Arnold v. Taco Properties, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 February 1983
• Docket Number: No. AK-116,AK-116
• Citation: 427 So.2d 216
• Parties: 9 Ed. Law Rep. 1104, 9 Media L. Rep. 2553 James D. ARNOLD and M.H.J. Collins, Appellants, v. TACO PROPERTIES, INC., and Kenneth C. Smith and Elizabeth J. Smith, d/b/a the Taco Times, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 216

427 So.2d 216

9 Ed. Law Rep. 1104, 9 Media L. Rep. 2553

James D. ARNOLD and M.H.J. Collins, Appellants, v. TACO PROPERTIES, INC., and Kenneth C. Smith and Elizabeth J. Smith, d/b/a the Taco Times, Appellees.

No. AK-116.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

Feb. 10, 1983.

Rehearing Denied March 18, 1983.

Robert D. Mendelson of Gardner, Shelfar, Mendelson & Duggar, Tallahassee, for appellants.

Roy T. Rhodes of Horne, Rhodes, Jaffry, Horne & Carruth, Tallahassee, for appellees.

WENTWORTH, Judge.

This is an appeal from a final judgment rendered pursuant to a jury verdict in favor of the defendants. Prior to the trial a hearing was held for the limited purpose of determining whether plaintiffs were public figures. The trial court found that they were, and that they would therefore be required to prove that the defendants (owners and publishers of The Taco Times, a bi-weekly newspaper of general circulation in Taylor County and surrounding areas) acted with "actual malice" ¹ in publishing allegedly defamatory articles. This pretrial order is the basis of the primary point raised on appeal. We affirm.

Appellants are the major stockholders of the North Florida School of Medical Technology in Perry, Florida. Appellant Arnold is also the administrator of Doctor's Memorial Hospital in Perry, and Collins is the head technician in charge of the laboratory at that hospital. In the summer of 1977, Collins appeared on the "Good Morning Show" on WCTV ² to promote the school. On the program Collins discussed the availability of an associate of arts degree from North Florida Junior College for work at the lab school.

On August 18, 1977, the chairman of the state licensing board ³ wrote Mr. Arnold and informed him that the board was in receipt of the school's renewal application. The chairman noted that the school had added thirty semester hours to its curriculum and had purportedly "effected an arrangement with North Florida Junior College so that students may earn an Associate in Arts degree from North Florida Junior College while pursuing the medical technician course." The letter informed Arnold that by making these representations the school may have been taken out from under the jurisdiction of the vocational-technical school licensing board and that it might have to submit an application to the State Board of Independent Colleges and Schools. The letter was accompanied by a notice that the school's renewal application was on the agenda for the August 30, 1977 meeting of the board, and attendance was requested. The minutes of the board's August 30 meeting reflect that a 30-day deferral for renewal was recommended, with subsequent licensure granted, provided the school would comply with seven specific conditions. Those conditions included deletion of any reference to any relationship with North Florida Junior College from the college's promotional publications, and "[t]hat the school clearly and fully explain ... any arrangement for the use of the Doctor's Hospital in the training of laboratory technology students."

In August and September of 1977, the Taco Times ran a series of articles on the school and its relationship with the licensing board. As a result, appellants filed a complaint alleging that the articles contained false, defamatory statements. According to appellants, the articles falsely reported that the school had been in danger of losing its license because it had made misleading representations to the public about the benefits of enrolling at the school, and because the articles implied that Collins and Arnold were unscrupulous and dishonest. However, because the jury was instructed that it could find for the plaintiffs only if it found that the defendants published false statements with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of probable falsity, ⁴ the verdict does not reflect whether the jury found (1) that the statements were not false, or (2) that they were false but not made with actual malice. ⁵ Thus, the issue of whether plaintiffs were properly found to be public figures is the pivotal question upon which this case turns.

In Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the situations in which the New York Times "actual malice" standard must be applied in a defamation action against a publisher or broadcaster. If the person who is the subject matter of the publication is a public official or a public figure, the standard should apply. ⁶ A person may be deemed a public figure either because he has achieved such pervasive fame or notoriety that he is a public figure for all purposes, in all circumstances, or because he "injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351, 94 S.Ct. at 3012. The latter classification is often referred to as the "limited public figure" concept, ⁷ and is the only category which could include appellants.

Although Gertz made it clear that the actual malice standard should apply when the plaintiff is a limited public figure, it provided little guidance for determining when a person has achieved that status. As the parties agree, the issue involves a mixed question of law and fact which was properly presented for the trial court's determination prior to the jury trial. Basically, two factors must be present before a person may be considered a limited public figure. First, the circumstances in which a person achieves public figure status must rise to the level of a public controversy and may not be a matter of mere public interest. ⁸ Second, the person must have voluntarily thrust himself into the vortex of that controversy. ⁹

In support of their contention that the trial court should be reversed, appellants argue that the subject matter of the articles here in question was at most one of general public interest, not an identifiable public controversy. However, the subject matter of the articles concerned (1) a private school which trained technicians for employment in the health field, (2) that school's representations to the public through its catalog and through the television appearance of one of the directors, and (3) the school's relationship to a publicly funded state college. Thus, the subject matter involved a consumer interest aspect in that it affected potential tuition-paying students and, ultimately, recipients of health care provided by graduates of the school. As such, the school and its relationship with the licensing board were not the "private affair" of the plaintiffs. Since the relationship did involve the representations made by appellants on behalf of the school, and the board's conditional renewal of the license, we conclude that the facts support the existence of an identifiable public controversy going beyond a matter of mere public interest. ¹⁰

Appellants also argue that even if a public controversy existed, they did not thrust themselves into the vortex of it. Again, however, the facts support the opposite conclusion. Appellant Collins appeared on television to promote the school, and it was the content of that appearance which brought the possible infractions to the attention of the board. The plaintiffs also distributed promotional publications containing information which they were subsequently required to delete as a prerequisite to renewal of their license. In addition, the record reflects that appellants were repeatedly offered access to the media to rebut the alleged false statements. ¹¹ The plaintiffs' own actions therefore caused the controversy, and we are unable to conclude that they were dragged unwillingly into the midst of it. ¹² On the contrary, they were the central figures in the episode without whom there could have been no controversy.

Having determined that there is competent substantial evidence in the record ¹³ supporting a conclusion that an identifiable public controversy existed in which plaintiffs actively and voluntarily participated, we find that the trial court properly applied the law in ruling that plaintiffs were limited public figures for the purposes of this case.

In their...