Trial v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 12 March 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-2207,89-2207
• Parties: 133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2868, 114 Lab.Cas. P 12,019 Jimmy R. TRIAL, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 120

896 F.2d 120

133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2868, 114 Lab.Cas. P 12,019

Jimmy R. TRIAL, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 89-2207.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 12, 1990.

Harry Lee Gillam, Jr., Scott Baldwin, Jr., Scott Baldwin, Baldwin & Baldwin, Marshall, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Michael A. Smith, John J. Fleps, Chicago, Ill., E. Lawrence Merriman, Merriman, Patterson & Allison, Longview, Tex., for defendant-appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before THORNBERRY, GARWOOD, and DUHE, Circuit Judges.

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge:

Jimmy R. Trial, et al. ("appellants"), current and former employees of The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company ("Santa Fe"), appeal from summary judgment granted to Santa Fe for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the appellants' claims that Santa Fe improperly determined their wages and furloughs. We agree with the district court that the appellants did not allege a breach of the duty of fair representation by the United Transportation Union ("UTU") within six months of the UTU's refusal to bring a grievance on the appellants' behalf, as required in a hybrid action under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"). Therefore, we affirm the summary judgment on the ground that the appellants' claims against the UTU were time-barred, and consequently their claims against Santa Fe cannot be considered in federal court.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The appellants are fifty-seven individuals who are or were employed by Santa Fe as locomotive firemen and firemen promoted to locomotive engineers. Collective bargaining agreements between Santa Fe and the UTU governed the appellants' employment relationships with Santa Fe. Although the appellants belonged to the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers ("BLE"), the UTU, as the bargaining agent for firemen in the unit where the appellants worked, was obligated to represent the appellants in grievances against Santa Fe under the collective bargaining agreements. The collective bargaining agreements between Santa Fe and the UTU established comprehensive mechanisms for extra-judicial resolution of disputes regarding wages and furloughs.

A collective bargaining agreement between Santa Fe and the UTU dating back to 1930 and last amended in 1985 governs the computation and payment of wages to locomotive firemen. Under that agreement, a locomotive fireman who believes he has been improperly compensated must submit a "time claim" to the railroad. The employee may appeal denials of a time claim through a series of informal and formal conferences with Santa Fe officials, and following final rejection by Santa Fe, to arbitration before a division of the National Railroad Adjustment Board ("Board"), pursuant to the RLA. See 45 U.S.C. Sec. 153 First (i).

Additionally, in 1972, the UTU and various carriers including Santa Fe executed a mediation agreement, known as the "Manning Agreement." The Manning Agreement governs how Santa Fe may furlough (i.e., temporarily remove from service without pay) surplus firemen for fourteen-day blocks of time during periods of business decline. The Manning Agreement also provides for a comprehensive mechanism of negotiation and arbitration to resolve disputes regarding the complicated calculations used to determine whether there has been a decline in business, disputes regarding the resulting furloughs, and individual claims for compensation. Representatives designated by the railroad and the UTU must first meet and attempt to resolve any such disputes. Disputes that are not thus settled in a conference with the individual railroad must be submitted to a National Disputes Committee for arbitration.

The appellants contacted the UTU in March 1986 asking that UTU representatives be designated to assist them in filing grievances about their furloughing as provided in the Manning Agreement. The UTU responded on April 4, 1986, with a letter saying the UTU could not help them and implying that they should join the UTU. The appellants later asked the BLE to assist them with their grievances regarding furloughs, but the BLE informed them that only the UTU could handle their grievances, because the UTU was the bargaining agent for firemen. Santa Fe declined to provide the BLE with any information relating to the appellants' furloughs.

The appellants did not pursue their grievances against Santa Fe on their own through the administrative channels established by the collective bargaining agreements. They did not bring their claims to the Adjustment Board for arbitration, even though the RLA allows an employee to process a claim to the Board without the assistance of the union. 45 U.S.C. Sec. 153 First (i) & (j). Instead, the appellants filed this suit for breach of contract against Santa Fe on August 24, 1987, in Texas state court. They claimed that since 1980 Santa Fe had improperly computed their wages by failing to give them credit for mileage and hours worked in accordance with the contracts in effect. This had the result, according to the appellants, of causing them to be wrongfully furloughed. The appellants also alleged that the wrongful furloughing in turn deprived them of additional mileage and hours, and that Santa Fe's acts were committed intentionally and amounted to fraud, concealment and deceit.

Santa Fe removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Santa Fe moved for summary judgment and alternatively to strike the plaintiffs' demand for punitive damages and for a jury trial. The district court granted summary judgment on the ground that the appellants' claims against Santa Fe were time-barred because they did not allege unfair representation by the UTU within six months of the UTU's refusal to handle their grievances.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The standard of review at the appellate level of a district court's grant of summary judgment remains the same as at the trial court level. Ayo v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 771 F.2d 902, 904 (5th Cir.1985). The pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 273-75 (1986). Under this standard, fact questions are considered with deference to the nonmoving party. Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir.1986). The nonmoving party must designate specific facts to support its allegations. Bache v. American Tel. & Tel., 840 F.2d 283, 292 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 219, 102 L.Ed.2d 210 (1988). The appellate court decides questions of law just as it decides questions of law outside the summary judgment context: de novo. Walker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir.1988); Brooks, Tarlton, Gilbert, Douglas & Kressler v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1358, 1364 (5th Cir.1987).

B. Hybrid Actions

The National Railroad Adjustment Board ("Board") has exclusive jurisdiction over a railroad employee's grievances against the railroad involving the interpretation or application of a collective bargaining agreement. 45 U.S.C. Sec. 153 First (i); Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 325, 92 S.Ct. 1562, 1565, 32 L.Ed.2d 95 (1972); Brown v. American Airlines, Inc., 593 F.2d 652, 654 (5th Cir.1979). Judicial review of Board decisions is narrowly limited to review of whether the Board has failed to comply with RLA requirements, whether the Board has exceeded its jurisdiction, or whether there was fraud or corruption by a Board member. 45 U.S.C. Sec. 153 First (p) & (q).

The appellants' breach of contract claims in this case necessarily involve interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and the Manning Agreement, and thus must first be prosecuted to arbitration by the Board, through administrative channels as set out in the RLA. Even state law claims such as fraud must be resolved by the Board if they are inextricably intertwined with the grievance process and necessarily involve interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Leu v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 820 F.2d 825, 829 (7th Cir.1987); Stephens v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 792 F.2d 576, 580 (6th Cir.1986). Ordinarily, therefore, the district court would not have jurisdiction to consider claims against an employer subject to the RLA like the claims made by the appellants here, because first the appellants would have to exhaust their administrative remedies under the RLA.

An exception to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board exists, however, when the employee has not only a dispute with the employer involving interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, but also a claim against the union for breach of the union's duty of fair representation. In that situation, the employee may bring a "hybrid" action alleging claims against both the union and the employer. See, e.g., Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 328-29, 89 S.Ct. 548, 550-51, 21 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969); Brock v. Republic Airlines, Inc., 776 F.2d 523, 525 (5th Cir.1985).

Hybrid actions are recognized under both the RLA, e.g., Glover, 393 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 548, and the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), e.g., DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2290-91, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). A hybrid action brought under the LMRA does not have to join both the employer and the union as defendants; it is sufficient for the employee to sue one or the other, but the employee must prove a cause of action against both. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165, 103 S.Ct. at 2291; Smith v....