 1993) (). Appellants maintain, however, that the City's pay structure during the relevant time period in effect forced them to forego their lunch-time pay - because they were paid a lower hourly wage vis-a-vis other grade 14 employees whose meal times were not compensated. Appellants argue that, although the City could, consistent with the FLSA, avoid paying them overtime for their half-hour lunch breaks, the City could not, consistent with the equal protection clause, require appellants to surrender their lunch-time pay entirely, while other grade 14 employees did not have to forego any pay. Framing the issue...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. Janklow
..."Where the unresolved issues are primarily legal rather than factual, summary judgment is particularly appropriate." Arnold v. Columbia, 197 F.3d 1217, 1220 (8th Cir.1999). 1. United States' [¶ 13] In its motion for partial summary judgment, the United States requests that the Court: (1) or......
-
Hahn ex rel. Barta v. Linn County, Ia
...than factual" — as the parties assert is the case here — "summary judgment is particularly appropriate." Arnold v. City of Columbia, Mo., 197 F.3d 1217, 1220 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Crain v. Board of Police Commissioners, 920 F.2d 1402, 1405-06 (8th Cir.1990)); Haberer v. Woodbury County, 1......
-
Iowa Right To Life Comm. Inc. v. Tooker
...IRTL must still show that it is “similarly situated to those who allegedly receive favorable treatment.” Arnold v. City of Columbia, 197 F.3d 1217, 1220 (8th Cir.1999). In its brief, IRTL asserts that “corporations and other organized associations are similarly situated.” Pl.'s Br. at 27. H......
-
Dorr v. Weber
...513 U.S. 1185, 115 S.Ct. 1177, 130 L.Ed.2d 1130 (1995)), aff'd, 78 F.3d 589 (8th Cir.1996) (table op.); accord Arnold v. City of Columbia, 197 F.3d 1217, 1220 (8th Cir.1999) (“To prove their equal protection claim [based on disparate pay], appellants were required, as a threshold matter, to......