Arnold v. Duchesne County, 93-4046

• Decision Date: 27 May 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-4046,93-4046
• Citation: 26 F.3d 982
• Parties: Louis F. ARNOLD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DUCHESNE COUNTY, Merv Taylor, Jerry Foote, and Clair Poulson, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 982

26 F.3d 982

62 USLW 2774

Louis F. ARNOLD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DUCHESNE COUNTY, Merv Taylor, Jerry Foote, and Clair

Poulson, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 93-4046.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

May 27, 1994.

John D. Russell, Salt Lake City, UT, for appellant.

Brent A. Burnett, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Jan Graham, Utah Atty. Gen., Lynn J. Lund and Blake Nakamura, with him on the briefs), Salt Lake City, UT, for appellees.

Before ANDERSON and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and SHADUR, ^* District Judge.

STEPHEN H. ANDERSON, Circuit Judge.

This case presents a single issue: whether the appropriate statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 actions in Utah is two years pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-12-28(3) or four years pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-12-25(3). This issue has divided federal district court judges in the district of Utah. ¹ The lower court in this case held that section 78-12-28(3) applies to section 1983. We hold that it does not.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff and appellant Louis F. Arnold was arrested by officers of the Duchesne County Sheriff's Department on April 21, 1988, and charged with selling a stolen firearm. The charges were subsequently dismissed, and Arnold brought this action on April 17, 1992, against Duchesne County, Sheriff Clair Poulson and officers Merv Taylor and Jerry Foote, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988, as well as numerous state law claims. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Arnold's action is barred by Utah's two-year statute of limitations applicable specifically to section 1983 actions. ² The district court dismissed all of Arnold's claims, holding, with respect to his section 1983 claim, that section 78-12-28(3)'s two-year limitations period barred the claim. Arnold appeals only that ruling.

DISCUSSION

Congress provided no specific statute of limitations for actions under the Civil Rights Acts. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 endorses for the Civil Rights Acts the "settled practice" of adopting a state limitations period when the federal statute provides no such period, provided the state limitations period is not inconsistent with federal law or policy. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1941-42, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); see also Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 239, 109 S.Ct. 573, 576, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989). ³ As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, section 1988 mandates a three-step procedure for selecting such a state limitations period:

First, courts are to look to the laws of the United States "so far as such laws are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into effect." If no suitable federal rule exists, courts undertake the second step by considering application of state "common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes" of the forum state. A third step asserts the predominance of the federal interest: courts are to apply state law only if it is not "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."

Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48, 104 S.Ct. 2924, 2928, 82 L.Ed.2d 36 (1984) (citations omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988); accord Wilson, 471 U.S. at 267, 105 S.Ct. at 1942. Since section 1983 indisputably contains no statute of limitations, we must consider whether Utah's two-year statute of limitations enacted specifically for section 1983 actions comports with the second and third steps of the Burnett methodology. ⁴

While section 1988 directs us to borrow state limitations periods, it provides no guidance on how to select the appropriate one. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has told us to select the "most analogous" or "most appropriate" statute of limitations. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 485, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1721, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). It must, of course, be "consistent with federal law and policy." Owens, 488 U.S. at 239, 109 S.Ct. at 576.

Wilson dictates a three-part analysis to determine which state statute is most appropriate or analogous:

We must first consider whether state law or federal law governs the characterization of a Sec. 1983 claim for statute of limitations purposes. If federal law applies, we must next decide whether all Sec. 1983 claims should be characterized in the same way, or whether they should be evaluated differently depending upon the varying factual circumstances and legal theories presented in each individual case. Finally, we must characterize the essence of the claim in the pending case, and decide which state statute provides the most appropriate limiting principle.

Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268, 105 S.Ct. at 1942.

