Arnold v. Department of Retirement Systems

• Decision Date: 24 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 16577-5-II,16577-5-II
• Citation: 74 Wn.App. 654,875 P.2d 665
• Parties: Patricia ARNOLD, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 654

74 Wn.App. 654

875 P.2d 665

Patricia ARNOLD, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, Respondent.

No. 16577-5-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington Division 2.

June 24, 1994.

[875 P.2d 667] Dianna Timm Dryden, Belfair, for appellant.

Deborah Maranville, UW Civ. Clinic, Seattle, amicus curiae (Northwest Women's Law Center).

Zera Holland Lowe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for respondent.

SEINFELD, Acting Chief Judge.

Patricia Arnold brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of the death benefit provisions of Chapter 41.26 RCW, the statute that establishes and describes the Law Enforcement Officers' and Fire Fighters' Retirement System (LEOFF). She claimed that the statute discriminates against women, and thereby violates the State Equal Rights Amendment and constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department of Retirement Systems (DRS). Arnold appeals. DRS cross-appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it denied its motion for dismissal for want of a justiciable controversy. We reverse the grant of summary judgment.

FACTS

Patricia and Victor Arnold were married in 1964. During the marriage, Victor worked as a firefighter for the City of Tacoma and, thus, became entitled to LEOFF-1 retirement benefits. The Arnolds made payments into the LEOFF fund with community earnings. In 1985, the Arnolds were legally separated; in 1987 Victor was injured on the job and took a disability retirement; and in 1991 the Arnold marriage was legally dissolved.

The dissolution decree divided the monthly LEOFF-1 duty disability retirement benefit payments, awarding Victor 70 percent and Patricia Arnold 30 percent. These payments cease upon the death of Victor. Pursuant to the provisions of RCW Chapter 41.26, Patricia Arnold, as a former spouse, was ineligible for Victor's LEOFF death benefits. However, she asked the dissolution court to rule the statute unconstitutional and to award her a portion of the death benefits. The dissolution court declined to do so, commenting:

The matter of the legality of the Washington State statutory scheme regarding survivorship benefits of divorced spouses is not properly before this court nor can it compensate her [Arnold] for this potential loss. The wife [Arnold] may seek compensation for loss of any such interests through an action against the Department of Retirement Systems. This court makes no rulings regarding any such causes of action.

Patricia Arnold then brought this action against DRS for declaratory relief, challenging the constitutionality of the LEOFF statute, RCW Chapter 41.26, in effect in 1991. The thrust of her equal protection argument is that the class of retired LEOFF-1 members is predominantly male; therefore, the class of former spouses adversely impacted by the death benefit provisions of the statute is disproportionately female.

The LEOFF statute grants a surviving spouse, following the death of a LEOFF retiree, an entitlement to monthly death benefits equal to 50 percent of the amount of the retirement allowance the retiree was receiving at the time of death. RCW 41.26.160(1). Generally, the statute granted the benefit to a surviving spouse only if the spouse had been married to the LEOFF member for at least 1 year before the member's retirement. RCW 41.26.160(2). The statute specifically excluded most divorced spouses of members from the category of "surviving spouse". RCW 41.26.030(6); RCW 41.26.162(1). ¹

In its answer and motion to dismiss, DRS contended that the issue was not ripe for adjudication. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the matter was ripe because: Patricia Arnold owned community property rights in LEOFF benefits; under the LEOFF statute the dissolution caused her to lose her rights to death benefits; and the "[l]oss of that security has present aspects."

Arnold moved for summary judgment, arguing that the statute (1) violated the equal rights provision of article 31, § 1 of the Washington Constitution; (2) discriminated in violation of RCW 49.60.010 and 49.60.030; (3) violated the privileges and immunities clause of article 1, § 12 of the Washington Constitution; (4) deprived her of equal protection under U.S. Constitution amendment 14; and (5) deprived her of due process under article 1, § 3 of the Washington Constitution, and U.S. Constitution amendment 14. DRS filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.

