Arriaga v. County of Alameda

• Decision Date: 23 March 1994
• Docket Number: No. A062409,A062409
• Citation: 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 212,23 Cal.App.4th 800
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Previously published at 23 Cal.App.4th 800, 28 Cal.App.4th 1685, 33 Cal.App.4th 1360 23 Cal.App.4th 800, 28 Cal.App.4th 1685, 33 Cal.App.4th 1360, 62 USLW 2656 Linda ARRIAGA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 212

29 Cal.Rptr.2d 212

Previously published at 23 Cal.App.4th 800, 28 Cal.App.4th 1685, 33 Cal.App.4th 1360

23 Cal.App.4th 800, 28 Cal.App.4th 1685, 33 Cal.App.4th 1360,

62 USLW 2656

Linda ARRIAGA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. A062409.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

March 23, 1994.

Rehearing Denied April 13, 1994.

Review Granted June 16, 1994.

Rufus L. Cole, Penelope S. Pahl, Law Offices of Rufus L. Cole, San Francisco, for plaintiff and appellant.

William M. McMillan, Chief Counsel, Daniel C. Murphy, Thomas Lacchia, Rene Lias, Legal Div., Dept. of Transp., State of Cal., San Francisco, for defendants and respondents.

CHIN, Associate Justice.

Linda Arriaga appeals from a judgment dismissing her action for personal injury against respondents County of Alameda (County) and State of California (State). The trial court entered judgment after sustaining a demurrer to Arriaga's complaint without leave to amend. It sustained the demurrer because it found as a matter of law that Arriaga suffered her injuries in the course of employment with respondents, and therefore her exclusive remedy was under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (Lab.Code, § 3200 et seq.). ¹ Arriaga contends that the trial court's finding is erroneous. We disagree. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 4, 1993, Arriaga filed a complaint alleging a cause of action for negligence against respondents in connection with injuries she sustained on February 15, 1992. The complaint alleged liability based on the following facts: "... ARRIAGA was assigned by the Sheriff Department for the ... COUNTY ... through the Department's Weekender Program to work for the Department of Transportation for [the] State Respondents demurred to the complaint on three grounds. They first argued that they were immune from liability under Government Code section 844.6, which provides that a public entity is not liable for an injury to a prisoner. They also argued that, because Arriaga was an employee under section 3351 at the time of her injury, her exclusive remedy was workers' compensation. Finally, they argued that, under Government Code section 815, they were not liable for general negligence, and that Arriaga had failed to allege a statutory cause of action. Arriaga opposed the demurrer, contending that she was not a prisoner within the meaning of Government Code section 844.6, that she was not an employee within the meaning of the workers' compensation laws, and that the alleged facts stated certain statutory causes of action. She therefore requested that the court overrule the demurrer or grant her leave to amend the complaint.

(hereinafter 'CAL TRANS'), as part of her sentence to work off a four year old speeding ticket. [Arriaga] was assigned by CAL TRANS to clean greasy walls of a ventilation duct deep inside the building over the Posey Tube connecting the city of Alameda to Oakland. [Arriaga] was required to work for several hours in the ventilation duct in an unsafe and dangerous environment. Specifically, [Arriaga] was left without supervision and without adequate warning or instruction concerning the hazards and risk associated with the use of the solvent she was provided by defendants. [Arriaga] was compelled to wash walls utilizing the solvent without ventilation or special respiratory equipment which defendants knew or should have known was dangerous to [her] physical, mental and emotional health. As a consequence of said actions, [Arriaga] was exposed to toxic fumes and experienced dizziness and lost consciousness."

At the hearing on the demurrer, the court agreed that, under the alleged facts, workers' compensation constituted Arriaga's exclusive remedy. It therefore sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment dismissing the complaint. Arriaga then filed this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

This appeal turns on whether the trial court was correct in determining that workers' compensation is Arriaga's exclusive remedy. Ordinarily, "a defendant in a civil action who claims to be one of that class of persons protected from an action at law by the provisions of the ... Act bears the burden of pleading and proving, as an affirmative defense to the action, the existence of the conditions of compensation set forth in the statute which are necessary to its application. [Citations.]" (Doney v. Tambouratgis (1979) 23 Cal.3d 91, 96-97, 151 Cal.Rptr. 347, 587 P.2d 1160, fn. omitted.) However, when a complaint affirmatively alleges facts indicating that the Act applies, no civil action will lie, and the complaint is subject to a general demurrer unless it states additional facts that negate application of the exclusive remedy rule. (Id., at p. 97, 151 Cal.Rptr. 347, 587 P.2d 1160; Hughes v. Western MacArthur Co. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 951, 957, 237 Cal.Rptr. 738.)

