Arnold v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.

• Decision Date: 07 February 1887
• Docket Number: 285
• Parties: Arnold v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Co
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

8 A. 213

115 Pa. 135

Arnold v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Co

No. 285

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

February 7, 1887

Argued January 6, 1887

ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas No. 1, of Philadelphia county Of January Term, 1886, No. 285.

Case by Charles M. Arnold against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company to recover damages from the defendant for injuries alleged to have been sustained by him by reason of the agents of the defendant unlawfully and negligently ejecting him from one of their passenger trains in which he was a passenger. Plea, not guilty.

The following are the facts of the case as they appeared on the trial before PEIRCE, J.

On the morning of April 6th, 1883, the plaintiff went to the Broad street station at Philadelphia of the Pennsylvania Railroad Co. to buy a ticket for Lancaster. He bought an excursion ticket, the return coupon of which was as follows: --

Pennsylvania Railroad Co., Daily Excursion Ticket.

In consequence of the reduced rate at which this ticket is sold it will only be received for return passage on the day of sale, as stamped on the back. If issued on Saturday or Sunday, will be good to return until the following Monday, inclusive.

Lancaster to Philadelphia.

Not good to stop off. (On the side)

Return Coupon.

J. R. WOOD, General Passenger Agent.

482.

(Endorsed)

Pennsylvania Railroad Co.

April 6th, 1883.

Broad Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

He went to Lancaster, transacted his business, and arrived at the depot at Lancaster at about 11 o'clock in the evening, ready to return to Philadelphia. He waited for a train until about 12.45, when a train arrived, which he took. He took his seat in one of the passenger cars. A short time after the train had left Lancaster, the conductor entered the car for the purpose of collecting the fares of the passengers. The plaintiff handed him the return coupon. The conductor examined it and refused to take it, saying that it had expired at 12 o'clock (about an hour before), and said he would have to pay the full cash fare. The conductor then left, and proceeded to collect the fares of the other passengers. He returned and again asked the plaintiff for his fare, and said that unless he paid it he would put him off. The plaintiff replied that his ticket was good, but rather than be put off he would pay the difference between the redemption value of his return coupon and a full fare. This offer the conductor refused. In the meantime the train had made several stops at its regular stations and no effort was made by the conductor to eject the plaintiff, when the train reached a way station, called Laemon Place, the conductor stopped the train and told the plaintiff that he would now have to get off. The plaintiff arose and, under protest, followed the conductor to the door. On reaching the platform of the car the conductor showed the plaintiff off on the side of the train nearest to the station, and motioned with his hand toward the station. In order to get there it was necessary for him to cross the tracks of the west-bound trains. He had hardly stepped on the ground when the train moved off. It was about half-past one o'clock at night, and very dark. There were no lights or signals at the station, and before the plaintiff had time to clear the track, the head-light of the express train, which was then due at that place, suddenly flashed upon him, and the next instant he was thrown a considerable distance on one side of the track. He lay for a time unconscious, then sought a place of shelter for the night. The only place he could find was in the signal tower of the railroad company, where he spent the night on the floor. In the morning he returned to Philadelphia.

After the plaintiff had closed his case the court on motion of the defendant's counsel entered a compulsory nonsuit. A motion was made to take off the nonsuit which the court in banc overruled. Judgment was accordingly entered, whereupon the plaintiff took this writ, assigning for error the said action of the court.

The judgment is reversed, and a new venire ordered.

William W. Porter, for plaintiff in error. -- I. The plaintiff's ticket was good for the passage if begun on the day upon which the ticket expired. He was at the depot of the company and thus beginning his journey before the ticket expired: Allender v. The Railroad, 37 Iowa 264; Caswell v. The Railroad, 98 Mass. 194; Gordon v. the Railroad, 40 Bard., 546; Central R.R. Co. v. Perry, 58 Ga. 461; Buffett v. The Railroad, 40 N.Y. 168; Warren v. The Railroad, 8 Allen, 227; Poucher v. The Railroad, 49 N.Y. 263.

