Arnold v. State
| Decision Date | 11 November 1908 |
| Citation | 62 S.E. 806,131 Ga. 494 |
| Parties | ARNOLD v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Where on the trial of one for murder, the homicide is admitted, and the material question is whether it was willful or accidental, the conduct of the defendant in shooting at the sister of the deceased as she ran from the house immediately after the defendant had mortally wounded her brother, and her screams for help, are parts of the res gestae, and relevant to the issue.
[Ed Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 807; Dec. Dig. § 365. [*]]
While a person accused of crime may put his general character in issue, a witness called by him to show his general character will not be permitted on his examination in chief to testify as to the particular instances or special traits which do not bear upon the peculiar nature of the crime charged.
[Ed Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 841; Dec. Dig. § 376. [*]]
Where testimony is offered as a whole, some of which is competent and some not, a new trial will not be granted because of its rejection.
[Ed Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1595; Dec. Dig. § 670. [*]]
In defining a reasonable doubt, it is not error to instruct the jury that a reasonable doubt "is just such a doubt as its name implies, not a vague conjecture nor fanciful doubt, but it is such a doubt that you, as trial jurors, can give a reason for having."
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1904-1922; Dec. Dig. § 789. [*]
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 7, pp. 5958-5972; vol. 8, p. 7779.]
The charge on the subject of impeachment of witnesses was within the ruling in Powell v. State, 101 Ga. 19-22, 29 S.E. 309, 65 Am.St.Rep. 277; Smith v. State, 109 Ga. 479 (2), 35 S.E. 59.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Dec. Dig. § 785. [*]]
Error from Superior Court, Floyd County; Moses Wright, Judge.
John Arnold was convicted of murder, and he brings error. Affirmed.
J. W. Wise and G. E. Maddox, for plaintiff in error.
W. H. Ennis, Sol. Gen., and John C. Hart, Atty. Gen., for the State.
John Arnold was convicted of the murder of Harris Rodney, and recommended to mercy. He made a motion for a new trial, which was refused, and he excepts.
1. The deceased was slain at the house of his sister, at about 10 o'clock at night. At the time of the homicide the deceased, his sister, and her two infants were the only persons in the house. The defendant demanded that he be allowed to come in the house, and, upon being refused, he forced an entrance, and in a struggle with the deceased killed him. The sister, in narrating the occurrence, was allowed to testify, over objection, that immediately upon the defendant shooting her brother she ran out of the house, and the defendant shot at her four times while she was running; that she ran across the street to Sadie Brock's, calling upon her to run and help her brother, and stating that defendant had shot him and would kill him; that Sadie Brock told her father not to go, but to get a policeman. While this was going on, witness and Sadie Brock entered the house, and by that time the defendant had come on the porch. The specific objection to this testimony was that it related to occurrences after the killing, and included a conversation with a third person not in the presence of the defendant. In his statement the defendant claimed that the killing was accidental, and that the pistol was unintentionally discharged in a scuffle with the deceased and his sister. The testimony to which objection was made was but a part of the narrative of the circumstances of the homicide. The immediate flight of the witness, the firing upon her by the defendant as she was fleeing, her instant appeal for help, was so closely connected with the firing of the fatal shot as to become a part of the res gestae, and was material in determining whether the shooting was willful or accidental. Pool v. State, 87 Ga. 526, 13 S.E. 556. It is not certain whether the conversation was heard by the defendant who had followed her, but the evidence is strongly indicative that it occurred within his hearing, if not actually in his presence. Even if the conversation relative to getting a policeman was inadmissible, the error in admitting it was so manifestly harmless that a new trial should not be had on that account alone.
2, 3. The defendant offered to prove his good character by several witnesses, one of whom was C. T. Clements. The fourth ground of the motion for a new trial complains that the court erred in ruling out the following testimony of this witness It appears from the brief of evidence that this witness was allowed to testify that he had known the defendant about two years, knew his character in the community pretty well, that his character was good, except that he had the reputation of drinking some. We fully concede that it is the right of a person accused of crime to put in issue his general character. In examining the witnesses called to establish his character, the defendant may inquire of them how long they have known him, and their opportunities of forming a knowledge of his character. Peeples v. State, 103 Ga. 629, 29 S.E. 691. But a witness called by the defendant to show his good character will not be permitted on his examination in chief to testify as to the particular instances or special traits which do not bear upon the peculiar nature of the crime with which the defendant is charged. Thus a man on trial for murder will not be permitted to show his character for industry. State v. Dalton, 27 Mo. 13. The witness in this case was allowed to swear that the character of the accused was good. The excluded answer was not so positive in its indorsement of the defendant's character as the evidence which was admitted. Testimony that the defendant's general character for peaceableness was good was relevant. But from the form of the question it seems his purpose was to put in issue his general character, and not his character for peaceableness. If the court had allowed the...
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