Arrington v. County of Dallas
| Decision Date | 08 September 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-1817,91-1817 |
| Citation | 970 F.2d 1441 |
| Parties | Floyd D. ARRINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. COUNTY OF DALLAS, et al., Defendants, Jack Richardson, Defendant-Appellant. Timothy HAMMOND, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. COUNTY OF DALLAS, et al., Defendants, Jack Richardson and Rick Richardson, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Marc H. Richman, Alicia G. Curran, Legal Arts Center, Dallas, Tex., for Richardson, et al.
Albert B. Greco, Jr., Barbara L. Wohlrabe, Dallas, Tex., for Floyd D. Arrington and Timothy Hammond.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
Before WILLIAMS, JOLLY, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
Two constables of Dallas County, Texas, along with the county government, bring this interlocutory appeal seeking to overturn the district court's denial of qualified immunity from suits by two former deputy constables, who seek redress for loss of jobs, allegedly because they failed to support the constables' election campaigns. For the reasons set forth below we affirm in part, and reverse in part, and remand for trial.
Jack Richardson is constable for Precinct 2 of Dallas County, Texas. Rick Richardson is constable for Precinct 3. Both were elected to their current terms of office in 1989, two years after the two districts were formed from old Precinct 2. Jack Richardson had been Precinct 2's constable prior to the precinct partition. Rick is Jack's son.
Floyd Arrington was employed as a Deputy Constable in Precinct 2 from October 1981 until July 27, 1988, when Jack fired him. Timothy Hammond was Deputy Constable in Precinct 2 from February 1986. Hammond was initially stationed in Richardson, Texas, but was transferred to the Irving, Texas office in May 1988. He was transferred back to Richardson on January 1, 1989. He was employed as a probationary employee by then Constable-Elect Rick Richardson in Precinct 3 until being fired on February 3, 1989.
Both Arrington and Hammond allege that Jack asked them to help in his March 1988 reelection campaign but that they did not become involved. After the campaign, they claim, they were treated less favorably than were the others who had supported the Richardsons' elections. Also during this time, Arrington and Hammond obtained office records that are said to show that Jack had used his access to police records for political purposes and that he spied on Hammond. Arrington and Hammond say that they found the files in the course of their ordinary duties and that they only retained the files as evidence of possible criminal activity by the Richardsons.
Jack Richardson, however, contends that the papers were stolen from locked office files. Accounts of events vary, but during his investigation of the files' removal, Jack Richardson fired Arrington. Richardson asserts that he fired Arrington for refusing to cooperate with a police investigation of the stolen office files.
Shortly after the election, Jack Richardson transferred Hammond to his Irving, Texas office. This action, Hammond contends, was a punishment for his failure to support Richardson's reelection. At the end of 1988, Hammond left the Precinct 2 constabulary and started working for Rick Richardson in Precinct 3. One month later, Rick Richardson fired Hammond, allegedly for unauthorized possession of stolen office files. (Arrington apparently provided Hammond with some of the contested office files, which included records from Hammond's personnel file.) Hammond contends that he was fired for telling a newspaper reporter about official improprieties committed by Jack Richardson.
Arrington initially sought a declaratory judgment against Jack Richardson in Texas state court. In November 1988, that court held that deputy constables are not subject to the county civil service rules. Arrington then filed this federal suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jack Richardson and Dallas County, seeking damages for deprivations of his right to free speech caused by retaliation for refusing to assist in the election campaign. He also asserted claims under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, alleging that he was fired for refusing to waive his rights during a criminal investigation. He further alleged that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, he was wrongly deprived of a liberty interest because he was denied a name-clearing hearing in circumstances that impaired his reputation. Arrington also sought damages for state law claims for deprivation of his right to procedural due process, wrongful discharge, slander, defamation of character, and breach of contract.
Hammond filed a separate action against Jack and Rick Richardson and Dallas County, alleging that, because he was fired for speaking with a newspaper reporter on a matter of public significance, his termination was in violation of his rights to free speech. Hammond also alleged that Jack and Rick conspired to deprive him of his rights to free speech.
The district court consolidated the two actions and granted partial summary judgment. Applying Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the court held that the qualified immunity of public officials against suits for damages barred Arrington's claims for the taking of a property interest, breach of contract, and wrongful discharge; it also barred Hammond's claims for the taking of a property interest, breach of contract, wrongful discharge, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court specifically denied each motion for summary judgment on all remaining grounds.
