Aronow v. Silver

• Decision Date: 17 November 1987
• Citation: 223 N.J.Super. 344,538 A.2d 851
• Parties: Philip ARONOW, Plaintiff, v. Elizabeth SILVER, Defendant. Robert SILVER and Cybil Silver, his wife, Third-Party Plaintiffs and Intervenors, v. Philip ARONOW, Defendant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 344

223 N.J.Super. 344

538 A.2d 851

Philip ARONOW, Plaintiff, v. Elizabeth SILVER, Defendant.

Robert SILVER and Cybil Silver, his wife, Third-Party Plaintiffs and Intervenors, v. Philip ARONOW, Defendant.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division,

Burlington County.

Decided Nov. 17, 1987.

Robert J. Adinolfi, Cherry Hill, for plaintiff and third-party defendant.

Joseph M. Pinto, Mount Holly, for defendant and third-party plaintiffs and intervenors (Joseph M. Polino, P.A., attorney).

HAINES, A.J.S.C.

Philip Aronow, plaintiff, and Elizabeth Silver, defendant, were engaged to be married. The engagement was a stormy one. Problems arose involving the parties themselves and their relatives. On three occasions, Elizabeth cancelled the engagement and returned the engagement ring, only to recant. Finally, with the marriage ceremony a few days away, the engagement was broken irretrievably. Each party, in this resulting litigation, faults the other. Each claims the engagement ring, certain shares of stock and a jointly-owned condominium. Robert and Cybil Silver, Elizabeth's parents, seek reimbursement for various wedding expenses incurred by them. This opinion, which follows a trial of the liability issues, concludes (1) that Philip is entitled to the engagement ring and the condominium; (2) that he has no liability to the parents, and (3) that the stock transactions require adjustments. ¹

A. The Law Concerning Engagement Rings

The majority rule in this country concerning the disposition of engagement rings is a fault rule: the party who unjustifiably breaks the engagement loses the ring. The minority rule rejects fault. See Annotation, "Rights in Respect of Engagement and Courtship Presents When Marriage Does Not Ensue," 46 A.L.R.3d 578 (1972); Annotation, (same title), 24 A.L.R.2d 579 (1952); 38 C.J.S., Gifts, Sec. 61. New Jersey courts have considered the question in only four published opinions, with split results. This court, not bound by any of those opinions, joins the minority.

Our earliest case is Sloin v. Lavine, 11 N.J.Misc. 899, 168 A. 849 (Sup.Ct.1933), in which the court, citing the law of foreign jurisdictions, said:

So we have on the merits the simple case of an engagement ring and engagement broken and ring not returned. The decisions are not numerous, but we follow those holding what we deem the correct rule, viz., that such a gift is impliedly conditional, and must be returned, particularly when the engagement is broken by the donee, as the court was entitled to find in this case. [at 900, 168 A. 849]

Sloin's implication that the person who breaks the engagement loses the ring was rejected by Judge (later Justice) Sullivan in Albanese v. Indelicato, 25 N.J.Misc. 144, 51 A.2d 110 (D.Ct.1947). The decision involved ownership of an engagement ring and a dinner ring. The court said:

As far as the engagement ring is concerned, the defendant had no right to keep it. An engagement ring is a symbol or pledge of the coming marriage and signifies that the one who wears it is engaged to marry the man who gave it to her. If the engagement is broken off the ring should be returned since it is a conditional gift. True, no express condition was imposed but the law implies a condition because of the symbolic significance of the ring. It does not matter who broke the engagement. A person may have the best reasons in the world for so doing. The important thing is that the gift was conditional and the condition was not fulfilled.

The giving of the dinner ring is an entirely different proposition. True, it was given after the parties became engaged. No doubt plaintiff would not have given the ring to defendant if they had not been engaged. The dinner ring though, has no symbolic meaning and is only a token of the love and affection which plaintiff bore for the defendant. Many gifts are made for reasons that sour with the passage of time. Under the law though, there is no consideration required for a gift and it is absolute once made unless a condition is imposed. There was no express condition here and the law will not imply one as in the case of the engagement ring since the dinner ring has no symbolic meaning attached to it. Defendant was under no obligation to return the dinner ring. [at 144-145, 51 A.2d 110; citations omitted]

Albanese cited Sloin and a Pennsylvania case.

