Gaden v. Gaden

• Decision Date: 10 June 1971
• Citation: 323 N.Y.S.2d 955,29 N.Y.2d 80,272 N.E.2d 471
• Parties: , 272 N.E.2d 471 Dorothy J. GADEN, Respondent, v. Elmer L. GADEN, Jr., Appellant, et al., Defendant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 955

323 N.Y.S.2d 955

29 N.Y.2d 80, 272 N.E.2d 471

Dorothy J. GADEN, Respondent, v. Elmer L. GADEN, Jr., Appellant, et al., Defendant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 10, 1971.

Ira M. Hariton, and Frederick Fagelson, Bay Shore, for appellant.

Van B. Kruchten, Amityville, for respondent.

JASEN, Judge.

This appeal brings up for review the scope of applicability of section 80--b of the Civil Rights Law, Consol.Laws, c. 6. ¹

The parties to this appeal were married in 1953 and divorced on May 20, 1960. In July of 1960, they resumed living together with the expectation that they would ultimately remarry. They continued to live together, without remarrying, until the spring of 1962, when plaintiff and the couple's daughter moved away from the premises. Prior thereto, on July 15, 1961, defendant entered into a contract to purchase premises known as 100 Ocean Avenue in Islip. In conjunction with this transaction, it was necessary for the defendant to obtain a mortgage commitment in the sum of $25,000 from defendant Bay Shore Federal Savings & Loan Association. At the time of closing, August 30, 1961, title to the property was vested, at the request of the defendant, in the names of 'Elmer Gaden, Jr., and Dorothy J. Gaden, his wife.' The bond and mortgage given to the bank for the loan extended was executed by both parties and the diffeence in cash ($13,000) required to close the deal, was furnished by the defendant. Subsequently, in December, 1961, title to a vacant lot contiguous to the purchased premises was similarly acquired in both names for a purchase price of $5,000--$300 of which was advanced by defendant, and the balance was obtained by a loan from his father. In June of 1962, after plaintiff had moved out of the premises, both parties signed a promissory note for the $5,200 loan used for the purchase of this second parcel of land.

In December, 1967, plaintiff, as tenant in common, commenced this action for partion of both parcels. Defendant counterclaimed for the imposition of a constructive trust and for rescission, based on a claim that the creation of the tenancy in common was a gift conditioned upon remarriage of the parties.

After a trial of the action, Special Term found that section 80--b of the Civil Rights Law was applicable and directed plaintiff to deliver to the defendant a deed of her interest in the parcels provided she would be released from liability on the bond and note which were used to purchase the parcels. The Appellate Division, 34 A.D.2d 550, 309 N.Y.S.2d 612, in reversing the judgment on the law, granted partition as demanded in the complaint, dismissed the counterclaim, affirmed the findings of fact ² below and remitted the action to Special Term for entry of an appropriate judgment. In reaching this determination, the Appellate Division held that section 80--b of the Civil Rights Law is not applicable to the facts of this case.

Since the Appellate Division specifically affirmed the finding made at Special Term that the defendant transferred an interest in the two parcels to the plaintiff, conditioned upon the remarriage of the parties, we are bound by that determination. Consequently, the crucial question in this case is the applicability of section 80--b of the Civil Rights Law.

In 1935, New York adopted what has become known as a heart balm statute, ³ which abolished all causes of action 'to recover sums of money as damage for * * * breach of contract to marry' (Civ.Prac.Act, § 61--b) and provided that 'No contract to marry * * * shall operate to give rise * * * to any cause or right of action for the breach thereof.' (Civ.Prac.Act, § 61--d.) The purpose and intent of the heart balm statute was clearly set forth in section 61--a of the Civil Practice Act. 'The remedies heretofore provided by law for the enforcement of actions based upon alleged alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of contract to marry, having been subjected to grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance, embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary damage to many persons wholly innocent and free of any wrongdoing, who were merely the victims of circumstances, and such remedies having been exercised by unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment, and such remedies having furnished vehicles for the commission or attempted commission of crime and in many cases having resulted in the perpetration of frauds, it is hereby declared as the public policy of the state that the best interests of the people of the state will be served by the abolition of such remedies. Consequently, in the public interest, the necessity for the enactment of this article is hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination.'

