Aronson v. Siquier, 74-1338
| Decision Date | 22 July 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 74-1338,74-1338 |
| Citation | 318 So.2d 452 |
| Parties | Bonnie ARONSON and Allstate Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Pedro Antonio SIQUIER, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Weissenborn, Burr & Hyman and Gary M. Carman, Miami, for appellants.
Podhurst, Orseck & Parks; Mark J. Feldman, Miami, for appellee.
Before HAVERFIELD and NATHAN, JJ., and CHARLES CARROLL (Ret.), Associate Judge.
The appellee Pedro Antonio Siquier filed an action for damages for personal injuries received in an automobile accident, against the appellants Bonnie Aronson and her insurer Allstate Insurance Company, and against Robert K. Waters and Salvatore C. Santisi and their insurers.
There was a rear end collision, in which four vehicles were involved. While the automobile being driven by the plaintiff was in a stopped position on a street, it was struck from the rear by the car driven by Santisi (who was not served with process in the action). The car driven by the defendant Aronson then struck the Santisi car, and in turn was struck by the fourth car driven by the defendant Waters. The verdict rendered reveals the jury concluded the plaintiff's injuries were caused by the successive collisions or blows by the Santisi car and the Aronson car.
In answer to special interrogatories the jury by special verdicts found that the plaintiff had suffered permanent injuries; that the plaintiff was free of negligence; that the defendant Aronson was guilty of negligence which was 'a legal cause of the accident'; and that the defendant Waters was not guilty of any negligence which was a legal cause of the accident. The verdict awarded damages to the plaintiff in the amount of $45,000.
Defendants Aronson and Allstate Insurance Company moved the court to grant a new trial or a remittitur in reduction of damages as an alternative to the granting of a new trial. Included in the motion were grounds that the verdict was excessive due to 'the influence of passion or other improper motives'; was 'excessive such as to shock the judicial conscience'; was contrary to the evidence relating to the injuries; and was punitive in nature.
The trial court entered an order denying the motion, and five days later, in clarification thereof, entered a second order denying the motion in which it was explained that the court regarded the verdict as being against the manifest weight of the evidence relating to damages and was excessive, for which the court would have ordered a remittitur of $30,000 of the amount awarded by the jury, but did not do so because the court felt it was precluded by law from ordering a remittitur, by the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company v. McKelvey, Fla.1973, 270 So.2d 705. 1 Final judgment was entered on the verdict, and the defendant Aronson and her insurer appealed.
The appellants contend, and we agree, that the trial court misconceived a controlling principle of the applicable law, in concluding that the decision in McKelvey would preclude the court from granting a new trial on damages or from ordering a remittitur as an alternative to the granting of a new trial on damages, in the circumstances recited by the trial court in this case on its consideration of the defendants' motion therefor. 2
In McKelvey the Court said:
'Consistently, our Courts have vested juries with the sound discretion to render verdicts in personal injury cases, upon the equally consistent admonition that there is ample evidence to support such verdicts and that the verdicts are not clearly arbitrary or so excessive as to indicate passion, prejudice, corruption, improper motive or to shock the judicial conscience.' (Citations omitted).
That language in McKelvey is consistent with earlier and subsequent decisions of Florida appellate courts recognizing the jurisdiction and discretion of a trial court to grant a new trial, or order a remittitur as an alternative to the granting of a new trial, where damages awarded in a verdict are not supported by evidence or are excessive for a reason or to the extent referred to in the quoted order entered by the trial court. See De La Vallina v. De La Vallina, 90 Fla. 905, 107 So. 339; Kovacs...
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Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc.
...Bank of Florida, 421 So.2d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Parks v. Ralston Construction Co., 338 So.2d 65 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Aronson v. Siquier, 318 So.2d 452 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). However, because I would affirm the order granting a new trial based on an erroneous jury instruction, rather than as ......
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Gould v. National Bank of Florida, 81-502
...award. It is also settled law that the function of a remittitur is to correct an improper verdict as to damages, Aronson v. Siquier, 318 So.2d 452 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), and where the error is only that the damages awarded are excessive it is not proper to retry the issue of liability: remitti......
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Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 55345
...a misconception by the trial judge of a controlling principle of law can constitute grounds for reversal. E. g., Aronson v. Siquier, 318 So.2d 452 (3d DCA Fla. 1975); Green v. Putnam, 93 So.2d 378 (Fla.1957); Knight v. City of Miami, 127 Fla. 585, 173 So. 801 The trial court's imposition of......
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Salkay v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., s. 79-1689
...359 So.2d 430 (Fla.1978); Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So.2d 669 (Fla.1959); Bartholf v. Baker, 71 So.2d 480 (Fla.1954); Aronson v. Siquier, 318 So.2d 452 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). Remittitur as an alternative to a new trial is consistent with the trial court's finding that the plaintiff was also The ord......