Having answered the first question affirmatively--"the characterization of Sec. 1983 [is] to be measured by federal rather than state standards"--the Wilson Court concluded that section 1988 directs the selection for each state of "the one most appropriate statute of limitations for all Sec. 1983 claims." Id. at 270, 275, 105 S.Ct. at 1943, 1946. Finally, the Court held that the most appropriate limitations period is the one applicable to tort actions for personal injuries: it "is supported by the nature of the Sec. 1983 remedy, and by the federal interest in ensuring that the borrowed period of limitations not discriminate against the federal civil rights remedy." Id. at 276, 105 S.Ct. at 1947.

Wilson did not, however, completely eliminate confusion surrounding the appropriate limitations period for section 1983 actions. It failed to explain how to select a statute when a state has multiple statutes of limitations applicable to personal injury actions. The Court resolved this problem in Owens, in which it held that in states having multiple personal injury statutes of limitations, "courts considering Sec. 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions." Owens, 488 U.S. at 249-50, 109 S.Ct. at 581-82. The Owens Court's admittedly "practical inquiry" fashioned a rule to be "applied with ease and predictability in all 50 States." Id. at 242-43, 109 S.Ct. at 577-78. Owens therefore implicitly endorsed, for section 1983 actions in Utah, this court's earlier selection of Utah's four-year residual statute of limitations applicable to actions "for relief not otherwise provided for by law." See Mismash v. Murray City, 730 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir.1984) (citing Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-12-25(3)), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1052, 105 S.Ct. 2111, 85 L.Ed.2d 476 (1985). Accordingly, prior to the enactment of the specific statute at issue in this case, section 1983 actions in Utah were governed by a four-year statute of limitations.

In 1987, the Utah legislature enacted section 78-12-28(3), which provides a two-year period in which to bring an action "for injury to the personal rights of another as a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983." Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-12-28(3). It is the only statute in the country that provides an explicit limitations period for section 1983 actions. ⁵

Assuming that section 78-12-28(3) is the "most analogous" state limitations period for a section 1983 action in Utah, we must consider whether it provides "the most appropriate limiting principle," Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268, 105 S.Ct. at 1942, and is consistent with federal law and policy. ⁶ See Burnett, 468 U.S. at 53 n. 15, 104 S.Ct. at 2931 n. 15; cf. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 2306, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988) ("[a]ny state law, however clearly within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.") (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666, 82 S.Ct. 1089, 1092, 8 L.Ed.2d 180 (1962)). If it fails to provide the appropriate limiting principle and if it is inconsistent with federal law and policy, it fails the second and third steps of the Burnett/section 1988 test, and is therefore inapplicable to section 1983 actions.

To determine whether a state provision is inconsistent with the relevant federal law--section 1983--we initially review the purpose and policy behind that law. This is necessary because "[a]ny assessment of the applicability of a state law to federal civil rights litigation ... must be made in light of the purpose and nature of the federal right." Felder, 487 U.S. at 139, 108 S.Ct. at 2307. The primary objective of the Civil Rights Acts has been stated numerous times: "to ensure that individuals whose federal constitutional or statutory rights are abridged may recover damages or secure injunctive relief." Id. (quoting Burnett, 468 U.S. at 55, 104 S.Ct. at 2932). This "uniquely federal remedy" is to be given "a sweep as broad as its language." Id. (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 2160, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972), and United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1160, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966)). While state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over section 1983 actions, id., the section 1983 remedy is supplementary to any state remedy and "can have no precise counterpart in state law." Wilson, 471 U.S. at 272, 105 S.Ct. at 1944.

We now consider whether section 78-12-28(3) conflicts with or undermines that policy. We must first determine the section's scope and we hold that section 78-12-28(3), by its terms, specifically and exclusively targets section 1983 actions. Defendants endeavor to avoid some of the difficulties inherent in such a conclusion by arguing that the section would also apply to all other civil rights actions filed in Utah. ⁷ We reject those arguments that section 78-12-28(3) was intended to do anything other than apply exclusively to section 1983 actions. The language of the statute could not be clearer, and we read that clear language in its ordinary way. See Deal v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 1998, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993). We are unwilling to "assume that [the legislature] chose a surprisingly...