Arnold v. Hawkins

• Decision Date: 04 June 1888
• Citation: 8 S.W. 718,95 Mo. 569
• Parties: Arnold, Appellant, v. Hawkins, Collector
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

8 S.W. 718

95 Mo. 569

Arnold, Appellant, v. Hawkins, Collector

Supreme Court of Missouri

June 4, 1888

Appeal from Ozark Circuit Court. -- Hon. J. F. Hale, Judge.

Reversed.

W. J Orr for appellant.

"For county purposes the annual rate on property, in counties having six million dollars or less, shall not, in the aggregate, exceed fifty cents on the one hundred dollars valuation; said restrictions, as to rates, shall apply to taxes of every kind and description, whether general or special, except taxes to pay valid indebtedness now (then) existing, or bonds which may be issued in renewal of such indebtedness." Const. 1875, sec. 11, art. 10. The limitations in the above section are self-enforcing and do not require legislation to make them effective. State ex rel. v. Van Every, 75 Mo. 537; St. Joseph v Patten, 62 Mo. 444, 450. A cardinal rule in dealing with written instruments is, that they are to receive an unvarying interpretation, and that their practical construction is to be uniform. Cooley Const. Lim. [4 Ed.] 67. "A constitution is not to be made to mean one thing at one time and another at some subsequent time when the circumstances may have so changed as perhaps to make a different rule in the case seem desirable. What a court is to do is to declare the law as written, leaving it to the people themselves to make such changes as new circumstances may require." Cooley on Const. Lim., supra, and cas. cit. The object of construction as applied to a written constitution is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it.

J. L Davis for respondent.

OPINION

Black, J.

The plaintiff, who is a taxpayer in Ozark county, brought this suit against the collector of the revenue of that county to enjoin the collection of certain taxes levied for the year 1886. The case was submitted to the circuit court on agreed facts under section 3700, Revised Statutes, and so far as essential to an understanding of the only questions raised on this appeal, the facts are as follows:

(2) That the following taxes appear on said books for the year 1886, as extended against the property of plaintiff: twenty cents on the one hundred dollars valuation for state revenue tax; twenty cents on the one hundred dollars valuation for state interest tax; fifty cents on the one hundred dollars valuation for county revenue tax; forty cents on the one hundred dollars valuation for county special tax; forty cents on the one hundred dollars valuation for county judgment tax; five cents on the one hundred dollars valuation for county road tax.

(3) Plaintiff has fully paid all of said taxes except the said county judgment and county road taxes, which last-named taxes amount to the sum of $ 6.34 county judgment, and eighty-two cents county road tax; and which sums the plaintiff refuses to pay subject to the determination of the legality of the same.

(4) It is further agreed that said county revenue tax, amounting to fifty cents on the one hundred dollars valuation, is levied, collected, and used to meet all the ordinary current expenses of the county, as is provided for in section 6818, Revised Statutes, 1879, and the whole thereof is required for that purpose.

(5) That the said forty cents on the one hundred dollars valuation, called county special tax, is levied, collected, and apportioned to pay debts created prior to November 30, 1875, or renewal bonds in lieu thereof, or the interest thereon, and cannot legally be used for any other purpose.

(6) That the said forty cents judgment tax is levied and is to be collected and used to pay judgments now existing against said county, which said judgments are founded wholly upon warrants issued since November 30, 1875, and which said warrants were drawn to pay current expenses of...