Arnold v. State
| Decision Date | 26 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 102943,ED 102943 |
| Citation | 509 S.W.3d 108 |
| Parties | Tyrone ARNOLD, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
509 S.W.3d 108
Tyrone ARNOLD, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
No. ED 102943
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION FOUR .
FILED: April 26, 2016
Timothy Forneris, 1010 Market St., Suite 1100, St. Louis, MO 63101, for appellant.
Chris Koster, Shaun J. Mackelprang, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102, for respondent.
KURT S. ODENWALD, Judge
Introduction
Appellant Tyrone Arnold ("Arnold") appeals from the judgment of the motion court denying his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Arnold pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to voluntary manslaughter and received a sentence of 20 years' imprisonment. On appeal, Arnold contends the motion court clearly erred in denying his Rule 24.035 motion because Arnold alleged facts showing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, in that his attorneys (collectively referred to as "plea counsel") were ineffective for refusing to make offers of 10 and 15 years' imprisonment in exchange for Arnold's guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter. Arnold further claims the motion court abused its discretion in denying his request to disqualify the City of St. Louis Circuit Attorney's Office ("the Circuit Attorney") from representing the State in this matter. Because the record of Arnold's guilty plea and sentencing directly refutes that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing, and because his motion to disqualify the Circuit Attorney is moot, we affirm the judgment of the motion court.
Factual and Procedural History
The State charged Arnold with first-degree murder and subsequently filed a notice of its intent to seek the death penalty. On July 3, 2014, Arnold pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter as part of a plea agreement negotiated between plea counsel and the State. As part of the plea agreement, the State filed an information reducing the first-degree murder charge to a charge of voluntary manslaughter and charged Arnold as a dangerous offender based on a prior conviction for second-degree murder.
At the outset of the guilty plea hearing, plea counsel announced that, "[i]n light of the negotiations with the State of Missouri and the amended charge that has been filed," Arnold had decided to withdraw his not guilty plea and enter a plea of guilty
"pursuant to the plea agreement with the State." Arnold confirmed that he wished to plead guilty to the charge of manslaughter. The trial court asked Arnold if he understood that he was now being charged with voluntary manslaughter, a Class B felony, as a dangerous offender, Arnold confirmed he understood. Arnold also stated that plea counsel had explained the charges to him so that he understood them, which plea counsel confirmed.
The prosecutor then outlined the evidence it would present should the case proceed to trial. Arnold confirmed that these facts were accurate and were "what [he] did." Arnold also confirmed his previous guilty plea to second-degree murder. The trial court found Arnold to be a dangerous offender based on his prior conviction.
The prosecutor proceeded to explain the range of punishment for voluntary manslaughter as a dangerous offender. The prosecutor explained that Arnold was subject to an enhanced range of punishment as a dangerous offender: "imprisonment in the Missouri Department of Corrections for a term of years not less than ten years, or up to thirty years or life imprisonment." The following exchange then occurred between the trial court, the prosecutor, and Arnold:
Trial Court: Now, Mr. Arnold, you are making this plea pursuant to a stipulated plea agreement; is that correct?
Arnold: Yes, sir.
Trial Court: Now, [prosecutor], the basis of that stipulated plea agreement is—what is the agreed upon sentence that the parties have agreed to in this case?
Prosecutor: The State and the defendant have agreed that the appropriate disposition would be for the defendant to serve a term of twenty years imprisonment in Missouri Department of Corrections, and for that sentence to run consecutive to the balance of time that he is to serve in 22881–00851.
Trial Court: Now, Mr. Arnold, do you understand that that is what the stipulated sentence is in this case?
Arnold: Yes, sir.
Trial Court: And you have agreed to that; is that correct?
Arnold: Yes, sir.
The trial court produced the stipulation and plea agreement signed by Arnold and dated that same day, July 3, 2014. Arnold confirmed that he had signed the document and that he understood it. Arnold further stated that he voluntarily signed the document. The trial court again questioned Arnold about his understanding of the plea agreement and the sentence he would receive:
Trial Court: So you now know that it will be the sentence of this Court to give you twenty years in the Missouri Department of Corrections, and that time will be consecutive to your prior murder in the second degree conviction. Is that correct?
