Arrington v. Wong
| Decision Date | 23 September 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-00357 DAE.,98-00357 DAE. |
| Citation | 19 F.Supp.2d 1151 |
| Parties | Maria Marie ARRINGTON, Individually, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Harold E. Arrington, Deceased; as Next Friend of Tisha Maunaala Arrington, a minor; Haroldlind Kealapulani Fitzgerald; Pearl Momilani Arrington; Charlotte Nalani Parks; Lynette Leilani Arrington; Harold Edward Arrington, Jr.; Kelly Arrington; Ardella Aloha Arrington; Eric Anthony Arrington; Derek Bruce Arrington; Michelle Lehua Malufau; Natalie Pulani Lopa; Patricia-Marie Lealoha Arrington and Solomon Samuel Kaluna Arrington, Plaintiffs, v. Norbert B. WONG, M.D.; the Emergency Group, Inc.; the Queen's Medical Center; City and County of Honolulu; Clarence Uyema, Emt; and Jerry Ho, Emt; John Does 1-10; Doe Corporations 1-10; Doe Partnerships 1-10; Doe Non-Profit Organizations 1-10; and Doe Governmental Entities 1-10, Defendants. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Magali Sunderland, Trecker & Fritz, Honolulu, HI, for Harold E. Arrington, Tisha Maunaala Arrington, Haroldlind Kealapulani Fitzgerald, Pearl Momilani Arrington, Charlotte Nalani Parks, Lynnette Leilani Arrington, Harold Edward Arrington, Kelly Arrington, Ardella Aloha Arrington, Eric Anthony Arrington, Derek Bruce Arrington, Michelle Lehua Maliafau, Natalie Pulani Lopa, Patricia-Marie Lealoha Arrington, Solomon Samuel Kaluna Arrington.
Deborah Ann de Quevedo, Char Hamilton Campbell & Thom, Honolulu, HI, for Norbert B. Wong, M.D., Emergency Group, Inc.
William S. Hunt, Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing, Honolulu, HI, for Queen's Medical Center.
Marilyn S.H. Naitoh, Lyons Brandt Cook & Hiramatsu, Honolulu, HI, for City and County of Honolulu, Clarence Uyema, Emt, Jerry Ho, Emt.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
The court heard Defendants' Motions on September 21, 1998. Hilary Benson Gangnes, Esq., appeared at the hearing on behalf of Plaintiffs; Deborah A. de Quevedo, Esq., appeared at the hearing on behalf of Defendants Norbert B. Wong, M.D. and The Emergency Group, Inc.; William S. Hunt, Esq., appeared at the hearing on behalf of Defendant The Queen's Medical Center; and Thomas Cook, Esq., appeared on behalf of Defendants City and County of Honolulu, Clarence Uyema and Jerry Ho. After reviewing the motion and the supporting and opposing memoranda, the court GRANTS Defendants' Motions and DISMISSES Plaintiffs' Complaint and Action.
On May 5, 1996, Harold Arrington was driving to work at approximately 11:30 p.m. when he experienced difficulty breathing. One of his co-workers called an ambulance. When the ambulance arrived, the ambulance personnel noted that Mr. Arrington was "in severe respiratory distress speaking 1-2 words at a time." The ambulance left the scene with Mr. Arrington at 12:24 a.m. and headed to Queen's Medical Center ("Queen's"), the closest medical facility. En route, the ambulance personnel communicated by radio to Queen's and discussed Mr. Arrington's condition with Dr. Wong, an emergency room physician at Queen's. Dr. Wong asked who the patient's doctor was. The ambulance personnel replied that "patient is a Tripler patient, being that he was in severe respiratory distress we thought we'd come to a closer facility." Dr. Wong responded that "if you start on the treatment with the oblasics and the nitro I think it would be okay to go to Tripler." The ambulance then proceeded to Tripler. Tripler is located five miles away from Queen's.
The ambulance arrived at Tripler at 12:40 a.m. The patient coded at 12:42 a.m. Hospital personnel at Tripler attempted unsuccessfully to revive Mr. Arrington. He died at 1:17 a.m.