In the next case, Mate v. Abrahams, 62 A.2d 754 (N.J.Cty.Ct.1948), the court imposed a fault standard, saying:

In short, both on reason and authority, an engagement ring, being given as a symbol or pledge of a mutual agreement to marry, can be recovered by the man, if that agreement is dissolved by mutual consent, or the woman unjustifiably breaks off the engagement, but cannot be recovered by him, if he unjustifiably breaks the agreement it evidences. [at 755]

Mate cited general authorities and cases from other jurisdictions, quoting from Jacobs v. Davis, 2 K.B. 332 (1917), referred to as "the leading case", as follows:

Though the origin of the engagement ring has been forgotten, it still retains its character of a pledge or something to bind the bargain or contract to marry, and it is given on the understanding that a party who breaks the contract must return it. [quoted at 755]

The final case, Beberman v. Segal, 6 N.J.Super. 472, 69 A.2d 584 (Law Div.1949), adopts the fault standard, citing Mate.

The fault rule is sexist and archaic, a too-long enduring reminder of the times when even the law discriminated against women. The history is traced in 24 A.L.R.2d at 582-586. In ancient Rome the rule was fault. When the woman broke the engagement, however, she was required not only to return the ring, but also its value, as a penalty. No penalty attached when the breach was the man's. In England, women were oppressed by the rigidly stratified social order of the day. They worked as servants or, if not of the servant class, were dependent on their relatives. The fact that men were in short supply, marriage above one's station rare and travel difficult abbreviated betrothal prospects for women. Marriages were arranged. Women's lifetime choices were limited to a marriage or a nunnery. Spinsterhood was a centuries-long personal tragedy. Men, because it was a man's world, were much more likely than women to break engagements. When one did, he left behind a woman of tainted reputation and ruined prospects. The law, in a de minimis gesture, gave her the engagement ring, as a consolation prize. When the man was jilted, a seldom thing, justice required the ring's return to him. Thus, the rule of life was the rule of law--both saw women as inferiors.

To accept the ancient rule of law is to ignore our constitutional insistence upon the equality of women, to further the unfortunate reality that society still discriminates. That reality is one which courts must not promote. Our obligation is to enforce the law, which bars discrimination. By doing so we move reality in the right direction.

The majority rule, even without its constitutional infirmity, will not withstand elementary scrutiny. Its foundation is fault, and fault, in an engagement setting, cannot be ascertained.

What fact justifies the breaking of an engagement? The absence of a sense of humor? Differing musical tastes? Differing political views? The painfully-learned fact is that marriages are made on earth, not in heaven. They must be approached with intelligent care and should not happen without a decent assurance of success. When either party lacks that assurance, for whatever reason, the engagement should be broken. No justification is needed. Either party may act. Fault, impossible to fix, does not count. Albanese is correct in saying: "It does not matter who broke the engagement. A person may have the best reasons in the world for so doing. The important thing is that the gift was conditional and the condition was not fulfilled." 25 N.J.Misc. at 145, 51 A.2d 110.

Our Legislature, recognizing the inability to determine fault when marriages fail, wisely adopted our no-fault divorce statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-2. Surely the concept of no fault divorce must have as its predicate the concept of no-fault engagements. This is the reasoning followed in the only two states (other than New Jersey if Albanese is the law) adopting the minority rule, Wisconsin and Ohio. Brown v. Thomas, 127 Wis.2d 318, 379 N.W.2d 868 (Wis.Ct.App.1985), held that the policy of the no-fault divorce law applies equally to broken engagements. The same philosophy appears in Lyle v. Durham, 16 Ohio App.3d 1, 473 N.E.2d 1216 (Ohio Ct.App.1984):

In many cases, however, there is no real fault. " * * * [O]ne or both of the parties merely changes his mind about the desirability of the other as a marriage partner * * * " Gaden v. Gaden (1971), 29 N.Y.2d 80, 88, 323 N.Y.S.2d 955, 272 N.E.2d 471. Because a primary purpose of the engagement period is to " * * * allow a couple time to test the permanency of their feelings, * * * " we question the wisdom of penalizing the donor for acting to prevent what may be an unhappy marriage. Id. at 88, 323 N.Y.S.2d 955, 272 N.E.2d 471. [at 473 N.E.2d 1218]

Philip's gift of a ring to Elizabeth was conditioned upon marriage. When the promise of marriage was not kept, regardless of fault, the condition was not fulfilled and the ring must be returned to him. ²

B. Other Gifts

An unconditional inter vivos gift is final, even in an engagement setting. In Gerard v. Distefano, 84 N.J.Super. 396 (Ch.Div.1964), for example, the court found insufficient evidence to prove that a ring, supposedly given as an engagement ring, was so intended. It said, "[t]herefore, this court finds that it was a gift inter vivos and need not be returned." Id. at 403, 202 A.2d 220. A conditional gift, however, must be returned if the condition is breached. Albanese.

During their engagement, Philip and Elizabeth purchased a condominium which they intended to be their future home. They took title in...