Arnold v. United States
| Decision Date | 07 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-cv-399 |
| Parties | DUSTIN ARNOLD and ASHLEY ARNOLD, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, or Alternatively for Partial Summary Judgment. Doc. 22. To resolve this motion, the Court must answer two questions: (1) did Plaintiff Dustin Arnold settle with the U.S. Postal Service (“USPS”) by cashing its claims check? And (2) did Plaintiffs Dustin and Ashley Arnold (together “Plaintiffs”) inadequately notify USPS of their negligent hiring, training, supervision, and entrustment claims? Having carefully reviewed the pleadings and applicable law, the Court finds in the affirmative for both questions. Therefore, the motion is GRANTED.
In early May of 2019, Plaintiffs were involved in a car crash with a federal employee driving a USPS vehicle in the course and scope of his employment. Consequently, Mr. Arnold filed an administrative claim, Standard Form-95 (“SF-95”), with USPS the following month on June 12, requesting $12, 431.61 in property damages. He claimed as the underlying basis that By signing the SF-95, Mr. Arnold certified “that the amount of claim covers only damages and injuries caused by the incident above and agree to accept said amount in full satisfaction and final settlement of the claim.”
About two weeks later, USPS mailed Mr. Arnold a check for $5 831.62. Crucially, a letter was attached to that check stating:
Acceptance of this check operates as a complete release and bars recovery of any additional or future claims against the United States, the United States Postal Service and/or government employee(s) whose act(s) or omission(s) gave rise to the claim by reason of the same subject matter.
Mr. Arnold could have rejected the offer, like his wife later chose to do. Instead, he cashed the check three days later. Nevertheless, Mr. Arnold thought he could recover more from USPS, and so Plaintiffs hired the law firm of Lerner and Rowe. Around October 30, 2019, Mr. and Mrs. Arnold through their law firm sent USPS “settlement demands” requesting $15, 066.43 and $15, 241.36, respectively, for personal injury damages. At some unspecified point, Mrs. Arnold received a check from USPS for $15, 000 but claims she has yet to cash it. As for Mr. Arnold, USPS subsequently advised him on July 9, 2020, that cashing his check for $5, 831.62 operated as an acceptance of USPS' settlement offer, barring any additional claims arising from the accident.
Mr. Arnold refused to take “no” for an answer. As such, Lerner and Rowe sent USPS two additional SF-95s on September 3, 2020-one demanding $100, 000 in total damages ($15, 066.43 in personal injuries), the other requesting $125, 000.00 ($15, 066.43 in personal injuries). While Mr. Arnold's name appeared on both, Plaintiffs intended to send the $100, 000 demand on Mrs. Arnold's behalf and thus sent a revised document on November 1. Once again, USPS referred Mr. Arnold to the waiver of liability. This caused Plaintiffs to initiate the instant lawsuit on April 29, 2021, under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), asserting the following claims: (1) negligence, (2) negligence per se, (3) respondeat superior, (4) negligent hiring, training and supervision, and (5) negligent entrustment. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq.
The United States, as a sovereign, is immune from suit unless it waives sovereign immunity and consents to be sued. Harrell v. United States, 443 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2006). “In 1946, Congress enacted the FTCA, which waived the sovereign immunity of the United States for certain torts committed by federal employees.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). The FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq. provides the exclusive avenue for relief in civil tort actions against the United States. In re Franklin Sav. Corp., 385 F.3d 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 2004). Prior to instituting a claim against the United States under the FTCA, a Plaintiff must have filed a claim with the appropriate federal agency and his claim must be finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). This requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be waived. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). “As with any jurisdictional issue, the party bringing suit against the United States bears the burden of proving that sovereign immunity has been waived.” Cortez v. EEOC, 585 F.Supp.2d 1273, 1283 (D.N.M. 2007). A waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied and must be unequivocally expressed in the complaint. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992).
Under Rule 12(b)(1), a court may dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction-an issue on which this motion turns. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Plaintiffs have the burden of presenting evidence sufficient to establish the Court's subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States ex rel. Hafter D.O. v. Spectrum Emerg. Care, Inc., 190 F.3d 1156, 1160 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege facts that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). To satisfy the plausibility standard, a plaintiff's allegations must show that defendant's liability is more than a “sheer possibility.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotations omitted). When applying this standard, the Court must “accept as true all well pleaded factual allegations” and view those allegations “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010).
Defendant challenges this lawsuit on two grounds. First, Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss Mr. Arnold's claims because he accepted USPS' settlement check, thereby releasing the Government from liability. Second, Defendant contends that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for negligent hiring, training, supervision, and entrustment because they failed to adequately notify USPS of these claims. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
I. Mr. Arnold's Claims
USPS responded to Mr. Arnold's SF-95 damages request by mailing him a check for $5, 831.62 “in full and final settlement of his claim.” Attached to the $5, 831.62 check was a letter stating in pertinent part “[a]cceptance of this check operates as a complete release and bars recovery of any additional or future claims against the United States, the [USPS] and/or government employee(s) whose act(s) or omission(s) gave rise to the claim by reason of the same subject matter.” Mr. Arnold cashed the check. These facts warrant two dispositive conclusions.
This issue boils down to a simple contracts question: whether Mr. Arnold bound himself to the terms of the settlement offer by cashing the check. In relevant part, the FTCA provides: “The acceptance by the claimant of any such award, compromise, or settlement [of an administrative claim] shall be final and conclusive on claimant, and shall constitute a complete release of any claim against the United States and against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, by reason of the same subject matter.” 28 U.S.C. § 2672. Additionally, USPS has promulgated that: “Payment by the Postal Service of the full amount claimed or acceptance by the claimant, his agent, or legal representative, of any award, compromise, or settlement made pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act, shall be final and conclusive on the claimant . . . and shall constitute a complete release of any claim against the United States and against any employee of the Government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim by reason of the same subject matter.” 39 C.F.R. § 912.14.
On this topic, Mr. Arnold argues that the Government “trapped” him with “legal language” through a “technical” government procedure that in his view, undermines the FTCA's goal of just compensation. Mr. Arnold did not intend to settle his personal injury claim by cashing the check; rather, he figured it was compensation for property damages only.[2] Even if he misunderstood the agreement's terms, however, Mr. Arnold's subjective intent does not change the legal effect of his objective actions. See Murphree v. United States, No. 10-4122-WEB, 2011 WL 1980371, at *7 (D. Kan. May 20, 2011) (“[I]t is possible that Murphree misunderstood the legal ramifications of accepting and cashing the check [and it] is also possible that Murphree did not intend to surrender her claim for personal injury . . . [h]owever, neither of these scenarios change the effect of the release.”); Adams v. United States, 201 F.3d 435 (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished) ...
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