The plaintiff was entitled to be carried as a passenger because he offered to pay the difference between the redemption value of his return coupon and the full fare.

By the Act of May 6th, 1863, sec. 5, P.L. 582, railroad companies are obliged to redeem their unused tickets.

II. Even if the plaintiff be regarded as a trespasser upon the defendant's cars and as rightfully ejected therefrom, still he is entitled to recover.

1. If a trespasser at all he was on the defendant's cars under a reasonable claim of right. He believed the ticket which he had purchased entitled him to ride. When informed to the contrary he offered to pay the difference between the redemption value of the ticket and the cash fare.

2. Even if a willful wrongdoer he was still entitled to be ejected from the train with a due regard for his safety. A conductor is not permitted to use violence in ejecting a trespasser: Penna. R.R. Co. v. Toomey, 10 Norris, 256; Rorer on Railroads, vol. 2, pp. 960, 963, 966; Biddle & Wye v. R.R. Co., 2 Amerman, 551; R.R. Co. v. Rosenzweig, 3 Id., 519; Law v. R.R. Co., 32 Iowa 534; Healy v. R.R. Co., 28 Ohio 23; Kline v. R.R. Co., 400; R.R. Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall., 657; Penn. R.R. Co. v. Vandwer, 6 Wr., 365.

III. There was ample evidence of negligence and of damage, and the case should have been submitted to the jury.

The question of negligence should have been submitted. If there is any question of fact raised the case should go to the jury: Berg v. Abbott, 2 Norris, 177; Prutzman v. Bushong, 2 Id., 526.

On motion for a nonsuit, not only must the evidence of the plaintiff be taken as true, Gordon v. The Railroad, 6 W.N.C., 405; Miller v. Bealer, 5 Out., 583; but every inference of fact which a jury might draw from it in favor of the plaintiff must be drawn by the judge; Smith v. Craig, 3 W. & S., 14; or if there be some evidence, though slight, from which a jury might draw an inference favorable to the plaintiff, the case should be left to the jury: Bevan v. The Ins. Co., 9 W. & S., 187; Maynes v. Atwater, 88 Pa. St., 496; Howard Ex. Co. v. Wile, 64 Pa. St., 201.

Negligence is always a question for the jury when there is reasonable doubt as to the facts or as to the inference to be drawn from them. Where the measure of duty is ordinary and reasonable care, and the degree of care varies according to circumstances, the question of negligence is necessarily for the jury: McCully v. Clark, 4 Wright, 406; Penna. Canal Co. v. Bentley, 16 P.F.S. 30; W.C. & P.R. Co. v. McElvee, 17 Id., 311; Crissey v. Hestonville Pass. Railway Co., 25 Id., 83; McKee v. Bidwell, 24 Id., 223; Phila. City Railway Co. v. Hassard, 25 Id., 367.

Isaac Elwell (David W. Sellers with him) for defendant in error.

The plaintiff had no ticket entitling him to a passage and declined to pay his fare, the conductor had a right to decline to carry him further. No cause of action exists for the ejection: Dietrich v. R.R., 7 Pa. St., 432; Railway v. Clark, 72 Pa. St., 231.

As his ticket had expired, it was his duty, if able to do so, to pay his fare. If he caused his expulsion, he can recover nothing unless the railroad had committed a breach of contract. Hall v. R.R., 9 Am. & English R. Way Cases, 348. He had no right to couple the payment of his fare with a condition that his expired ticket should be redeemed. Vankirk v. R.R., 76 Pa. St., 66.

Before MERCUR, C.J., GORDON, TRUNKEY, STERRETT and GREEN, JJ. PAXSON and CLARK, JJ., absent.

OPINION

Mr. Justice GORDON

Two well established principles, governing cases like that in hand, seem to have been overlooked or disregarded by the court below in the disposition of the present contention. The one is that, as a general rule, questions of negligence are for the jury, and cannot be...