Arrington v. Louisiana State Racing Com'n, CA-2658

• Decision Date: 15 January 1986
• Docket Number: No. CA-2658,CA-2658
• Citation: 482 So.2d 200
• Parties: Bobby Edward ARRINGTON v. LOUISIANA STATE RACING COMMISSION. 482 So.2d 200
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 200

482 So.2d 200

Bobby Edward ARRINGTON v. LOUISIANA STATE RACING COMMISSION.

No. CA-2658.

482 So.2d 200

Court of Appeal of Louisiana Fourth Circuit.

Jan. 15, 1986.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Robert A. Barnett, John E. Jackson, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., New Orleans, for defendant-appellee, Louisiana State Racing Com'n.

Salvador Anzelmo, Thomas W. Milliner, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant, Bobby Edward Arrington.

Before SCHOTT, BARRY, BYRNES, LOBRANO and WARD, JJ.

WARD, Judge.

On March 3, 1983 a race horse belonging to Bobby Arrington, a Louisiana licensed owner and trainer of quarter-horses, finished second and shared part of the purse in the fifth race at Evangeline Downs. A post-race analysis of the horse's urine sample indicated the presence of methamphetamine, a central nervous system stimulant prohibited by the Louisiana Rules of Racing, L.A.C. 11-6:53.14. At Arrington's request, a split sample of the urine was later analyzed and proved positive for methamphetamine. Before the results of the split sample test were known, the Board of Stewards of Evangeline Downs issued a rule suspending Arrington's racing privileges. Arrington appealed the Stewards' rule to the Louisiana State Racing Commission which suspended Arrington's owner and trainer license for eighteen months and imposed a five-hundred dollar fine. The ruling of the Commission was affirmed by Orleans Parish Civil District Court, but upon Arrington's Motion for a New Trial, it remanded the case to the Commission for the purpose of hearing evidence on the results of the split sample test. After the rehearing, the Commission affirmed its original ruling but reduced Arrington's suspension from eighteen to twelve months. The Commission relied upon the absolute insurer rule of the Rules of Racing and the Louisiana Statutes. L.A.C. 11-6:53.18 and La.R.S. 4:150(A). That rule makes the trainer responsible for the condition of his horse, whether or not the act of doping a horse was the act of another and whether or not the trainer was negligent. This ruling was affirmed by the District Court.

Arrington now appeals, raising three issues which all amount to the same argument: the absolute insurer rule violates the Due Process Clauses of the Louisiana and United States Constitutions by creating an irrebuttable presumption.

This same argument was rejected in Owens v. Louisiana State Racing Commission, 466 So.2d 764 (La.App. 4th Cir.1985). The holding of Owens, which involved strikingly similar facts, controls the disposition of this appeal. The absolute insurer rule which makes the trainer responsible for the condition of his horses does not violate Due Process because the rule is reasonably related to the government interests sought to be advanced by the rule--to insure fair, safe races, to protect the wagering public and to preserve the public's confidence in the integrity of the racing industry. See La.R.S. 4:141; Louisiana Rules of Racing, Preface and Forward (1983).

We agree with Owens; the strong public interest justifies close regulation of horse racing, an industry especially susceptible to fraud and corruption. Furthermore, strict regulation of the trainer by making him an absolute insurer is reasonable because the trainer is the person best able to guarantee the condition of the horses. See Berry v. Michigan Racing Commission, 116 Mich.App. 164, 321 N.W.2d 880 (1982), appeal dismissed, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 64, 83 L.Ed.2d 15 (1984). "The insurer rule provides maximum protection against illegal drugging; arguably it is the only practical means of reducing such corrupt practices.... The insurer rule is a reasonable alternative to either leaving [the public and State] interests unprotected or forbidding legalized racing." (citations omitted) Id., 321 N.W.2d at 884.

Furthermore, hearings and rulings of the Racing Commission are not to be equated with criminal trials. The Commission is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act and functions as a civil administrative body, not as a Trial Court in a criminal case. La.R.S. 4:154; Pullin v. Louisiana State Racing Commission, 477 So.2d 683 (La.1985). One appearing before the Commission is not entitled to every constitutional right afforded defendants in criminal trials. Hence, it is not necessary to show either knowledge or intent, or even negligence of the trainer.

Moreover, a trainer voluntarily applies for a license, and upon approval by the Commission, he subjects himself to certain terms and conditions such as the absolute insurer rule which might be inappropriate in other situations. Id. at 686-87. The relationship between the Commission and trainers, owners, jockeys and others is analogous to a contractual commitment with each party agreeing not to race a horse that has been stimulated by drugs, no matter who administers the drugs. La.R.S. 4:150(A) and (B). If a horse races when stimulated by drugs, the responsible party has breached his commitment, both to others in the sport and to the public that horse racing will be fair, safe and deserving of public confidence.

AFFIRMED.

BARRY, J., dissents with reasons.

BYRNES, J., joins with Justice BARRY's dissent.

BARRY, Justice, dissenting.

The "absolute insurer rule" of La.R.S. 4:150(A) and LAC 11-6:53.18 violates the due process clause of both the state and federal constitutions in two respects: they create an irrebuttable presumption of guilt and fail to provide standards or impose a duty which can be breached.

LAC 11-6:53.18 provides:

The trainer and/or assistant trainer shall be responsible for and be the absolute insurer of the condition of the horses he enters regardless of acts of third parties. Trainers and/or assistant trainers are presumed to know the rules of the Commission.

La.R.S. 4:150(A) provides:

The granting of a license to a trainer shall make him responsible for and be the absolute insurer of the condition of the horses he enters regardless of the acts of third parties.

In striking down a similar statute, the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned:

In the case at bar there is not even an evidentiary presumption. The licensee is penalized without showing any act or neglect on his part whatsoever. There is no proof that he even knew of the doping of his horse, much less that he actively participated in it. He loses his license solely because of someone else's conduct, of which he had no personal knowledge. It is a fundamental principle of Anglo-Saxon justice that responsibility is personal and that penalties may not be inflicted on one person because of another's acts. Brennan v. Illinois Racing Board, 42 Ill.2d 352, 247 N.E.2d 881, 883 (1969).

The absolute insurer rule creates an irrebuttable presumption of guilt which deprives the trainer of his right to offer evidence to prove his innocence. It is no defense that a trainer exercised due care or that "doping" occurred under circumstances over which he had no control. A statute that does...