Arnold: Yes, sir.
Trial Court: That's what you understand the sentence to be?
Arnold: Yes.
The trial court next questioned Arnold about his interactions with plea counsel:
Trial Court: [S]ince they have been assigned to your case, have you had an opportunity to talk with them about your case?
Arnold: Yes, sir.
Trial Court: And you have gone over the facts of this case with them, haven't you?
Arnold: That's correct.
Trial Court: In fact, several times you have met here in this courtroom with your attorneys; is that correct?
Arnold: Yes, sir.
Trial Court: And that's in addition to the times that you've met with them over in the Justice Center?
Arnold: Jail. Yes sir.
The trial court went on to explain, and Arnold indicated that he understood the various rights he was giving up by pleading guilty rather than proceeding to trial, including: the right to a jury trial, the right to be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the State's burden of proof, the necessity of a unanimous verdict in order to obtain a conviction, the right to not testify on his own behalf, and the right to cross-examine the State's witnesses.
Arnold stated that he did not have any questions to ask either the trial court or plea counsel before entering his guilty plea. The trial court asked Arnold whether anyone had threatened, intimidated, or tricked him into pleading guilty. Arnold responded, "No, sir." Arnold proceeded to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter. The trial court accepted the guilty plea, finding that Arnold "knowingly and voluntarily entered into this plea of guilt with a full understanding of the charges and the consequences," and finding that a factual basis existed for the guilty plea.
The trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing. Both plea counsel and the prosecutor requested that the trial court follow the plea agreement. The trial court did so, sentencing Arnold to 20 years' imprisonment. The trial court explained Arnold's post-conviction rights under Rule 24.035, which Arnold indicated he understood.
Finally, the trial court asked Arnold a series of questions regarding plea counsel's performance, as well as another question about the voluntariness of his guilty plea:
Trial Court: Now, I have to ask you again, then, you have met with both of your attorneys numerous times; is that correct?...
Arnold: That's correct.
Trial Court: And when you met with them, did you discuss your case?
Arnold: Yes, sir.
Trial Court: And did they answer those questions?
Arnold: Yes, sir.
Trial Court: Did you eventually tell them that you wanted to plead guilty?
Arnold: Yes, sir.
Trial Court: And that was your decision?
Arnold: Yes, it was.
Trial Court: No one fooled you or tricked you or forced you into that decision?
Arnold: No, sir.
Trial Court: During the plea of guilty that we just went through, did they say or do anything that you disagreed with?
Arnold: No.
Trial Court: Are you happy with their services?
Arnold: Yes, I am.
Trial Court: Should I know of any reason at all why they have not done an adequate
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Cook v. State
...that this case presents a "reverse" Frye situation has already been rejected by the eastern district of this Court in Arnold v. State , 509 S.W.3d 108 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016). There, Arnold claimed: (1) his "plea counsel were ineffective for refusing to make offers of 10 and 15 years’ imprison......
-
Arata v. State
...specific obligations of defense counsel during plea negotiations. See Frye , 132 S.Ct. at 1408 ; see also Arnold v. State , No. ED102943, 509 S.W.3d 108, 113 – 15, 2016 WL 1642966, at *5–6 (Mo. App. April 26, 2016) (noting Frye is limited to cases where counsel failed to communicate an exis......
-
Cork v. State
...the specific obligations of defense counsel during plea negotiations. See Frye , 132 S.Ct. at 1408 ; see also Arnold v. State , [ED 102943, ]509 S.W.3d 108, 113–15 (Mo. App. 2016) (noting Frye is limited to cases where counsel failed to communicate an existing plea offer to the defendant an......
-
Kerpash v. State
...466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The Strickland test applies to the plea bargain context. Arnold v. State , 509 S.W.3d 108, 113 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016).I. Performance Movant fails to show Counsel performed ineffectively. A lawyer's performance is ineffective when it do......