Following enactment of this legislation, it was decided that the statute proscribed not only actions to recover damages for breach of promise to marry, but also prohibited suits to recover specific real or personal property given in contemplation of a marriage. (Andie v. Kaplan, 263 App.Div. 884, 32 N.Y.S.2d 429, aff'd 288 N.Y. 685, 43 N.E.2d 82; Josephson v. Dry Dock Sav. Inst., 266 App.Div. 992, aff'd 292 N.Y. 666, 56 N.E.2d 96.)

Although the New York State Law Revision Commission proposed an amendment ⁴ to the statute in 1947 to permit the recovery of antenuptial gifts, this proposed amendment, after enactment by both houses of the Legislature, was vetoed by Governor Dewey.

Finally, in 1965, the afore-mentioned section 80--b of the Civil Rights Law was enacted to legislatively change our interpretation of the heart balm statute. Thus, it should now be abundantly clear that a person, not under any impediment to marry (Lowe v. Quinn, 27 N.Y.2d 397, 318 N.Y.S.2d 467), will no longer be denied the right to recover property given in contemplation of a marriage which has not occurred. There can be no doubt that the land was purchased, and an interest was given to plaintiff, in anticipation of the forthcoming remarriage of the parties. Moreover, real property is specifically mentioned in the statute as a class of gift that is recoverable.

The Appellate Division, however, reasoned that section 80--b is inapplicable where a party undertakes a legal obligation with respect to the gift, such as the plaintiff did in executing a bond and note, since it cannot then be said the sole consideration supplied by the party was the promise to remarry. ⁵

Although the obligation incurred by the plaintiff in signing the bond and note constituted legal consideration, the Appellate Division's interpretation of the word 'consideration' failed to give effect to the intention of the Legislature--to authorize actions seeking recovery of gifts given in contemplation of marriage. This conclusion is mandated by reading the second half of the statute in conjunction with the first. That portion of the statute allows the court, in its discretion, to award the donee a lien upon the real property for moneys expended in conjunction therewith or improvements made thereto. Thus, the statute specifically contemplates that the donee may contribute to some extent towards the gift in question. ⁶ Making this contribution, however, does not defeat the donor's right to the return of the gift under the statute, bur rather only provides the donee with a lien to the extent of the contribution.

Consequently, to construe the words 'sole consideration' in the first portion of the statute as meaning sole Legal consideration would be to ignore the latter half of the statute and to render it meaningless. One of the most elementary canons of statutory construction requires that all parts of a statute are to be read and construed together to determine the legislative intent. (McKinney's Consol.Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes, § 97.) Thus, it necessary to interpret the word 'consideration', as used in this statute, to mean motive or reason. (See Webster's Third Int. Dictionary, p. 484.) Thus interpreted, the statute would read that 'the sole (motivation or reason) for the transfer of the * * * real property was a contemplated marriage which has not occurred'.

If the statute is so read, it seems abundantly clear that it is applicable to the case at bar. There are affirmed findings of fact that defendant's gift to the plaintiff of an interest in the parcels of land was conditioned upon the marriage of the parties. it stretches credulity to argue that the reason for including her name on the deeds was to enable the defendant to obtain necessary financing to close the transactions. The truth of the matter is to the contrary, since the necessary financing (mortgage commitment) was obtained solely by the defendant prior to the plaintiff's name being inserted on the instruments. It was only after the defendant insisted that plaintiff's name also appear on the deed, as his wife, that her signature on the bond and mortgage was required by the mortgagee. It is also evident that her signature on the bond was of no real benefit to defendant since he had supplied the entire downpayment, as well as subsequent principal and interest payments, and would thus bear the entire loss in event of a default.

The other reason advanced by the Appellate Division for the inapplicability of section 80--b was that 'the statute contemplates a case where one party has directly transferred property to another', rather than, as here, where 'the transfer was made by a third party to both of the parties.' This reasoning is unduly restrictive of legislative intent. There is nothing in the statute itself that requires a transfer directly from the donor to his financee, nor does it seem that such a requirement should be imposed. Many gifts, given in contemplation of marriage, are transferred directly from a third party to a donee without the donor's ever gaining possession of them. Consequently, the interpretation given by the Appellate Division appears to restrict the application of the statute so as to defeat its intent to provide for...