The trial court denied Arnold's summary judgment motion along with her request that it take judicial notice of the fact that the surviving spouses of LEOFF members are predominantly female. In its oral opinion, the court explained that RCW 41.26.030(6) does not violate the equal rights provision because it is gender neutral. The trial court applied a "rational basis" test to the statutory classifications and concluded that the exclusion of former spouses is "rational and defendable, in order to preserve the integrity and the solvency of the LEOFF fund and to achieve, therefore, the statutory purpose of providing death benefits to members and their current surviving dependents." Accordingly, the trial court declined to find a statutory or constitutional violation. The trial court further concluded that while Arnold possessed a property right to a portion of that part of Victor's LEOFF retirement benefits that constituted community property, she did not have a vested property right to LEOFF death benefits. The trial court then granted summary judgment of dismissal to DRS.

Arnold moved for reconsideration under CR 59(a)(4), CR 60(b)(1), and CR 60(b)(3), contending that she had "newly discovered evidence". She submitted statistics from the Office of the State Actuary showing that as of December 31, 1990, there were 58 female and 4,305 male members of LEOFF-1. DRS opposed reconsideration, arguing that Arnold had failed to exercise due diligence or to show excusable neglect for her tardy presentation of the statistical data. The trial court refused to consider the statistical data and denied reconsideration, stating: "Even if evidence of the gender composition of LEOFF was allowed, this Court finds that it would not change the Court's ruling on the Constitutionality of RCW 41.26.030(6)."

ANALYSIS

MOOTNESS

Although neither party raised the issue, we note that Arnold's complaint, filed in November 1991, challenges the definition of "surviving spouse" contained in the version of RCW 41.26.030(6) that was amended effective September 1991. Laws of 1991, Sp.Sess., ch. 12, §§ 1, 3. Nonetheless, we conclude that Arnold's challenge is not moot.

"A case is moot if a court can no longer provide effective relief." In re Cross, 99 Wash.2d 373, 376-77, 662 P.2d 828 (1983).

"It is a general rule that, where only moot questions or abstract propositions are involved, ... the appeal ... should be dismissed." Sorenson v. Bellingham, 80 Wash.2d 547, 558, 496 P.2d 512 (1972). An exception to this rule exists where we determine the moot issue to be of substantial or continuing public interest. Sorenson, at 558, 496 P.2d 512. The governing criteria in this determination are whether: (1) the issue presented is of a public or private nature, (2) it is desirable to provide guidance to public officers, and (3) the issue is likely to recur. Sorenson, at 558, 496 P.2d 512.

Harvest House Restaurant, Inc. v. Lynden, 102 Wash.2d 369, 373, 685 P.2d 600 (1984). The issues raised in this appeal satisfy the criteria set forth in Harvest House.

First, Arnold's constitutional challenges are generally applicable to the amended statute. In amending the definition of "surviving spouse", the Legislature included only a very small group of former spouses; the majority of former spouses remain ineligible for death benefits. Second, this case satisfies the three requirements for the application of the public interest exception to the general rule on moot issues.

DECLARATORY RELIEF

DRS, in its cross-appeal, contends that this case involves "a purely hypothetical and speculative controversy", and thus does not present a justiciable controversy. To invoke a court's jurisdiction under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, RCW 7.24, an action must present a justiciable controversy or contain an issue of major public importance. Nollette v. Christianson, 115 Wash.2d 594, 598, 800 P.2d 359 (1990). The Nollette court, quoting Diversified Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Ripley, 82 Wash.2d 811, 815, 514 P.2d 137 (1973), set forth the following four tests:

For purposes of declaratory relief, a justiciable controversy is:

(1) ... an actual, present and existing dispute, or the mature seeds of one, as distinguished from a possible, dormant, hypothetical, speculative, or moot disagreement, (2) between parties having genuine and opposing interests, (3) which involves interests that must be direct and substantial, rather than potential, theoretical, abstract or academic, and (4) a judicial determination of which will be final and conclusive.

Nollette, 115 Wash.2d at 599, 800 P.2d 359.

As we interpret the Declaratory Judgments Act, we are mindful that the Legislature has declared it remedial in nature and subject to liberal construction and administration. RCW 7.24.120; RCW 7.24.050. We are satisfied after analyzing the facts here in light of the four-part Nollette test and this legislative declaration that the trial court did not err in finding a justiciable controversy.

First, there is an actual, present, and existing dispute as to Arnold's eligibility for death benefits. We recognize that Arnold, in any event, could not receive such benefits unless and until Victor predeceased her. Nonetheless, her entitlement to benefits presents an existing dispute between parties with genuine and opposing interests. Thus, the second Nollette test is also satisfied.

Third, Nollette asks whether the controversy involves an interest that is direct and...