The defendants appeal, arguing that the district court should have barred the plaintiffs' remaining claims: first, those based on a taking of a liberty interest in violation of both the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article One, section 19, of the Texas Constitution; second, those based on a violation of the plaintiffs' rights under the First Amendment; third, those based on violations of Arrington's rights secured under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and finally, those based on conspiracy to violate their rights under the First Amendment. 1
We review de novo a summary judgment, applying the same standards of law as those available to the district court. Trial v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 896 F.2d 120, 122 (5th Cir.1990). Therefore, to sustain the partial summary judgment rendered below, we must find that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" concerning the issues decided. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Dunn v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 927 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir.1991).
Qualified immunity bars suits for damages against public officials for conduct within the scope of their discretionary duties, performed with an objectively reasonable belief that the conduct does not violate the clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of another. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. It follows that the district court is obligated to grant summary judgment if the law at the time of the actions giving rise to the complaint did not clearly establish a cause of action for the violation of statutory or constitutional rights, which the official should have known then existed. Id.
Clearly, the Richardsons were public officials, and the transfer and firing of their employees were within their discretion as public officials. Arrington was an employee of Jack Richardson, and Hammond was an employee of both Jack and Rick, although he was only a probationary employee of Rick Richardson. Therefore, the conduct on which the plaintiffs base their action for damages is against public officials acting within the scope of their discretion. We must, therefore, determine whether the conduct alleged, if proved, violated any of the plaintiffs' statutory or constitutional rights clearly established at the time of the conduct.
The district court, in applying the doctrine of qualified immunity, barred Arrington's claims for the taking of a property interest, for breach of contract, and, under state law, for wrongful discharge. It barred Hammond's claims for the taking of a property interest, for breach of contract, for wrongful discharge under state law, and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants now argue that the remaining claims should likewise be barred.
Arrington and Hammond do not now challenge the district court's judgment. We are thus concerned only with those claims that remain following partial summary judgment, namely, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments claims; the liberty interest claims under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article One of the Texas Constitution; and the First Amendment and related conspiracy claims.
We turn first to Arrington's claims that his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments were violated. In his amended complaint, he alleged he
would show that while conducting a criminal and internal investigation of his deputies in July of 1988, Defendant [Jack] RICHARDSON requested Plaintiff to respond to certain questions concerning alleged criminal conduct. Once it was made clear to Plaintiff that he could be criminally prosecuted if his answers incriminated him, Plaintiff refused to participate further in the investigation and demanded the right to confer with legal counsel. Plaintiff was then immediately terminated by Defendant [Jack] RICHARDSON for Plaintiff's refusal to waive his rights against self-incrimination under the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and his right to counsel under the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Termination of Plaintiff's employment with Defendants under such circumstances amounts to a violation of Plaintiff's civil rights.
The district court did not address this claim, and the defendants argue that they are...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bluitt v. Houston Independent School Dist.
...Board made the charges against her public, and she conceded at deposition that she had no such evidence. See Arrington v. County of Dallas, 970 F.2d 1441, 1447 (5th Cir.1992); Wells, 736 F.2d at 256; Johnson, 930 F.Supp. at 286. Had she presented such evidence, Bluitt has failed to overcome......
-
Sher v. U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs
...his answers could be used against him in a later prosecution. The Fifth Circuit considered this question in Arrington v. County of Dallas, 970 F.2d 1441, 1446 (5th Cir.1992), and concluded that, where the government allegedly warned the employee that his answers could be used against him in......
-
Spielbauer v. County of Santa Clara, S150402.
...Council of Baltimore (4th Cir.1995) 48 F.3d 773, 777, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 824, 116 S.Ct. 89, 133 L.Ed.2d 45; Arrington v. County of Dallas (5th Cir.1992) 970 F.2d 1441, 1446; Hester v. City of Milledgeville (11th Cir.1985) 777 F.2d 1492, 1496; see Weston v. U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban ......
-
Mosley v. Houston Community College System, Civil Action No. H-93-2457.
...under the Texas Constitution, the Texas and United States Constitutions are to be construed the same. Arrington v. County of Dallas, 970 F.2d 1441, 1447 (5th Cir.1992); Price v. City of Junction, Tex. 711 F.2d 582, 590 (5th Cir.1983); Moore v. Port Arthur Independent School District, 751 F.......