"An employer-employee relationship must exist in order to bring the ... Act into effect. (§ 3600.)" (County of Los Angeles v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 391, 396, 179 Cal.Rptr. 214, 637 P.2d 681 (hereafter Conroy ).) ² However, the coverage of the Act extends beyond those who have entered into "traditional contract[s] of hire." (Laeng v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1972) 6 Cal.3d 771, 776, 100 Cal.Rptr. 377, 494 P.2d 1 (hereafter Laeng ).) "[S]ection 3351 provides broadly that for the purpose of the ... Act, ' "Employee" means every person in the service of an employer under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written....' " (Laeng, supra, at pp. 776-777, 100 Cal.Rptr. 377, 494 P.2d 1, fn. omitted.) Given this "section's explicit use of the disjunctive," a contract of hire is not "a prerequisite" to the existence of an employment relationship. (Id., at p. 777, fn. 5, 100 Cal.Rptr. 377, 494 P.2d 1; see also Conroy, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 398, 402-403, 179 Cal.Rptr. 214, 637 P.2d 681.) Moreover, under section 3357, "[a]ny person rendering service for another, other than as an independent contractor, or unless expressly excluded ..., is presumed to be an employee."

"Given these broad statutory contours, ... an 'employment' relationship sufficient to bring the [A]ct into play cannot be determined simply from technical contractual or common law conceptions of employment but must instead be resolved by reference to the history and fundamental purposes underlying the ... Act [citations]." (Laeng, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 777, 100 Cal.Rptr. 377, 494 P.2d 1, fn. omitted.) The purpose of the Act is to protect individuals against the special risks of employment. (Id., at pp. 774, 782, 100 Cal.Rptr. 377, 494 P.2d 1; Conroy, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 397, 179 Cal.Rptr. 214, 637 P.2d 681.) "The Act intends comprehensive coverage of injuries in employment. It accomplishes this goal by defining 'employment' broadly in terms of 'service to an employer' and by including a general presumption that any person 'in service to another' is a covered 'employee.' [Citations.]" (S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, 354, 256 Cal.Rptr. 543, 769 P.2d 399 (hereafter Borello ).) Thus, "the basic inquiry in compensation law involves which injuries to the employee should be insured against by the employer. [Citations.]" (Laeng, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 778, fn. 7, 100 Cal.Rptr. 377, 494 P.2d 1.)

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court in Laeng extended compensation coverage to a city job applicant who was injured "as part of a 'tryout' competition for the position of 'refuse crew worker,' " even though he "was concededly not an 'employee' of the city in a strict, contractual sense" at the time of the injury. (Laeng, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 774, 100 Cal.Rptr. 377, 494 P.2d 1.) In reaching this conclusion, the court first found that the city received benefit from the applicant, in that his "efforts permit[ted] the employer to select workers who are likely to be better suited for the available position." (Id., at p. 781, 100 Cal.Rptr. 377, 494 P.2d 1.) It further found that the applicant was "in the 'service' of" the employer in that, "during the tryout [he] subject[ed] himself to the employer's control, and the employer, in turn, assum[ed] responsibility for directing the applicant's activities." (Id., at p. 782, 100 Cal.Rptr. 377, 494 P.2d 1.) Finally, the court found that the applicant "incurred his injury while undertaking a 'special risk' of employment...." (Id., at p. 783, 100 Cal.Rptr. 377, 494 P.2d 1.) Therefore, he qualified as an " 'employee,' " as that term must be understood "in light of ... the [A]ct's purpose of protecting individuals from any special risks inherent in employment...." (Id., at p. 782, 100 Cal.Rptr. 377, 494 P.2d 1.)

In Conroy, the Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion as to "workfare" recipients. There, Los Angeles County required Conroy to work as a watchman for a school district in exchange for general assistance. (Conroy, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 395, 179 Cal.Rptr. 214, 637 P.2d 681.) Conroy sustained injury while working at a high school to which the school district had assigned him, and sought workers' compensation under the Act. (Ibid.) In opposing the application, Los Angeles County cited McBurney v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1934) 220 Cal. 124, 30 P.2d 414, which denied benefits to a "workfare" recipient "because ... no contract of employment was present. [Citation.]" (Conroy, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 397, 179 Cal.Rptr. 214, 637 P.2d 681.) The Conroy court first observed that McBurney incorrectly "restricted the definition [of "employee"] to those situations where a contract for hire was present." (Conroy, supra, at p. 398, 179 Cal.Rptr. 214, 637 P.2d 681, fn. omitted.) Then, applying "the principles of Laeng," it held that Conroy was an employee under the Act, reasoning: "[Conroy] was in the service of [Los Angeles] County when he was...