On May 4, 1998, Plaintiffs filed a claim with the Medical Claim Conciliation Panel, State of Hawaii ("MCCP") for exemption from the MCCP filing requirements. Plaintiffs filed a similar motion before this court on July 2, 1998. A decision from the MCCP is pending resolution of the issue in this court.
Plaintiffs filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii on May 4, 1998 against the following Defendants: Dr. Wong; his physicians group, The Emergency Group, Inc.; The Queen's Medical Center; the City and County of Honolulu as operators of the ambulance service; and Clarence Uyema and Jerry Ho, emergency medical technicians attending Mr. Arrington in the ambulance. Plaintiffs assert federal subject matter jurisdiction arising under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, a subsection of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub.L. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986) ("COBRA").
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, filed on May 18, 1998, alleges violation of EMTALA, as well as state law claims for negligence and/or breach of warranty arising from the ambulance transfer of Mr. Arrington on May 5, 1996. Plaintiffs claim to have suffered, among other things, mental distress, loss of consortium, and loss of earnings. Plaintiffs seek general, special, and punitive damages, remedies available under EMTALA, as well as interest, attorney's fees and costs.
Defendants Dr. Wong and The Emergency Group filed a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. On the same day, June 26, 1998, Defendant The Queen's Medical Center filed a separate Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On July 6, 1998, Defendants City and County of Honolulu, Clarence Uyema and Jerry Ho filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Because these three motions implicate the same issues, they are treated as one for purposes of this Order.
A motion to dismiss will be granted where the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiff "would be entitled to no relief under any set of facts that could be proved." Fidelity Fin. Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 792 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1064, 107 S.Ct. 949, 93 L.Ed.2d 998 (1987); Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 766 F.Supp. 830, 831 (N.D.Cal.1991). All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Stender, 766 F.Supp. at 831.
Pursuant to a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court may receive among the forms of competent evidence affidavits to resolve any factual dispute. Biotics Research Corp. v. Heckler, 710 F.2d 1375, 1379 (9th Cir.1983). The consideration of such evidence does not convert a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Id.
Under Rule 12(h)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[a] defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ... may be made ... by motion for judgment on the pleadings[.]" Judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that it is entitled to prevail. Doleman v. Meiji Mut. Life Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir.1984). Thus, the movant must show that 1) no material issue of fact remains to be resolved; and 2) it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all allegations of fact of the opposing party are accepted by the court as true. Id.
In 1986, Congress enacted the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, commonly known as the "Patient Anti-Dumping Act," in response to a growing concern about the provision of adequate emergency room medical services to individuals who seek care, particularly as to the indigent and uninsured. H.R.Rep. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 726-27. "Congress was concerned that hospitals were "dumping" patients who were unable to pay, by either refusing to provide emergency medical treatment or transferring patients before their conditions were stabilized." Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1995).
The two relevant provisions of EMTALA provide the following:
(a) Medical screening requirement. In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if any individual ... comes to the emergency department and a request is made on the individual's behalf for examination or treatment for a medical condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital's emergency department ... to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition ... exists.
(b) Necessary stabilizing treatment for emergency medical conditions and labor.
(1) In general. If any individual ... comes to a hospital and the hospital determines that the individual has an emergency medical condition, the hospital must provide either-
(A) within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, for such further medical examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition, or
(B) for transfer of the individual to another medical facility in accordance with subsection (c)
To overcome a motion to dismiss under EMTALA, a plaintiff must allege that: 1) plaintiff went to defendant's emergency room; 2) with an emergency medical condition; and either the hospital 3) did not adequately screen him or her to determine whether he or she had such a condition, or 4) discharged or transferred him or her prior to stabilization of the medical condition. See Miller v. Medical Center of Southwest Louisiana, 22 F.3d 626, 630 fn. 8 (5th Cir.1994); Ruiz v. Kepler, 832 F.Supp. 1444, 1447 (D.N.M.1993); Huckaby v. East Ala. Medical Ctr., 830 F.Supp. 1399, 1402 (M.D.Ala. 1993).
Plaintiffs have failed to meet this standard because it is...
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